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Member of the Commission with special responsibility 
for competition policy 
Last year's Competition Report ushered in a new 
form of introduction which afforded me the op-
portunity of raising issues that transcended pre-
sent-day concerns and turned competition policy 
towards broader horizons. This innovation was, I 
know, well received and I have decided to contin-
ue in the same vein. Heeding the oft-repeated call 
of the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee, I propose this year to turn the 
spotlight on to our international activities because 
of the increasing importance of the international 
dimension to the competition rules that the Com-
mission is enforcing. 
I would like, in particular, to highlight the desir-
ability of enhanced international cooperation be-
tween competition law enforcement authorities. 
To date, such cooperation has been largely con-
fined to bilateral arrangements, many of which are 
proving very effective. In the long run, however, I 
believe that the desirability, even the necessity, of 
also putting in place a multilateral framework en-
suring the observance of certain basic competition 
principles will be widely recognised. This would 
guarantee that the impressive progress which has 
been made in trade liberalisation over the past few 
decades is not undermined by a failure to deal ef-
fectively with anticompetitive behaviour by firms 
competing in the global economy. 
Globalisation and the threat posed 
by anticompetitive practices 
The ever-increasing integration of the world econ-
omy is creating an unprecedented inter-depen-
dence between countries. Over the past decade, 
with the successful conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round, we have seen an acceleration in the pro-
gressive dismantling of trade barriers. Business is 
taking advantage of this openness, and there has 
been a huge growth in the volume of trade. In many 
industries, companies are competing in worldwide 
markets, and are becoming larger and multination-
al as a result. The past year has seen a series of so-
called 'mega-mergers' between companies based 
in different parts of the world, creating new corpo-
rations of truly global dimensions. Where compa-
nies are not already present in several countries, 
they often form strategic alliances which enable 
them to penetrate foreign markets together with in-
ternational partners. This is particularly true in 
high-technology sectors such as the telecommuni-
cations, information technology, entertainment, 
air transport and pharmaceutical industries. The 
Commission has had to keep pace with the increas-
ing globalisation of markets and, to an increasing 
extent, its analyses of competition problems take 
into account market data from outside the Euro-
pean Union. 
It is not surprising to find that, in these circum-
stances, competition problems are also taking on 
global dimensions. Anticompetitive behaviour, in-
cluding restrictive arrangements between compa-
nies and abuses of market dominance, does not re-
spect borders. The emergence of ever-larger multi-
national companies, with the technological means 
and resources to do business on a global level, 
brings with it the danger that they may be tempted 
to take measures — either unilaterally or in collu-
sion with other firms—which restrict competition 
or abuse their market power on these global mar-
kets. If such anticompetitive behaviour is allowed 
to go unchecked, it is no exaggeration to say that 
many of the benefits that have been achieved in 
terms of opening markets across the globe could be 
negated. The enhanced opportunities which trade 
liberalisation has provided for the interpénétration 
of markets around the world could very well be se-
riously undermined by restrictive commercial be-
haviour. Such practices may be resorted to by com-
panies seeking to protect their traditional, often na-
tional, markets from foreign competitors. 
The need for cooperation in 
enforcement 
The removal of barriers to market integration 
resulting from anticompetitive commercial prac-
tices is nothing new for the European Union. Since 1958, the Community's competition rules 
have served as an indispensable tool in carrying 
out the task of creating a single European market, 
and in helping to ensure that it becomes and 
remains a reality. In the absence of such control 
over restrictive and abusive behaviour by com-
panies, or without merger control, national mar-
kets would remain much more difficult for new-
comers from both inside and outside the Com-
munity to penetrate. Where such practices are 
carried on outside the Community, however, 
combating them is much more complicated. 
National or regional competition authorities are 
ill-equipped to grapple with the problems posed 
by commercial behaviour occurring beyond 
their borders. Information may be difficult to 
obtain, and decisions, once taken, may be im-
possible to enforce. Although new competition 
legislation has been introduced in many coun-
tries in recent years, some behaviour might not 
be unlawful in the country where it is being car-
ried out, or the authorities there may be unwill-
ing to condemn it. Alternatively, incoherent or 
even directly contradictory conclusions might 
be reached by different enforcement authorities, 
both of which may claim jurisdiction over the 
same subject matter. Such divergent treatment 
not only entails the risk of precipitating a dis-
pute between countries or trading blocks, as was 
illustrated by the initial disagreement between 
the US and the EU over the proposed Boe-
ing/MDD merger last year, but is also a source 
of considerable uncertainty and cost for compa-
nies engaging in global transactions. 
It is clear, therefore, that cooperation is necessary 
in order to deal effectively with competition 
problems which have transnational characteris-
tics. There is already a degree of bilateral coop-
eration between authorities and there is reason 
for optimism that this will continue apace. In 
order for such cooperation to be effective, how-
ever, I am convinced that it is necessary not only 
to put in place arrangements regarding the logis-
tics for cooperation, but also that there should be 
some common agreement at the international 
level regarding the content of a basic set of sub-
stantive principles of competition law. 
In my view, the advantages of such cooperation 
will not accrue to the industrialised countries of 
the world alone. Indeed, I believe that developing 
countries can benefit substantially from 
enhanced cooperation of this kind. 1998 has been 
a year of turmoil and uncertainty for many of the 
world's 'emerging' economies, particularly in 
Asia. It is generally accepted that one of the main 
causes of the problems experienced by these 
economies is the lack of genuine market open-
ness. So-called 'crony capitalism' meant that 
competition between firms was very often fore-
gone in favour of opaque arrangements which 
have little to do with market forces. I am con-
vinced that the pursuit of a robust competition 
policy, at both the national and the international 
level, would provide an important antidote to 
such tendencies by promoting the competitive-
ness of industry, decentralising commercial deci-
sion-making, fostering innovation and maximis-
ing consumer welfare. 
These issues were considered in 1994 by a group 
including three independent experts who, at my 
request, made a number of recommendations 
regarding the European Union's competition pol-
icy objectives in the post-Uruguay Round era. 
They compiled a report which recommended that 
efforts should in the future be made on two par-
allel fronts: firstly, to further extend the Com-
mission's bilateral cooperation with third coun-
tries; and, secondly, to develop a multilateral 
framework ensuring compliance with certain 
basic competition rules by all countries involved. 
Bilateral cooperation with the United 
States and Canada 
The European Union has in recent years been 
actively advancing bilateral cooperation in the 
field of competition with its main trading part-
ners. The best example of such cooperation is 
provided by the agreements concluded with the 
USA, the first of which was concluded in 1991 
and entered into force in 1995. When this first 
agreement was conceived, the EU and the USA 
were witnessing a rapid growth in the number 
and importance of transatlantic commercial 
transactions and, at the same time, coming to 
recognise the dangers posed by the emergence of 
cross-border anticompetitive practices. There 
was consequently a common recognition of the 
importance of avoiding conflicting decisions, 
and of coordinating enforcement activities to the 
extent that this would be mutually beneficial. 
In substance, the agreement was designed to facil-
itate logistical cooperation between the Commis-
sion, on the one hand, and the US Department of FOREWORD BY MR KAREL VAN MIERT 
Justice or Federal Trade Commission, on the oth-
er. It provides for: the reciprocal notification of 
cases under investigation by either authority, 
where those cases may affect the important inter-
ests of the other party; the exchange of non-confi-
dential information between the authorities; the 
possibility of coordination by the two authorities 
of their enforcement activities, and of rendering 
assistance to each other; and, finally, the possibil-
ity for one authority to request the other to take en-
forcement action (positive comity), and for one 
authority to take into account the important inter-
ests of the other party in the course of its enforce-
ment activities (traditional comity). 
This amounts to a commitment by the EU and the 
USA to cooperate with respect to antitrust 
enforcement, and not to act unilaterally and 
extraterritorially unless the avenues provided by 
comity have been exhausted. This commitment 
has been strengthened by the positive comity 
agreement concluded with the US in 1998, which 
further reinforced the provisions contained in the 
1991 accord. The new agreement provides that 
each party's respective authority will normally 
defer or suspend its enforcement activities in 
respect of anticompetitive practices which occur 
principally in, and are directed principally 
towards, the other party's territory, where that 
other party is prepared to deal with the matter. 
The Commission's experience in operating the 
agreement with the US since 1991 has demon-
strated that such cooperation can be highly effec-
tive, substantially reducing the risk of divergent 
or incoherent rulings. Cooperation to date has 
helped to build confidence between the Commis-
sion and the US competition authorities, and has 
facilitated an increasingly convergent approach 
towards the analysis of markets and regarding 
appropriate remedies. The year 1998 saw an 
intensification of this transatlantic cooperation 
including, for example, the closely coordinated 
parallel investigations of the WorldCom/MCI 
and Dresser/Haliburton mergers. 
The Commission has finalised a bilateral agree-
ment with the Canadian Government which is 
closely analogous to the 1991 EU-US agree-
ment. It is expected that it will be adopted during 
the course of 1999. It is also worth noting that 
similar cooperative arrangements also exist 
between some other countries, for example 
between the USA and Canada, and between Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. 
Bilateral cooperation with a view 
to enlargement 
The EU has entered into bilateral arrangements 
regarding competition of a somewhat different 
kind with the countries of central and eastern 
Europe. The demise of the eastern bloc has pro-
vided us with an unprecedented opportunity to 
heal the wounds of our continent and to assist in 
the transition from command to market 
economies, an essential aspect of which process 
involves the introduction of a functional compe-
tition policy. The Community has since devel-
oped close relationships with the central and east 
European countries, including the Baltic States, 
and the so-called 'Europe agreements' are aimed 
at paving the way for future membership of the 
EU. The same applies to Cyprus and Malta, can-
didates for membership with which the Commu-
nity has concluded association agreements. The 
harmonisation of competition rules — including 
those governing State aid — is an important fea-
ture of these agreements, and hence of the Com-
munity's pre-accession strategy with respect to 
these countries. Enforcement bodies are also 
expected to be put in place. In line with the same 
logic as applies within the Community, the com-
petition rules are considered necessary to ensure 
that the elimination of trade barriers between 
countries should not be circumvented by anti-
competitive commercial conduct and State mea-
sures producing the same effects. 
Progress in relation to the adoption of antitrust 
rules and the establishment of appropriate com-
petition enforcement authorities is, in my view, 
promising. There still remains considerable work 
to be done, however, in relation to the introduc-
tion of adequate frameworks for the control of 
State aid. Detailed arrangements have also been 
put in place for cooperation between the Com-
mission and the various enforcement authorities. 
Formal accession negotiations have now begun 
with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Slovenia and Cyprus. 
Bilateral cooperation with other 
countries 
The 1995 Customs Union Agreement with 
Turkey is one of the best examples in recent years 
of a bilateral agreement containing detailed pro-
visions dealing with competition and State aid. 
Free trade agreements concluded between the Community and third countries, such as the asso-
ciation agreements concluded over the last few 
years with several Mediterranean countries, have 
also usually included such provisions. The Com-
munity has recently concluded a series of so-
called partnership and cooperation agreements 
(PCAs) with Russia, Ukraine, and several of the 
other ex-Soviet States. These agreements, while 
less ambitious than the Europe agreements, none 
the less involve a commitment by these countries 
to move progressively towards an approximation 
of their competition and State aid legislation with 
that of the Community. There is as yet no formal 
bilateral framework for the Community's coop-
eration in the field of competition with its other 
principal trading partners, most notably Japan. 
Notwithstanding this, regular contacts — includ-
ing an annual high-level bilateral meeting and the 
reciprocal notification of cases affecting each 
other's important interests — take place between 
the Commission and the Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission. 
Multilateral cooperation — the need 
for a new worldwide framework 
In spite of the considerable progress that has been 
made at the bilateral level, however, the fact must 
be faced that arrangements for international 
cooperation in competition policy based solely 
on a bilateral approach entail major shortcom-
ings. In particular, it is evident that bilateral coop-
eration will inevitably only take into account the 
interests of the countries involved and, as a result, 
the interests of third countries are likely to be 
neglected. Moreover, many countries still have 
no competition legislation at all. Despite a 
marked increase in enthusiasm for introducing 
competition rules over the past decade, still only 
about half the World Trade Organisation's mem-
ber countries have competition laws. The sub-
stance of these rules, and the zeal with which they 
are enforced in the various countries, also show 
considerable divergence. 
The OECD's 1995 recommendation concerning 
competition cooperation, and the recommenda-
tion on 'hardcore' cartels which it adopted earlier 
this year, represent important guidelines for the 
shape which bilateral cooperation should take, 
particularly when several member countries are 
grappling with the threat posed by an interna-
tional cartel. The recommendations are 
addressed only to OECD member countries, 
however, and are not binding even on them. Nor 
are the current WTO rules adequate for dealing 
with competition problems. The WTO panel's 
ruling in April 1998 on the dispute between the 
USA and Japan, which involved allegations of 
anticompetitive behaviour by Fuji aimed at deny-
ing its US rival Kodak access to the Japanese 
market for photographic film and paper, provided 
a clear illustration of this inadequacy. 
I am therefore convinced that a comprehensive 
worldwide multilateral framework, providing for 
the application of a basic set of common competi-
tion rules, needs to be established as a necessary 
complement to trade liberalisation. Because of 
this complementary relationship between trade 
and competition policy, the WTO would appear to 
be the multilateral organisation best suited to 
house such a framework. The idea of creating a 
supranational structure of this kind was the sub-
ject of a Commission communication to the Coun-
cil in 1996, which proposed that the WTO should 
set up a working group with a remit to explore the 
desirability of going down that path. This propos-
al, which was endorsed by the Council, provided 
the principal inspiration for the ministerial deci-
sion, taken in Singapore in December 1996, to es-
tablish a WTO working group to study the interac-
tion between trade and competition policy. This 
group has already met on a number of occasions 
and will continue its deliberations in 1999. Al-
though the degree of interest shown by both the in-
dustrialised and the developing countries (includ-
ing some countries which have no domestic com-
petition rules) in the discussions is very encourag-
ing, it is too early to say whether they will ulti-
mately lead to the launching of formal negotia-
tions between the members of the WTO. It is very 
much my hope that they will, as part of the next 
round of multilateral negotiations. 
Such negotiations could focus on the following 
four proposals for possible agreement: firstly, the 
members could agree to each adopt domestic 
competition rules, and to the establishment of ap-
propriate enforcement bodies. This would mean 
the adoption of basic rules for dealing with restric-
tive business practices, abuse of market power and 
mergers, together with adequate enforcement pro-
visions, and a right of access for companies to the 
enforcement authorities and courts. Secondly, the 
members could at the same time agree on a com-
mon set of core principles for addressing anticom-
petitive practices with an international dimension. 
Initially, it would seem reasonable to concentrate FOREWORD BY MR KAREL VAN MIERT 
on practices whose harmful nature is generally 
recognised — in particular horizontal restrictions 
such as price and output fixing, market sharing, 
bid rigging and export cartels. Agreement on oth-
er practices, such as abuse of market power and 
vertical restraints may prove more difficult, but 
could be envisaged in the longer term. Thirdly, the 
elements of an instrument for multilateral cooper-
ation could also be developed. This would be de-
signed to facilitate cooperation between enforce-
ment authorities, and could include provision for 
consultation, avoidance of conflicts, exchanges of 
non-confidential information, reciprocal notifica-
tion and comity. Finally, it would also seem logi-
cal to provide for a mechanism to enable the set-
tlement of disputes in clearly specified circum-
stances. This could involve the adaptation of the 
present dispute mechanism of the WTO to that 
purpose by, for example, ensuring that patterns of 
failure to enforce competition law affecting trade 
between member countries are dealt with. To ex-
tend such a mechanism to settlement in individual 
cases, however, would not be appropriate. 
These proposals should not be interpreted as a 
call for the establishment of a new international 
organisation, with its own powers of investiga-
tion and enforcement. Rather, they are intended 
to form a basis for the creation of a new multilat-
eral framework whose purpose would be to 
strengthen the world trading system by ensuring 
that liberalisation and market access are not cir-
cumvented by anticompetitive commercial prac-
tices. With that objective in mind, I believe that 
the proposals are modest, but reasonable and 
coherent, and likely to prove effective in grap-
pling with one of the most important challenges 
faced by the economies of the world as the new 
millennium approaches. 
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12 INTRODUCTION 
1. In 1998, the last year before the Union 
changed over to the single currency, the Commis­
sion naturally had to make every effort to ensure 
that the economic environment into which the 
euro was born was a healthy and vigorous one. 
Competition policy contributed to this process 
within its own sphere and within the limits of its 
own resources. The Commission worked in two 
main directions here. First, it sought to underpin 
and consolidate the operation of the single market, 
by improving market structures and taking firm 
action against anticompetitive practices, so as to 
provide a sound and healthy basis for economic 
and monetary union. Second, it took decisive 
steps towards the modernisation of Community 
competition law. Thus at the end of September it 
issued a communication on the application of the 
Community competition rules to vertical re­
straints. At the end of November the new proce­
dural regulation for State aid secured agreement in 
principle from the Council, and this should clear 
the way for its adoption in the course of 1999. 
Throughout the year the Commission sought to 
strengthen links with competition authorities out­
side the Union; the international dimension has 
now become a constant in its work ( ' ). 
1. Competition policy: defending 
and facilitating the single market 
2. This was a very satisfactory y ear for Commis­
sion competition policy. The Commission clearly 
demonstrated its determination to use competition 
policy to defend and facilitate the single market in 
the run-up to economic and monetary union. It im­
posed severe penalties in a number of exemplary 
cases. It also took the first steps in what is intend­
ed to be a series of measures aimed at focusing the 
supervisory work of its departments on those cas­
es where the Community interest is manifest. 
1.1. Invigorating the single market 
3. The Commission sought to consolidate the 
single market and to fend off attempts by firms to 
set artificial bounds to its development. 
It exercised particular vigilance with regard to 
practices that tend to partition markets. It fined 
the motor manufacturer Volkswagen ECU 102 
( ' ι International cooperation is not discussed here as it already forms 
the subject matter of Mr Van Mien's foreword. 
million for obstructing trade within the Commu­
nity by preventing its Italian dealers from selling 
Volkswagen and Audi cars to foreign customers. 
It also penalised the abuse of a dominant position 
by the Italian Amministrazione Autonoma dei 
Monopoli dello Stato, which had been favouring 
the cigarettes it manufactured itself over ciga­
rettes manufactured abroad. 
In the same spirit it continued the fight against 
price cartels, in order to counter their inflationary 
effects and to ensure that competition could oper­
ate efficiently. It prohibited several restrictive 
practices and imposed heavy fines on firms that 
had been taking part. There were cases of this 
kind in areas such as stainless steel, sugar, district 
heating pipes and sea transport. The fines 
imposed totalled ECU 178.83 million. 
Discriminatory abuses of dominant positions are 
likewise practices which weaken the health of the 
single market, because they inhibit the develop­
ment of firms that find themselves dependent on 
the dominant company and of others that might 
wish to enter a particular market, such as a net­
work industry that may be in the process of liber­
alisation. The Commission acted against such 
abuse in several cases, for example in air and sea 
transport. 
If the single market is to work properly its struc­
tures must continue to be flexible and open, so 
that the interplay of competitive forces can be as 
effective as possible. The Commission banned 
mergers between Bertelsmann, Kirch and Pre­
miere and between Deutsche Telekom and 
BetaResearch on the grounds that they would 
have established structures for digital television 
in Germany in which the parties would have held 
dominant or indeed monopolistic positions on 
several markets. It authorised several transac­
tions on condition that the firms involved com­
plied with undertakings they had given which 
would ensure that sufficient competition was 
maintained on the relevant markets. 
The monitoring of State aid also makes a major 
contribution to this effort to assist the develop­
ment of the single market. The Commission takes 
the view that unjustified State aid leads to market 
distortion and inefficient resource allocation. The 
effect is to increase barriers to trade and hence 
put at risk the achievements of the single market. 
The continuing disparities in the levels of aid 
between Member States jeopardise the objective  13 of economic and social cohesion. The Commis-
sion therefore continued the strict exercise of its 
responsibility to control State aid. The number of 
cases it had to decide decreased, but unfortu-
nately remained high. A sizeable proportion of 
cases (about 20 %) were cases where Member 
States failed to comply with the obligation to 
notify new aid measures to the Commission. This 
confirmed the Commission in its view that it 
must consistently order the recovery of non-noti-
fied aid that is incompatible with the Treaty. 
Without such a practice, Member States would 
not have sufficient incentive to observe their pro-
cedural obligations. Major aid cases concerned 
additional aid to Crédit Lyonnais (between ECU 
8 billion and ECU 15 billion, which is quite 
unprecedented) and the aid package for the con-
struction of the Channel Tunnel rail link. This lat-
ter case is exemplary in addressing the implica-
tions of the construction and provision of trans-
port infrastructure by private investors. 
All these Commission decisions are directed 
towards the same objective, namely consolidat-
ing the single market, which is the foundation of 
economic and monetary union. But the somewhat 
severe picture conveyed by this brief review 
should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the 
great majority of agreements, mergers and State 
aid measures notified to the Commission in 1998 
were the subject of positive decisions. 
owing to a drop in the number of State aid cases. 
In conventional antitrust cases the number of 
notifications is tending to stabilise, which is an 
encouraging development, and is no doubt partly 
the result of the new de minimis notice. The num-
ber of complaints lodged with the Commission 
continues to be high. The explosion in merger 
notifications which the Commission had 
expected as a result of the revision of the merger 
regulation (Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89), and 
more especially the new powers which that regu-
lation gives to the Commission in respect of 
cross-border transactions, did not in fact materi-
alise; but the total number of transactions notified 
under the regulation nevertheless rose by 36 %, 
or 5 points more than in 1997, when the corre-
sponding figure was 31%. This increase has to be 
seen against the background of the current inter-
national environment, which tends to encourage 
mergers, and of the girding-up of markets for 
economic and monetary union. The total number 
of new State aid cases over the year showed a 
spectacular fall by comparison with 1997, down 
32 %, taking it lower than it has been in the last 
three years. The number of cases terminated was 
1 279, comprising 581 under Articles 81 and 82, 
238 mergers and 460 State aid measures; this is 
an increase of 119 cases closed by comparison 
with last year. These figures bear witness to the 
Commission's desire to speed up the handling of 
cases wherever possible. 
1.2. Refocusing the Commission's 
supervisory work 
4. One of the main aims of modernising compe-
tition law and Commission practice is to allow the 
Commission departments to concentrate on those 
cases where the Community interest is manifest. 
This intention was clearly announced in 1997, 
with the first package of initiatives, namely the de 
minimis notice and the notice on cooperation be-
tween Community and national competition au-
thorities. At the end of 1998 the results were en-
couraging, but did not go far enough. 
5. There was intense supervisory activity once 
again in 1998, in all the Commission's spheres of 
responsibility. The total number of new cases was 
1 198, comprising 509 under Articles 81, 82 or 
86, 245 mergers (') and 444 State aid cases; this 
total was down substantially on 1997, by 134, 
14  (') Including 10 ECSC decisions. 
2. Modernisation of competition law 
6. The Commission took a further step in its 
policy of modernisation when it published its 
communication on vertical restraints. The year 
also saw the adoption of the regulation empow-
ering the Commission to declare block exemp-
tions for certain types of State aid, and the secur-
ing of agreement in principle to the procedural 
regulation, which came at the Council meeting on 
industrial affairs on 16 November. 
2.1. Antitrust policy 
7. The communication from the Commission 
on the application of the Community competition 
rules to vertical restraints, which was approved 
on 30 September, is in many ways a major inno-
vation in the Commission's approach to antitrust 
policy. It breaks with a method which was differ-
entiated by industry and category of agreement, 
and had become extremely complex. It is based INTRODUCTION 
on the economic analysis of the effects of verti-
cal restraints; exemption is to depend on the mar-
ket power of the firms involved. Simplification of 
procedures, realistic analysis and greater 
involvement of courts and competition authori-
ties in the Member States are the fundamental 
principles of the Commission's new approach, 
and will continue to guide it in the months ahead. 
8. The general idea is that there should be a single 
and very broad block exemption regulation cover-
ing all vertical restrictions of competition in re-
spect of all intermediate and finished goods and all 
services. Alimi ted number of restrictions would be 
excluded, such as price-fixing agreements for ex-
ample. These would form a 'black list' of clauses 
that were not exempted by the regulation. The reg-
ulation would not seek to list the clauses that were 
exempted, as is done in the block exemption regu-
lations currently in force, and this would immedi-
ately remove the straitjacket effect associated with 
the present 'white lists', which incite firms to force 
their agreements into a mould provided by the rel-
evant block exemption regulation. 
9. The main objective of this wide-ranging and 
flexible exemption regulation would be to give a 
measure of freedom and legal certainty to the large 
number of firms that do not possess market power. 
Within the limits thus mapped out they would not 
have to be concerned for the validity of their 
agreements under Community law. To preserve 
competition on markets, and to confine the benefit 
of the exemption to firms with no great market 
power, the regulation would lay down market 
share thresholds beyond which the block exemp-
tion would no longer apply. The fact that these 
thresholds were exceeded would not mean that the 
agreements were necessarily unlawful, but only 
that they would have to be examined for compati-
bility on an individual basis. 
10. To help firms see what sort of analysis they 
have to carry out in order to establish that their 
agreements are compatible with Article 81(1) and 
(3), the Commission intends to publish guide-
lines which would supplement the legislative 
provision in the new regulation. 
11. To pursue this policy the Commission will 
have to obtain new legislative powers from the 
Council. The Commission has submitted a pro-
posal for a Council regulation amending Regula-
tion No 19/65/EEC so as to authorise the Com-
mission to adopt a block exemption regulation of 
the new type. The Commission has also put for-
ward a proposal to amend Council Regulation 
No 17 of 6 February 1962 so as to enlarge the 
scope of the exemption from notification laid 
down in Article 4(2). 
2.2. State aid 
12. In 1998 the Commission pressed forward 
with the measures it had launched in autumn 1996 
for the reorientation and modernisation of State 
aid monitoring. The aim of the initiative is to im-
prove transparency and legal certainty by simpli-
fying and clarifying the procedural rules, and to 
improve the efficiency of the State aid monitoring 
system for less significant cases. Given the high 
number of aid measures the Commission has to as-
sess, it must inevitably concentrate on major cases 
involving large amounts of aid or new legal issues. 
This necessity is underlined notably by the grow-
ing number of individual ad hoc aid measures, 
where intensities are often very high. 
13. As an important step in the exercise of mod-
ernising State aid monitoring, the Council reached 
political agreement, pending receipt of the Euro-
pean Parliament's opinion, on a Commission pro-
posal for a procedural regulation. This regulation 
will clearly define the procedural steps to be ob-
served by the Commission and Member States in 
the application of Article 88 of the Treaty, notably 
concerning time limits, injunctions, and recovery 
of incompatible aid. The Council formally adopt-
ed the proposal for a regulation enabling the Com-
mission to exempt certain categories of horizontal 
State aid from the notification requirement. Ex-
emption regulations of this kind should simplify 
procedures by relieving the Commission of the as-
sessment of numerous aid cases where there is no 
major risk of competition being distorted. 
14. The Commission also took other steps to 
clarify its assessment of aid measures. The multi-
sectoral framework on regional aid for large in-
vestment projects entered into force on 1 Septem-
ber. The Commission adopted a framework on 
training aid. The Council adopted a regulation es-
tablishing new rules on aid to shipbuilding, re-
placing the seventh directive; this had become 
necessary because the United States had failed to 
ratify the OECD shipbuilding agreement. Finally, 
the Commission issued a notice explaining its new 
approach towards assessing possible aid elements 
in direct business taxation in the Member States. 
This move runs parallel to the efforts of Member 
States within the Code of Conduct Group to put an 
end to harmful tax competition.  15 16 
3. The liberalisation process 
75. Another component in the policy of con-
solidation of the single market is the continuing 
process of liberalisation in the network industries 
which were formerly public monopolies. The 
opening-up of the sectors associated with the 
information society or the production and distri-
bution of energy is-vital to the competitiveness of 
European industry and the dynamism of the sin-
gle market. It provides an incentive for the devel-
opment of technological innovation, and pro-
motes the creation of new, stable and durable 
employment. 
3.1. Telecommunications 
16. Telecommunications moved over to full 
liberalisation on 1 January, and the Commission 
was particularly active in this sphere. 
17. In the first few months of the year the Com-
mission supplemented the body of aids to inter-
pretation by adopting a notice on the status of 
voice communication on the Internet and a notice 
on the application of the competition rules to 
access agreements in the telecommunications 
sector. In this latter notice the Commission 
among other things said it wanted to see most 
cases dealt with by the regulatory authorities in 
the Member States and, if need be, by the national 
competition authorities, and to have to intervene 
itself only where necessary. 
18. The Commission has set up a joint fol-
low-up team with representation from the Direc-
torates-General responsible for competition and 
for telecommunications. In the course of the year 
it published two reports on the implementation 
by the Member States of the telecommunications 
liberalisation and harmonisation directives. The 
reports give a broadly encouraging picture of the 
process under way in the Union. In all Member 
States apart from Greece and Portugal, which 
benefit from derogations until 2000, new opera-
tors have been authorised to supply voice tele-
phony services or to establish and operate public 
telecommunications networks in competition 
with the existing operator. The Commission has 
nevertheless observed that some shortcomings 
continue. At the beginning of 1998 infringement 
proceedings were in progress in 35 cases. But the 
Commission terminated several of these after the 
Member State concerned took appropriate steps. 
19. The Commission continues to check the 
conformity with the Treaty of national measures 
governing interconnection, the concept of uni-
versal service, the methods of calculating the cost 
and financing of universal service, and the pro-
cedures and conditions for the granting of autho-
risation, in order to ensure that these measures do 
not place barriers in the way of new entrants. 
20. All of these measures are intended to 
ensure the success of the process of liberalisation, 
which has aroused great enthusiasm among busi-
ness people. Across the Community more than 
500 licences for access to the local loop had been 
granted by the end of February. The spectacular 
development of mobile telephony which has 
been encouraged by free competition has not 
come to an end. The Commission will of course 
support it, particularly as the prospects held out 
by the combined effect of mobile telephony, 
satellite links and the Internet are promising in 
terms of growth. 
3.2. Energy 
21. The Member States approved the directive 
opening up the Community market in natural gas 
at the Council meeting on energy on 11 May; this 
completed the process of liberalising the energy 
sector, which began with the directive on the sin-
gle market in electricity. The new directive estab-
lishes common rules for the transmission, distri-
bution, supply and storage of natural gas; it lays 
down rules on access to the market, the operation 
of systems, and the criteria and procedures 
applicable to the granting of authorisations for 
the construction and operation of natural gas 
facilities. 
22. The market is to be opened up in respect of 
at least 20 % of the total annual gas consumption 
of each national gas market as soon as the direc-
tive is transposed into national law, that is to say 
in 2000; this minimum is to rise to 28 % within 
five years and 33 % within 10 years. At the same 
time the category of natural gas customers enti-
tled to negotiate their own supply contracts with 
the supplier of their choice is to be gradually 
widened. 
For the organisation of access to the system, 
Member States may choose either or both of two 
procedures, known as negotiated access and reg-
ulated access. Both must operate in accordance 
with objective, transparent and non-discrimina-INTRODUCTION 
tory criteria. Upstream pipelines are as a general culty asaresult of liberalisation.Thedirective also 
rule to be open too, but the procedure here is to provides for derogation where a Member State is 
be determined by the particular Member State. not directly connected to the system of any other 
Member State and has only one external supplier, 
23. The Commission may allow certain deroga- for emerging markets and regions in Greece and 
tions where companies which have concluded Portugal, and for areas where the gas infrastructure 
'take-or-pay' gas-supply contracts encounter diffi- is still being developed. 
Box 1: The euro and competition 
In 1998, the preparations for the launch of the euro were successfully finalised. The introduction of the 
euro will have a profound impact on competition in Europe. In general, economic and monetary union 
(EMU) will intensify competition for three reasons: 
First, it will reinforce the positive effects of the single market programme. The single market has had a 
pro-competitive impact by integrating markets effectively and making the relevant markets broader. The 
euro should enhance this effect because, for trade between the participating Member States, it will elimi-
nate exchange rate risk and the transaction costs associated with converting one currency into another. As 
a consequence, trade flows are likely to increase. Whereas the effects of the single market programme were 
mainly concentrated on certain manufacturing sectors which had hitherto been protected by high non-tar-
iff barriers, the euro is likely to affect a wide range of sectors, including notably financial services and dis-
tribution. In particular, the markets for many financial services, which are at present national because of 
the existence of separate currencies, will gradually be widened to cover the whole euro zone. 
The broadening of geographic markets offers new opportunities to exploit economies of scale and will lead 
to an increase in merger and acquisition activity. This will be true especially for industries where sales net-
works have previously been confined largely within national boundaries, and where companies see 
prospects of obtaining major cost savings by enlarging these to a European scale. On the other hand, com-
petition will expose the weaknesses of less efficient companies, which will become vulnerable to takeover 
bids. In general, the restructuring arising from EMU will pose no competition problems and should enhance 
the overall efficiency of the Community economy. Provided that market entry is easy, no major competi-
tion problems should result from the reduction in the total number of firms as inefficient firms exit and 
more efficient firms expand. Although the number of domestic suppliers in any local market should fall, 
the total number of actual or potential competitors in that market should increase after it has been incor-
porated into a wider geographic market. 
Secondly, EMU will increase price transparency. After the introduction of the euro, the greater ease with 
which prices in different countries can be compared will mainly affect those sectors where price disper-
sion between Member States is high and not due to structural causes such as differences in consumer tastes 
and indirect taxation, but rather to the market-segmentation strategies of firms. Certain consumer durables 
sectors, such as motor vehicles, are likely to be particularly strongly affected by increased price trans-
parency, since each purchase represents a high proportion of the consumer's total expenditure. For such 
products the potential savings which the consumer can achieve by cross-border purchasing can easily out-
weigh the additional costs which he incurs. 
Thirdly, the impact of the euro on the market for corporate equity will have repercussions on competition 
in products and services. EMU will reduce the cost of capital, which could lead to an increase in the num-
ber of mergers. New financing techniques and markets can be put to work for a new generation of EU entre-
preneurs, thus facilitating market entry. Therefore, in principle, the change in the market for capital should 
further increase the pro-competitive impact of EMU. 
17 In the context of this overall pro-competitive impact of EMU, competition policy has an important role to 
play in safeguarding or enhancing the flexibility of product and service markets. Companies which are able 
to protect themselves through anticompetitive behaviour against competitive pressures are likely to be less 
efficient and innovative and hence less well able to adapt in the event of macroeconomic shocks. 
Some companies will inevitably experience difficulties as a result of more intense competition. Conse-
quently, Member States are likely to experience strong pressure to protect these companies by means of 
State aid, notably rescue and restructuring aid. Such aid can lead to serious distortion of competition at the 
expense of more efficient companies. 
The potential for increased competition could also lead to attempts by companies to find ways to reduce 
the actual level of competition. For example, increased price transparency will create further incentives for 
parallel trade, but will also increase the temptation for companies to create new obstacles to arbitrage. Sim-
ilarly, new competitive threats arising from EMU may induce incumbents to enter into vertical or hori-
zontal agreements with the object of foreclosing rivals' markets, or alternatively to seek State aid. Finally, 
in the longer run, the expected increase in mergers and acquisitions could create oligopolies in some indus-
tries. Companies in these industries could be tempted to reduce the competitive pressure either by engag-
ing in tacit collusion or by forming cartels. This will be made easier as the increased price transparency 
will facilitate the monitoring of competitors' prices. It will also be more difficult to deviate from agreed 
prices and hide this fact behind exchange rate fluctuations. 
Competition policy therefore needs to remain vigilant to ensure that the euro can deliver its full benefits. 
Both Community and national competition policy have a vital role to play in ensuring that product and ser-
vice markets are flexible so that European consumers will truly benefit from the common currency. 
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A — Modernisation of the legislative 
and interpretative rules 
24. For the last two years the Commission has 
been modernising its competition policy to 
ensure that it reflects contemporary economic 
realities and, in particular, to prepare it for the 
challenges of economic and monetary union and 
Community enlargement (')· One of the main 
aims of modernising the rules and practice is to 
ease the administrative burden on firms, particu-
larly those without market power, and to refocus 
the Commission's efforts on cases of clear rele-
vance to Community competition policy. In 
1997, the Council adopted a revised merger reg-
ulation and the Commission adopted several 
notices designed to clarify and modernise its 
practice as regards antitrust legislation. In 1998, 
the Commission took a major step forward when 
it published its communication on vertical 
restraints. 
1. Assessment of the first measures 
to refocus efforts 
25. In 1997 the Commission adopted two 
notices designed to enable its supervisory arm to 
focus efforts on cases with a definite impact on 
competition within the Union. The first was the 
revised notice on agreements of minor impor-
tance which are not deemed to have an apprecia-
ble effect on the functioning of the common mar-
ket, and the second was the notice on cooperation 
between the Commission and national competi-
tion authorities which followed up the notice on 
cooperation with the national courts. These new 
provisions are designed to enable the Commu-
nity's supervisory arm to focus more effectively 
on cases with a definite impact on competition 
within the single market. It is worthwhile draw-
ing up an initial assessment now that these two 
notices have been in force for one year. 
26. As regards Articles 81 and 82, the situation 
in 1998 was virtually identical to that in 1997. 
The number of new cases recorded in 1998 was 
509, as against 499 the previous year (447 in 
1996), and therefore seems to have stabilised. 
The number of notifications has also tailed off, 
although it remains high. The situation is similar 
( ' ) 1997 Competition Report, points 36 to 50. 
as regards complaints and proceedings initiated 
by the Commission. 
27. The stabilisation in the number of notifica-
tions, which fell from 221 in 1997 to 216 in 1998, 
can probably be attributed partly to the provi-
sions which the Commission adopted last year, 
particularly the notice on agreements of minor 
importance. The Commission invoked this notice 
on only about 10 occasions in the course of the 
year. It will probably have encouraged a number 
of firms not to notify agreements of minor impor-
tance and, had it not existed, the number of noti-
fications might well have been higher. Neverthe-
less, the results for the first year of implementa-
tion (a decrease of 0.2 %) are still insufficient. 
28. As regards complaints, the number of 
which was slightly higher than in the previous 
year (192, as against 177 in 1997), the Commis-
sion observes that, whereas some of them are of 
manifest Community relevance and have given 
rise to major decisions like the one on Greek fer-
ries, many of the complaints it receives are not. 
The number of Commission decisions rejecting a 
complaint because it was not of manifest interest 
to the Community is revealing. The Automec 
precedent, which enables the Commission to 
reject complaints of this type, is useful but prob-
ably insufficient. What is needed is an instrument 
to facilitate the rejection procedure. 
29. The number of cases instituted by the Com-
mission on its own initiative was the same in 1998 
as the previous year (101). Most concern a specif-
ic sector, telecommunications, for which full lib-
eralisation came into effect on 1 January. Hence 
close scrutiny by the Commission is necessary. 
30. The notice on cooperation between the 
Commission and national competition authorities 
in handling cases caught by Articles 81 and 82 be-
gan to make itself felt. The Commission rejected 
15 complaints for lack of Community interest; 
these cases were handled by the authority of the 
Member State most affected by the practice com-
plained of. It should also be noted that 89 requests 
for information changed hands between national 
authorities and the Commission regarding cases 
handled by both bodies on a joint basis. Lastly, it 
should be noted that the Commission was consult-
ed on 10 cases handled by the competition author-
ities acting alone and that it encountered three cas-
es of dilatory notification as defined by the notice. 
This first set of instances of application of the no-
tice reflects increased cooperation between Com- 19 munity and national authorities and illustrates 
their common determination to implement Com-
munity antitrust legislation on a decentralised ba-
sis. However, it is clear that even more intensive 
use could be made of this notice. 
31. In any event, the notice on cooperation 
between the Commission and national competi-
tion authorities will not be fully effective until 
work on decentralising implementation of the 
Community competition rules has been com-
pleted. In 1998, in the 15 Member States, only 
eight authorities were in a position to apply Arti-
cles 81(1) and 82 directly, following the adoption 
of specific legislation by the national legislators. 
The countries concerned are Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal and Spain. The Commission hopes that those 
Member States which have not to date adopted 
legislation for the direct implementation of those 
articles will do so at the earliest opportunity. 
However, it should be noted that, when Member 
States revise or adopt national competition law, 
they very often base their work on Community 
law, thereby carrying out voluntary harmonisa-
tion which can only promote the emergence of a 
common legal framework in the European Com-
munity. The Netherlands and the United King-
dom both recently amended their national legis-
lation. The Dutch law is very similar to Articles 
81 and 82, as are the Dutch rules on merger con-
trol (')· The United Kingdom's new Competition 
Act (
2) is essentially based on Articles 81 and 82. 
Section 60 of the Act specifies that, in imple-
menting their national law, the United Kingdom 
authorities must take account of the principles 
and analyses resulting from Commission deci-
sions and Court of Justice case law. 
32. The number of cases closed in 1998 was 
581 (the corresponding figures for 1997 and 1996 
were 517 and 388 respectively). The number of 
formal decisions grew substantially, rising from 
27 in 1997 to 42 in 1998. Of special significance, 
apart from decisions rejecting complaints and 
non-opposition decisions in the transport field, 
were 11 formal decisions based on Articles 81(1) 
and 82, most of which were coupled with fines. 
This increase in the number of cases closed 
reflects a commitment on the Commission's part 
to speed up the handling of antitrust cases. How-
ever, this improvement cannot conceal the slow 
processing of certain cases. On the basis of the 11 
formal decisions referred to above, the average 
length of proceedings was 4 years and 10 months, 
the shortest duration being 2 years and 1 month 
and the longest 8 years. The length of proceed-
ings was essentially due to complex procedures 
which entailed delays. For that reason the Com-
mission reviewed a number of procedural regula-
tions during the year, including Regulation 
No 99/63/EEC on hearings, with a view to 
streamlining and speeding up the processing of 
cases. This streamlining is an ongoing process. 
33. In view of the stabilisation in the number of 
notifications and the development of cooperation 
with national competition authorities, the impact 
of measures to refocus efforts may be described 
as encouraging, even if the results are still limited 
as yet. The review of the policy on vertical 
restraints should allow further progress to be 
made. Nevertheless, the Commission will con-
tinue its work on this subject and will put forward 
new modernisation proposals during 1999. 
2. Communication on the application 
of the Community competition rules 
to vertical restraints 
34. On 30 September the Commission adopted 
a communication on the application of the Com-
munity competition rules to vertical restraints (
3) 
setting out its proposals for reform in this field. 
The Commission also adopted two proposals for 
Council regulations amending, respectively, 
Council Regulation No 19/65/EEC of 2 March 
1965, with a view to granting the Commission 
the necessary legislative powers to implement 
the proposed new policy, and Council Regulation 
No 17 of 6 February 1962, with a view to extend-
ing the waiver from notification provided for in 
Article 4(2) to all vertical agreements. 
35. This communication and the related propos-
als follow the publication of the Commission's 
Green Paper on vertical restraints in EC competi-
tion policy (
4) in January 1997, and the very 
wide-ranging debate that ensued. Subject to the 
adoption of two proposed Council regulations, the 
Commission intends to enact a new type of block 
20 
(') Law of 22 May 1997, which entered into force on 1 January 1998 
(Mededingingswet). 
(
2) Act of 9 November 1998, which will enter into force on I March (
3) COM(1998) 544 final. 
2000. (
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exemption regulation for vertical restraints, com-
plemented by a set of guidelines. New competi-
tion rules for the distribution of goods and services 
should be in place for the year 2000. 
2.1. Outline of the policy proposal 
A more economics-based approach 
36. In its communication, the Commission rec-
ommends a shift from the current policy relying 
on form-based requirements with sector-specific 
rules to a system based on economic effects cover-
ing virtually all sectors of distribution (')- It pro-
poses to achieve this by means of one wide-rang-
ing block exemption regulation that covers all ver-
tical restraints concerning intermediate and final 
goods and services except for a limited number of 
hardcore restraints. It is based mainly on a 'black 
list' approach, i.e. defining what is not exempt un-
der the block exemption instead of defining what 
is exempt. This removes the straitjacket effect, a 
structural flaw inherent in any system which at-
tempts to identify the clauses which are exempt. 
37. The principal objective of such a wide-
ranging and flexible block exemption regulation 
is to grant companies which lack market power, 
and most do, a safe harbour within which it is no 
longer necessary for them to assess the validity of 
their agreements in the light of the EC competi-
tion rules. In order to preserve competition and to 
limit the benefit of this exemption to companies 
which do not have significant market power, the 
future block exemption regulation will make use 
of market share caps to link the exemption to 
market power. 
38. Companies with market shares above the 
thresholds of the block exemption will not be 
covered by the safe harbour. It must, however, be 
stressed that, even in such circumstances, their 
vertical agreements will not be subject to any pre-
sumption of illegality. The market share thresh-
old will serve only to distinguish those agree-
ments which are presumed to be legal from those 
that may require individual examination. To 
assist companies in carrying out such an exami-
nation, the Commission intends to issue a set of 
guidelines basically covering two issues: the 
application of Articles 81(1) and 81(3) above the 
(') The block exemption regulation on car distribution, which expires 
in 2002, is not covered by the current proposal. 
market share threshold and the Commission's 
policy on withdrawal of the benefit of the block 
exemption, particularly in cumulative effect 
cases. In most cases, these guidelines should 
allow companies to make their own assessment 
under Articles 81(1) and 81(3). The objective is 
to reduce enforcement costs for industry and to 
eliminate, as far as possible, notifications of 
agreements that do not give rise to any serious 
competition problem. 
Market share threshold(s) 
39. A choice will have to be made between sys-
tems based on one or two thresholds, an issue 
which is still being discussed. In a two-threshold 
system, the first and main market share figure 
would be 20 %. Below this it would be assumed 
that vertical restraints had no significant net nega-
tive effects and therefore all vertical restraints and 
their combinations, with the exception of hard-
core restraints, would be exempt. Above the 20 % 
threshold, there would be room to exempt certain 
vertical restraints up to a higher level of 40 %. This 
second threshold would cover vertical restraints 
that, on the basis of economic thinking or past pol-
icy experience, lead to less serious restrictions of 
competition (e.g. exclusive distribution, exclu-
sive purchasing, non-exclusive types of arrange-
ment such as quantity forcing on the buyer or sup-
plier, agreements between SMEs). A two-thresh-
old system has the advantage of providing for an 
economically justified graduation in the treatment 
of vertical restraints. The system's principal draw-
back is its complexity and the risk of reintroducing 
formalistic criteria for the identification and defi-
nition of the individual vertical restraints covered 
by the higher threshold. 
40. In a one-threshold system all vertical re-
straints and their combinations, with the excep-
tion of hardcore restraints, would be automatical-
ly exempted up to the level of a single market share 
ceiling. The level of such a ceiling has not been 
proposed, but it would have to be below 40 %, the 
level at which single market dominance may start. 
It is likely to be in the 25-35 % range. The advan-
tage of a single-threshold system lies in its sim-
plicity, there being no necessity to define specific 
vertical restraints other than hardcore restraints. 
Hardcore restraints 
41. These are restrictions which always fall 
outside the block exemption regulation. They  21 22 
include agreements concerning minimum and 
fixed resale price maintenance and agreements 
resulting in absolute territorial protection. In 
addition, the Commission proposes to make 
wider provision for arbitrage by both intermedi-
aries and final consumers and therefore to black-
list, more generally, resale restrictions in so far as 
these restrictions result from factors within the 
parties' control. However, the exact content of 
the hardcore list is still subject to further discus-
sions. Maximum and recommended resale 
prices, provided that they do not amount to fixed 
resale prices, would as a general rule be deemed 
to fall outside the scope of Article 81(1). 
No sector-specific rules 
42. It has been decided to propose one wide-
ranging block exemption regulation instead of 
different regulations for specific forms of vertical 
restraints or sectors. Different forms of vertical 
restraints with similar effects will thus be treated 
in a similar way, preventing unjustified differen-
tiation between forms or sectors. This avoids, as 
far as possible, a policy bias in the choices com-
panies make concerning distribution formats. 
The company's choice should be based on com-
mercial merit and not, as under the current sys-
tem, on unjustified differences in exemptability. 
43. Selective distribution, including quantita-
tive selective distribution, would be covered by 
the proposed block exemption regulation, subject 
to certain conditions. In a two-threshold system, 
the first market share threshold of 20 % would ap-
ply. It is proposed to indicate in the guidelines that, 
as a general rule, qualitative selective distribution 
and agreements providing for service require-
ments fall outside the scope of Article 81(1). 
44. Although franchising would be covered, it 
would not be given preferential treatment as it is a 
combination of vertical restraints. Usually fran-
chising is a combination of selective distribution 
and non-compete obligations for the goods which 
form the subject of the franchise. Sometimes ex-
clusive distribution obligations like a location 
clause or exclusive territory are also added. These 
combinations would be treated according to the 
general criteria set out in the block exemption reg-
ulation, whereby absolute territorial protection 
would, in any event, come under the hardcore list. 
45. It is proposed that the block exemption reg-
ulation covers associations of independent retail-
ers set up for the purpose of collectively purchas-
ing goods for resale to final customers under a 
common format. To benefit from the block ex-
emption, the individual members of the associa-
tion must be SMEs. It is recognised that there are 
horizontal aspects to these associations, and there-
fore the benefit of the block exemption is also sub-
ject to the proviso that the horizontal aspects do 
not infringe Article 81. These horizontal aspects 
will be examined in a manner which accords with 
the general approach to vertical restraints as part 
of the review of the Commission's policy on hori-
zontal agreements (see below). 
46. It is proposed to make non-compete agree-
ments limited in duration in view of their potential 
foreclosure effects. The idea of making exclusive 
purchase agreements combined with quantity 
forcing limited in duration is also being consid-
ered, as is the possibility of dispensing with dura-
tion limits for non-compete obligations imposed 
by the supplier where it owns the premises from 
which the buyer operates. The guidelines will take 
account of the need for longer limits where this is 
justified by long-term investments. 
47. For reasons of coherence and unity of pol-
icy, it is proposed that sector-specific rules for 
beer and petrol be withdrawn as the continuation 
of a special regime for these sectors is not justi-
fied on economic or legal grounds. In so far as 
sector-specific treatment is justified, this will be 
done by means of guidelines. It should be noted 
that the block exemption regulation on car distri-
bution, which expires in 2002, is not covered by 
the current proposal. 
Withdrawal of the benefit of the block 
exemption 
48. The Commission intends to maintain the 
withdrawal mechanism for the rare cases where a 
serious competition problem may arise below the 
market share threshold(s). The withdrawal mech-
anism would in particular be applied in cumulative 
effect cases. In order to ensure effective supervi-
sion of markets and greater decentralisation in the 
application of the Community competition rules, 
it is proposed that not only the Commission but al-
so national authorities be empowered to withdraw 
the benefit of the block exemption in future. 
2.2. The proposed Council regulations 
These proposed regulations provide for two 
major changes: I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS: ARTICLES 31 AND 86 
(a) Extension of the Commission's powers 
under Council Regulation No 19/65/EEC. 
49. Council Regulation No 19/65/EEC gives 
the Commission the power to declare by regula-
tion that Article 81(1) does not apply to cate-
gories of bilateral exclusive agreements con-
cluded with a view to resale which relate to the 
distribution and/or exclusive purchase of goods 
or comprise restrictions on the acquisition or use 
of intellectual property rights. However, the pow-
ers thus conferred on the Commission do not 
allow it to implement the envisaged new policy 
in the field of vertical restraints. 
50. The proposed Council regulation therefore 
extends the scope of Articles 1 ( 1 )(a) and 1 (2)(b) 
of Council Regulation No 19/65/EEC in order to 
enable the Commission to cover, by block 
exemption regulation, all types of agreement 
concluded between two or more firms, each 
operating at a different stage of the economic 
process, in respect of the supply and/or purchase 
of goods for resale or processing or in respect of 
the marketing of services (i.e. vertical agree-
ments). 
57. Furthermore, in order to ensure greater 
decentralisation in the application of the Com-
munity competition rules, it is proposed to amend 
Article 7 of Regulation No 19/65/EEC so as to 
provide that, where the effects of vertical agree-
ments are felt in a Member State which possesses 
all the characteristics of a distinct market, the 
competent national authority may withdraw the 
benefit of the block exemption in its territory and 
adopt a decision for the purpose of eliminating 
those effects. 
52. Finally, in order to ensure effective control 
of the effects of parallel networks of similar 
agreements on a given market, it is proposed to 
amend Article 7 to allow the block exemption 
regulation to establish the conditions under 
which such networks of agreements are excluded 
from its application. 
(b) Relaxation of the notification procedure 
in Regulation No 17. 
53. The proposal is designed to extend the 
scope of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 17 with a 
view to granting dispensation from the prior noti-
fication requirement in respect of all vertical 
agreements. The practical advantage of the pro-
posed amendment is to enable the Commission, 
even in cases of late notification, to consider 
whether the agreements in question satisfy the 
conditions of Article 81(3) and, if so, to adopt an 
exemption decision taking effect on the date on 
which the agreement was entered into. In this 
way the legal certainty afforded to firms would 
be strengthened without jeopardising the 
enforcement of Article 81(1) in respect of anti-
competitive agreements. 
3. Review of the policy on horizontal 
agreements 
54. In 1997 (') the Commission's departments 
decided to begin assessing the policy on horizon-
tal agreements. The fact-finding exercise carried 
out that year revealed that the existing notices 
and block exemption regulations in this field (
2) 
were not much used, were partly outdated and 
entailed a number of notifications, and should 
therefore be reviewed. The Commission's 
departments took the view that this exercise 
should be seen as an important complement to the 
project on vertical restraints. 
55. In 1998 the Commission's departments 
intensified their thinking on the review of the pol-
icy on horizontal agreements. Various initial con-
clusions were reached. The review of the current 
rules should take on board the need to update and 
improve the existing provisions in terms of both 
clarity and coherence. In many respects, the body 
of law and regulations on horizontal agreements 
appears to be incomplete. The aim is therefore to 
make it more efficient and transparent in the light 
of the criticisms expressed by companies in the 
survey. In this review exercise, the Commission's 
departments should propose the adoption of an 
approach which focuses systematically on eco-
nomic analysis, in line with the way in which the 
vertical restraints exercise was tackled. They 
should propose following a course probably 
involving the drawing-up of guidelines, accom-
panied, as necessary, by revised block exemption 
regulations for certain types of agreement. 
A consultation paper for discussion with Member 
States and other interested parties would be made 
available in 1999. 
( ' ) 1997 Competition Report, points 46 and 47. 
(
2) Block exemption regulations concerning specialisation and R&D 
agreements and notices on cooperation between companies (1968) 
and cooperative joint ventures (1993).  23 4. Review of procedural regulations 
56. The Commission has a general objective of 
modernising and simplifying its procedures for 
investigating competition cases and making them 
more user-friendly. As part of that process, on 22 
December it adopted two regulations to stream-
line the legislative framework. The first, Regula-
tion (EC) No 2842/98, spells out how the Com-
mission guarantees the right of the different par-
ties involved in competition cases, including 
those in the transport sector, to be heard. It has 
replaced Regulation No 99/63/EEC on hearings, 
which served its purpose but now has to be 
updated to reflect case law, Commission practice 
and new concepts that have developed since 
1963. The second regulation, Regulation (EC) 
No 2843/98, sets out how to lodge applications 
and notifications in competition cases relating to 
the transport sector. Both regulations enter into 
force on 1· February 1999 and replace five exist-
ing Commission regulations. 
refers to the role of the hearing officer in the hear-
ing procedure, and to the right of access to the file 
without, however, pre-empting the Commis-
sion's further intentions in this field. 
59. The regulation makes provision for the 
applicant (
3) or complainant (
4) to be provided 
with a copy of the non-confidential version of the 
objections and to be given a date by which it may 
make its views known in writing. This applies in 
cases where the Commission raises objections. 
60. With a view to simplifying the way in 
which the time limit for submissions by the par-
ties to the Commission is calculated, all submis-
sions under the regulation must reach the Com-
mission by a certain date set by the Commission 
in its written submission to the party concerned. 
The time allowed is at least two weeks. Setting a 
specific date by which the submission must reach 
the Commission is considered less likely to result 
in legal uncertainty than if the parties calculate 
the time limit themselves. 
4.1. Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 2842/98 of 22 December 1998 on the 
hearing of parties in certain proceedings 
under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty (
1) 
57. The new regulation sets out how the Com-
mission will safeguard the right of the various par-
ties involved in competition cases to be heard. Par-
ties entitled to submit comments under the regula-
tion will in future also be able to do so in writing 
without prejudice to the possibility of an oral hear-
ing. To make the provisions clearer and more user-
friendly, the regulation is divided into different 
chapters according to the status of the party (
2). 
58. To facilitate the handling of individual 
cases by the Commission departments, and to 
avoid unnecessary delays, the Commission is not 
obliged to take account of written comments 
from the addressees of a statement of objections 
received after the date by which they must make 
their views known. The addressees of a statement 
of objections must also indicate, by a date set by 
the Commission, any parts of its objections 
which, in their view, contain business secrets or 
other confidential material. The regulation also 
In order to simplify and expedite the hearing pro-
cedure, and in line with Commission practice on 
mergers, statements made by each person at the 
hearing will be recorded and the respective tape 
will replace the written minutes. 
4.2. Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 2843/98 of 22 December 1998 on the 
form, content and other details of 
applications and notifications provided for 
in Council Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, 
(EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 
applying the rules on competition to the 
transport sector (
5) 
61. In 1994 the Commission modernised the 
rules for notifying restrictive agreements in sec-
tors other than transport by adopting Regulation 
(EC) No 3385/94 and Form A/B (
6). Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2843/98 and the new Form 
TR (Annex I to the regulation) have introduced 
similar rules for companies which wish to notify 
restrictive agreements in the transport sector. 
24 
(') OJL 354. 30.12.1998. 
(
2) Chapter II: Hearing of parties to which the Commission has 
addressed objections; Chapter III: Hearing of applicants and com-
plainants: and Chapter IV: Hearing of other third parties. 
(') Applications made under Article 3(2) of Regulation No 17. 
C) Complaints made under Article 10 of Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1017/68. Article 10 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 
and Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87. 
(
5) OJL 354. 30.12.1998. 
(*) Commission Regulation (EC) No 3385/94 of 21 December 1994 
on the form, content and other details of applications and notifi-
cations provided for in Council Regulation No 17 (OJ L 377. 
31.12.1994). I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS: ARTICLES 31 AND 86 
Form TR specifies the information that must be 
provided by companies when applying for 
exemption under the three transport regulations 
and for negative clearance under Regulation 
(EEC) No 3975/87. It has replaced the previous 
Form II (transport by rail, road and inland water­
way), Form MAR (maritime transport) and Form 
AER (air transport). Form TR(B) (Annex II to the 
regulation) has replaced Form III for crisis cartels 
notified under Article 14(1) of Regulation (EEC) 
No 1017/68. 
62. The regulation differs, however, from Regu­
lation (EC) No 3385/94 in that references to Reg­
ulation No 17 are replaced by references to the 
three transport regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, 
(EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87. The 
regulation provides that where an application is 
wrongly made under one of the transport regula­
tions it can be examined under another regulation, 
as applicable. Furthermore, provision is made for 
the notification of awards at arbitration and rec­
ommendations by conciliators, and also for appli­
cations and notifications under the competition 
rules of the EEA Agreement to be made in one of 
the official languages of the EFTA States as well. 
Β — Consolidating the single 
market 
63. Consolidating the single market is of prime 
importance in ensuring that economic and mone­
tary union is a success. Of the Community policies 
that help to further single market consolidation, 
competition policy plays a key role, not just be­
cause it strengthens structures by tackling private 
or public initiatives designed to prevent or delay 
the opening-up of markets, but also because it stim­
ulates the operation of the single market by pro­
moting positive cooperation between companies 
in areas such as R & D or environmental protec­
tion (' ), and by punishing anticompetitive conduct. 
The Commission believes that this action to con­
solidate the single market has an immediate impact 
on the progress of economic and monetary union. 
1. Cartels 
64. Of all restrictions of competition, restric­
tive practices in the form of secret agreements are 
undoubtedly the most destructive. Very often, 
these concerted practices involve a substantial 
number of economic operators in a given area of 
activity and, as such, they have a very marked 
impact on the relevant markets. Furthermore, 
these agreements almost invariably concern 
prices and thus severely undermine competition. 
The Commission is committed to an extremely 
tough stance against cartels, particularly in the 
months immediately prior to and following com­
pletion of economic and monetary union. The 
positive impact of the launch of the euro, which 
should increase price transparency within the 
Union and, as a result, intensify competition to 
the benefit of consumers, must not be countered 
by restrictive agreements designed to side-step 
market confrontation by artificially fixing prices 
or other trading conditions, which in the longer 
term could push up inflation and undermine the 
foundations of economic and monetary union. 
65. During 1998 the Commission demon­
strated its firm commitment by its strong action 
against secret agreements between companies. 
Final decisions were issued in no less than four 
cases during the year, and additional sets of pro­
ceedings have been instituted. 
Pursuant to Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, the 
Commission prohibited a price-fixing agreement 
in the steel sector. Six producers of stainless-steel 
flat products, accounting for more than 80 % of 
European production of stainless-steel finished 
products, had decided on a concerted increase in 
stainless steel prices by changing the method for 
calculating the 'alloy surcharge'. The Commis­
sion decided to fine the members of the cartel a 
total of ECU 27.3 million (
2). 
The Commission also prohibited an agreement 
between four sugar producers. British Sugar, Tate 
& Lyle, Napier Brown and James Budgett, which 
together controlled 90 % of the white granulated 
sugar market in the United Kingdom, had devel­
oped a collaborative strategy of higher pricing for 
that product on the industrial and retail markets. 
Fines totalling ECU 50.2 million were imposed 
on the participating companies, including ECU 
39.6 million on British Sugar (
3). 
The Commission also took action on an agree­
ment between producers of district heating pipes 
(') Most of the cases which gave rise to a positive approach on the 
part of the Commission are discussed in the following section 
(See Section C — Sector-based policies). 
(
2) OJL 100, 1.4.1998. 
C) OJL284, 19.10.1998.  25 which was characterised by the variety of com-
petition restrictions involved: price fixing, mar-
ket sharing and bid rigging. The cartel began in 
Denmark and soon extended throughout the 
Union, thus cartelising the whole of the European 
market. The Commission imposed fines totalling 
ECU 92.21 million on the 10 companies 
involved, including ECU 70 million on ABB. A 
particularly aggravating factor was that the cartel 
continued for nine months after the Commission 
had discovered its existence ('). 
Lastly, the Commission prohibited a price-fixing 
agreement between seven ferry companies oper-
ating services between Greece and Italy. Investi-
gations at the offices of five Greek operators and 
one Italian operator revealed overwhelming evi-
dence of an agreement in the form of regular meet-
ings and exchanges of correspondence involving 
the collective readjustment of prices for passen-
gers and vehicles. The fine of ECU 9.12 million is 
relatively light given the seriousness of the in-
fringement: the Commission took account of the 
fact that it had had a fairly limited impact on the 
market. 
The Commission imposed fines totalling ECU 
178.83 million on the companies involved in 
these four cases, reflecting its determination to 
take vigorous action to combat anticompetitive 
practices of this type. 
66. The Commission concluded from the above 
proceedings th,at its notice of 10 July 1996 was 
beginning to bear fruit (
2). The notice, which pro-
vides for fines to be reduced or even waived for 
firms which denounce cartels in which they have 
taken part, was applied in the sugar case. 
67. With a view to detecting and combating 
cartels more effectively, the Commission has 
decided to reorganise part of its Directorate-Gen-
eral for Competition and to set up a unit within its 
ambit specialising in proceedings of that type. 
This demonstrates that the Commission has 
placed its anti-cartel policy among the items at 
the top of its agenda. 
Using the limited resources at its disposal, the 
Directorate-General has assigned about 15 
case-handlers to this new unit, which should 
eventually comprise about 20 officials with sig-
nificant experience in investigations of this type. 
26 
(') OJL 24, 30.01.1999. 
(
2) OJC207. 18.7.1996; 1996 Competition Repon, points 34 and 35. 
By carrying out this reorganisation the Commis-
sion is again sending an important signal to com-
panies engaged in these practices, which are par-
ticularly harmful to consumers and to the Euro-
pean economy in general. 
2. Opening-up of markets 
68. The Commission has always kept a close 
eye on distribution agreements and their restric-
tive effects in so far as they hindered intra-Com-
munity trade. Some exclusive distribution agree-
ments lead to the setting-up of watertight national 
distribution networks. In particular, clauses 
which prohibit distributors from supplying cus-
tomers based outside the contract territory. In this 
way, national markets are artificially isolated 
from one another. The Commission considers 
that measures should be taken to combat this sit-
uation, not just in order to re-establish effective 
competition between economic operators but 
also in order to promote market integration. In 
practice, the compartmentalisation of national 
markets prevents price convergence within the 
Union and restricts access by consumers to the 
markets with the lowest prices. With the creation 
of the single currency, price differentials will be 
obvious because they will be expressed in euro. 
They will be increasingly viewed as unjustified 
by ordinary people, who will want to derive full 
benefit from economic and monetary union. 
69. In 1998 the Commission clearly demon-
strated its determination to promote the open-
ing-up of markets, a prime example of this being 
the Volkswagen case. Since 1995 the Commis-
sion had received numerous complaints from 
European consumers, particularly from Germany 
and Austria, who had been confronted with vari-
ous difficulties when attempting to buy new 
Volkswagen and Audi cars in Italy. These con-
sumers wanted to benefit from the price differen-
tials between their Member State and Italy, where 
prices were particularly advantageous. Follow-
ing a series of inspections at the offices of Volk-
swagen AG, Audi AG and Autogerma SpA, 
which is a subsidiary of Volkswagen and the offi-
cial importer for both makes in Italy, and at the 
offices of a number of Italian dealers, the Com-
mission concluded that Europe's largest motor-
manufacturing group had been pursuing a mar-
ket-partitioning policy in the Union for about 10 
years. Volkswagen AG had systematically forced 
its dealers in Italy to refuse to sell Volkswagen I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS: ARTICLES 31 AND 86 
and Audi cars to foreign buyers, especially from cigarette producer and distributor which had a 
Germany and Austria. The Commission fined dominant position on the Italian market for the 
Volkswagen ECU 102 million, the largest fine wholesale distribution of cigarettes, imposed on 
ever imposed on a single company. foreign producers wholesale distribution contracts 
70. The case of Amministrazione Autonoma dei containing numerous restrictive clauses which 
Monopoli dello Stato (AAMS) provided a further
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indication of the Commission's determination to ian market and favoured its own production. The 
open up national markets, in this particular in- Commission fined AAMS ECU 6 million and or-
stance by means of Article 82. AAMS, an Italian dered it to put an end to the infringements. 
-^■■■■■■BHB 
Box 2: Motor vehicle distribution — a consumer-oriented policy 
EU competition law contains specific provisions on motor vehicle distribution. The legislation (Regula-
tion (EC) No 1475/95) came into force on 1 October 1995. One aim of the block exemption was to rein-
force the right of consumers to purchase a new car, either directly or through an authorised intermediary, 
wherever they wish in the European Community. 
Accordingly, the regulation prohibits any direct or indirect hindrance of parallel trade, i.e.: 
• refusals by dealers to supply a consumer simply because he/she is a resident of another Member State; 
• charging foreign consumers higher prices or imposing longer delivery periods than for consumers 
based in the Member State; 
• refusing to perform guarantee services or other free services for cars imported from another Member 
State; 
• hindering the activities of intermediaries authorised by consumers by applying excessive criteria as 
regards their mandate; 
• restricting supplies by manufacturers to dealers who sell cars to consumers resident in another Mem-
ber State; 
• threats by manufacturers to terminate contracts with dealers who sell cars to consumers resident in 
another Member State; 
• any interference by manufacturers with the freedom of consumers to resell new cars, provided that the 
sale is not effected for commercial purposes. 
Use of these 'blacklisted' measures can result in automatic loss of the benefit of the block exemption. 
The regulation requires manufacturers to supply their dealers with cars produced to the specifications of con-
sumers from other Member States—for example, right-hand drive (RHD)—if the dealers wish to sell them. 
However, EU competition law does not impose a legal obligation on individual car dealers to sell cars. 
By its decision to fine Volkswagen/Audi for forcing its authorised dealers in Italy to refuse to sell Volk-
swagen and Audi cars to foreign buyers, the Commission demonstrated that it will not tolerate practices 
which are contrary to consumers' interests. The Commission is currently examining similar cases involv-
ing other manufacturers. In so far as infringements of Community competition rules seem likely to be 
proven, the Commission will investigate cases of coordinated refusals to sell and, as in the recent Volk-
swagen case, take the necessary decisions. The Commission reiterates that it will not hesitate to act against 
manufacturers who fail to comply with Community law. 
In addition to such direct action, the Commission continues to increase price transparency by publishing 
twice-yearly reports on car prices in the Union. Growing consumer demand for this report — about 8 000 
27 copies are distributed annually — illustrates that consumers are increasingly aware of the benefits that the 
single market can provide. The introduction of the euro, which will increase price transparency and facil-
itate comparisons, is expected to reinforce this behaviour within the European Community. 
This heightened awareness has led to greater demand from individuals for assistance in purchasing cars 
abroad. This applies in particular to difficulties encountered by British citizens when trying to purchase 
RHD cars outside the United Kingdom. The Commission has succeeded in helping a large number of these 
individuals. In fact, the figures supplied by some manufacturers indicate an increase in sales of RHD cars 
for import into the United Kingdom. In order to provide an appropriate solution to this specific problem, 
most manufacturers, i.e. BMW, Fiat, Ford, Mercedes-Benz, Opel/Vauxhall, PAS (Peugeot/Citroën), Volvo, 
VW/Audi, Honda, Nissan and Renault have, at the Commission's suggestion, established information cen-
tres for European consumers wishing to buy a car abroad. 
3. Undertakings in a dominant position 
71. Article 82 prohibits undertakings in a 
dominant position on a given market from abus-
ing this situation to the prejudice of third par-
ties. Such abuse consists, inter alia, in limiting 
production, charging excessive prices, discrimi-
natory or predatory pricing, tied sales or other 
commercial practices not based on the principle 
of economic efficiency. The Commission takes 
the view that such practices, which undermine 
competition, are particularly dangerous when 
they are carried out by undertakings with the 
power to shield themselves from competitive 
pressure and eliminate their competitors without 
significant damage to themselves or to block 
market access by new entrants to a significant 
degree. In the context of further development of 
the single market, these practices are particular-
ly damaging because they lead to market parti-
tioning and delay the integration of the Member 
States' economies. In addition, in recently liber-
alised markets there is a danger that they will 
wipe out the expected benefits in terms of re-
structuring, innovation or job creation. This is 
why the Commission is particularly alert to the 
effects of dominant positions on these process-
es. The number of formal decisions pursuant to 
Article 82 has increased steadily over the last 
two years. In 1998 the Commission concluded 
six cases (') under that article. 
72. Two cases concerned the airports at Frank-
furt and Paris, which are operated by companies 
in a dominant position. The abuses identified by 
the Commission concerned groundhandling and 
self-handling services, which were liberalised 
under a directive adopted in 1996. In addition to 
the direct anticompetitive effects on the suppliers 
involved, the Commission showed that there 
were repercussions on non-domestic airlines, 
with market partitioning occurring as a result. 
The abuses also slowed down the liberalisation of 
groundhandling services. 
The Frankfurt Airport case concerns groundhan-
dling. Following complaints from several air-
lines, the Commission found that the operator of 
the German airport (Flughafen Frankfurt/Main 
AG (FAG)) had abused its dominant position as 
operator by prohibiting airlines from providing 
self-handling services and by denying access to 
any independent providers of groundhandling 
services, thus creating on the related but separate 
groundhandling market a monopoly situation of 
which it was the beneficiary. The Commission 
therefore ordered FAG to bring its monopoly to 
an end (
2). It also found that the long-term con-
tracts (3 to 10 years) that FAG had awarded to its 
best customers were contrary to Community law 
in that they effectively closed the groundhan-
dling-services market to new entrants or made it 
less attractive to them, thus reinforcing its domi-
nant position. FAG agreed to amend the contracts 
in question by granting contracting parties an 
annual right of withdrawal. 
In the Alpha Flight Services/Aéroports de Paris 
(ADP) case, the Commission found that the oper-
ator of the two Paris airports had abused its dom-
inant position as operator by imposing discrimi-
natory commercial fees on suppliers or airlines 
providing groundhandling or self-handling ser-
vices such as catering, cleaning and freight han-
28  (') Including the AMMS case discussed under point 2.  (
;) Decision 98/190/EC of 14 January 1998 (OJL 72, 11.3.1998). I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
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dling. ADP charged different levels of fees to the 
two third-party suppliers, AFS, the plaintiff, and 
OAT, a subsidiary of Air France. In addition, the 
fee charged by ADP to airlines providing catering 
services for passengers via specialist subsidiaries 
was either zero or less than that charged to com-
panies providing similar catering services for 
third parties. There was no objective justification 
for the differences, which distorted competition 
between suppliers since some benefited from 
lower operating costs. The Commission therefore 
ordered Aéroports de Paris to bring its fee 
arrangements to an end. 
73. The Commission also invoked Article 82 in 
another case involving the transport sector. This 
was the TACA (Trans-Atlantic Conference Agree-
ment) case, in which the Commission fined the 
members of the liner conference ECU 273 mil-
lion ('). 
74. In the IRE/Nordion and Van den Bergh 
Foods cases, both involving very different mar-
kets, the Commission devoted a great deal of 
attention to the effects of contracts concluded by 
companies in a dominant position and containing 
exclusivity clauses: such clauses may make the 
other parties involved so dependent on the dom-
inant company that the residual competitors' abil-
ity to counter its dominant position is severely 
restricted. 
Nordion, a Canadian company operating on the 
world market for the production and sale of 
molybdenum 99, a base product for radiophar-
maceuticals used in nuclear medicine, conclud-
ed exclusive, long-term supply agreements with 
its customers, with the result that the main com-
petitor, the Belgian company IRE, which was 
the complainant in this case, was prevented 
from developing and ultimately even from 
maintaining its presence on the market. This sit-
uation also made the entry of potential new 
competitors impossible. After receiving a state-
ment of objections charging it with abusing its 
dominant position, Nordion undertook to re-
nounce the exclusivity clauses in its contracts. 
The Commission then decided to terminate the 
proceedings (
2). 
Van den Bergh Foods, a Unilever subsidiary, 
holds more than 85 % of the Irish ice cream mar-
ket. The company has an extensive network of 
freezer cabinets which are provided to retailers 
free of charge on condition that they are used 
exclusively for the storage of Unilever's prod-
ucts. The Commission found that, in the circum-
stances of the Irish market, the provision of cab-
inets on exclusive terms constituted a real barrier 
to market entry for Unilever's competitors. 
Given the reluctance of Irish retailers to replace 
Unilever cabinets, or to install additional ones, 
40 % of retail outlets in Ireland offered Unilever 
products only. By virtue of its dominant position 
on this market, Unilever had been able to encour-
age retailers to enter into exclusive arrangements 
with it. The Commission took the view that this 
practice constituted an abuse of a dominant posi-
tion and issued a decision condemning 
Unilever (
3). 
C — Sector-based policies 
1. Telecommunications (
4) 
1.1. The process of supervised 
liberalisation 
75. 1 January 1998 was the date fixed by the 
directive of 13 March 1996 on the implementa-
tion of full competition in telecommunications 
markets (
5) for the abolition of the remaining 
monopolies for the provision of voice telephony 
services and the supply of telecommunications 
infrastructure in the Community, with the ex-
ception of certain Member States to which the 
Commission had granted additional implemen-
tation periods (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Luxem-
bourg and Greece). The additional periods 
granted to Luxembourg and Spain ended on 1 
July and 1 December respectively. In addition, 
Ireland, which had been granted an additional 
period due to terminate on 1 January 2000, de-
cided in June to anticipate the full liberalisation 
of its telecommunications market on 1 Decem-
ber, so as to benefit earlier from the advantages 
(') Since the TACA case also involved application of Article 81. see 
the comments on the case in the section on sector-based policies 
(Chapter I. Section C.4). 
(
!) Proceedings were also instituted against IRE/Nordion in Japan, 
with the result that the Commission cooperated with the Japanese 
authorities (JFTC). See Chapter IV — International cooperation. 
(
Ί) The Commission also took the view thai the exclusivity condition 
constituted a restriction of competition which infringed Article 81. 
(
4) See also Box 7. Chapter II — Mergers, which discusses several 
decisions affecting the telecommunications sector. 
(
5) Directive 96/19/EC (OJ L 74, 22.3.1996).  29 Box 3: Commission policy on fines 
The year 1998 seems likely to go down as the strictest year of the decade, with fines totalling ECU 560 
million, followed by 1994 (ECU 535 million, with inter alia the Beams, Cartonboard and Cement cases). 
It was also noteworthy for the variety of anticompetitive practices which were identified: four cartels but 
also three abuses of a dominant position. The severity of the penalties and the diversity of the practices and 
economic sectors involved reflect the Commission's determination to consolidate the single market with a 
view to completing economic and monetary union. 
At the end of 1997 the Commission adopted guidelines on setting fines. The various cases concluded in 
1998 reflect the implementation of these guidelines, which were designed to 'help to make the Commis-
sion's policy on fines more coherent and to strengthen the deterrence of the financial penalties.' 
One of the major innovations of this new system consists in adjusting the basic amount of the fine, which 
is determined according to the gravity and duration of the infringement. The basic amount may be increased 
to take account of aggravating circumstances or reduced to reflect attenuating circumstances. 
Aggravating circumstances include repeated infringements, refusal to cooperate or the role of leader in the 
infringement. In the Volkswagen case, the Commission took into account when setting the fine the fact that 
the company had failed to take appropriate action when instructed to put an end to a serious infringement. 
It took account of similar behaviour in the case concerning the pre-insulatedpipe cartel, which continued 
to operate for nine months after the investigation carried out by the Commission's inspectors. In the case 
of the restrictive agreement in the UK sugar industry, the aggravating circumstance found against British 
Sugar was that the company was the instigator of the infringement and, throughout the relevant period, 
remained the driving force. 
The attenuating circumstances specified in the guidelines include an exclusively passive role in the 
infringement, or termination of the infringement as soon as the Commission intervenes. A reduction in the 
amount of a fine may be justified on the basis that the company concerned cooperated in the proceedings. 
In the case of the price cartel in the stainless-steel sector, two companies which were party to the agree-
ment cooperated, one by putting an end to the infringement following the Commission's initial investiga-
tions, and the other by providing important information in the course of the proceedings. These companies 
were fined a smaller amount man their partners. An attenuating circumstance which was taken into account 
in the case of ferry services between Greece and Italy was the fact that the infringement had had a fairly 
limited impact on the market. 
Also of relevance is the notice of 10 July 1996 on the waiving or reduction of fines in cartel cases, which 
states that the Commission should take into account, when calculating the amount of the fine, cooperation 
on the part of companies which inform it of cartels in which they were involved. Accordingly, in the case 
involving the British sugar industry, the Commission substantially reduced the fine on Tate & Lyle to take 
account of the fact that it had submitted self-incriminating letters which provided evidence of the cartel's 
existence. The notice reflects a concern to make the detection of cartels more efficient, and indeed several 
have been detected since its adoption. 
The Commission is relatively satisfied with the arrangements for calculating the amount of fines, but it 
takes the view that, in the light of the wealth of experience acquired during 1998, certain aspects should 
be reviewed after consulting the national competition authorities with a view to finalising this crucial 
instrument of Community competition policy. 
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associated with the opening-up of this market to 
competition. 
In view of the economic importance of the 
telecommunications sector, which may be put at 
some ECU 150 billion, and its impact on job cre-
ation, the Commission continued throughout the 
year to monitor the implementation of this liber-
alisation by the Member States and the establish-
ment of the regulatory framework in the two 
Member States where the additional implementa-
tion period was due to terminate. 
1.1.1. Monitoring the implementation 
of the directives 
76. The '1998 joint team' (the body responsi-
ble for implementing Community telecommuni-
cations legislation), comprising officials drawn 
from the Directorates-General for competition 
and telecommunications, working together with 
the Legal Service, continued the work it had be-
gun in 1997 (')· It prepared two reports on 
progress in implementing the directives, which 
were adopted by the Commission on 18 Febru-
ary (
2) and 25 November (
3). The first was 
based on the results of bilateral meetings with 
the Member States, while the second sum-
marised the findings of a survey carried out by 
the Commission among the Member States 
(questionnaires and contacts with the competent 
national authorities) and the audit findings of in-
dependent consultants on the actual implemen-
tation of the new regulatory framework in each 
of the Member States. 
77. The report of 18 February points to consid-
erable progress in those Member States in which, 
according to the report of 8 October 1997, trans-
posai into national law was less advanced and a 
substantial amount of work still needed to be 
done. The Commission noted in the report that 
the bulk of the Community regulations had been 
transposed into national law in most of the Mem-
ber States. 
78. That notwithstanding, the Commission 
was obliged to institute new infringement pro-
ceedings against Member States which had 
failed to transpose the directives in full, in addi-
tion to the 35 infringement proceedings pending 
at the start of the year, some of which it was 
able to wind up following the recent notification 
of measures adopted by the Member States con-
cerned. Apart from problems associated with 
legislative or regulatory delays, the main diffi-
culties concern the non-compliance of certain 
specific conditions for licences in some Mem-
ber States (obligation to allocate a certain 
amount of investments or turnover to R & D, 
obligation to obtain a bank guarantee for the 
completion of business plans, etc.). In addition, 
some Member States had failed to ensure that 
operators published their standard terms and 
conditions governing interconnection. In some 
Member States (Austria and Italy), the prices 
put forward by the operator were approved by 
the regulatory authority only towards the end of 
the year. However, about half of the tariffs pub-
lished were within the range recommended by 
the Commission as regards charges for call ter-
mination (
4). 
1.1.2. Price surveys 
79. Concerned at the continuing high cost of 
mobile communications in Europe, and in partic-
ular of calls from fixed lines to mobile phones, 
the Commission carried out a survey early in 
1998 on the interconnection charges of fixed-line 
and mobile telecommunications operators in the 
European Community. In particular, the Com-
mission wanted to ascertain whether operators of 
a certain type of network applied similar, non-
discriminatory conditions to other operators, in 
particular as regards interconnection charges. It 
also examined the impact of these charges on the 
level of charges for calls made by users of fixed-
line networks to mobile phones. Interconnection 
charges for call termination, which are set by 
operators, have a tangible impact on the level of 
charges for calls between fixed-line and mobile 
phones. 
80. In the light of this survey in the 15 Mem-
ber States, the Commission found that there 
were preliminary indications that excessive or 
discriminatory prices were indeed being 
charged and that, accordingly, in-depth investi-
gations needed to be carried out. In five of these 
cases, the Commission suspended proceedings 
so as to allow the national supervisory authori-
ties to take action. In the 10 others, namely 2 
(') 1997 Competition Report, point 102. 
(
2) COMO 998) 80. 
C) COM(l 998) 594.  C) Recommendation 98/195/EC (OJL 73, 12.3.1998).  31 cases on call termination charges made by mo-
bile telephone operators in Italy and Germany 
and 8 cases concerning income retained by op-
erators of public switched telephone networks 
(PSTNs), namely Belgacom, Telecom Eireann, 
British Telecom, P&T Austria, Telefonica, KNP 
Telecom, Telecom Italia and Deutsche Telecom, 
on calls from fixed-line telephones to mobile 
telephones, the Commission launched an en-
quiry based mainly on tests to detect excessive 
and/or discriminatory prices. It found that four 
PSTN operators charged higher call termination 
tariffs to mobile operators than to fixed-line op-
erators. The Commission also found anomalies 
in mobile operators' call termination charge 
structures, particularly in Italy and Germany. 
Lastly, it demonstrated that the income retained 
by PSTN operators for calls from fixed-line 
telephones to mobile telephones where these 
operators were present on both markets ap-
peared to be significantly higher than the bench-
mark established by the Commission with the 
assistance of an external auditor as part of the 
enquiry. 
81. Following this in-depth investigation, the 
Commission took note of several positive 
changes and closed a number of case files. The 
operators decided to bring the discriminatory 
arrangements complained of to an end and to set 
new tariffs at a lower level. For example, Tele-
com Italia began to apply identical charges to 
operators of mobile and fixed-line networks for 
call termination on its network, which led to a 
reduction of about 40 % in the costs paid by 
mobile operators. The national regulatory author-
ities took the necessary steps to examine the prac-
tices revealed by the Commission. In the case of 
Spain, for instance, the national regulator ordered 
Telefónica to change its charge structure. 
82. Last year the Commission started proceed-
ings against dominant telephone operators in re-
spect of the accounting rates (transfer prices) 
which they charge for transferring international 
telephone calls (')· Following this initial phase 
of the investigation, the Commission decided to 
focus on the charging practices of seven opera-
tors which possibly derived excessive margins 
from the accounting rates: OTE Greece, Post & 
Telekom Austria, Postes et Télécommunications 
Luxembourg, SONERA (formerly Telecom Fin-
land), Telecom Éireann, Telecom Italia and 
Telecom Portugal. The Commission invited the 
national regulatory authorities of the Member 
States concerned to investigate these charging 
practices. 
1.2. Clarifying the legal framework 
1.2.1. Notice on access agreements 
83. On 31 March, after carrying out a wide-
ranging consultation of interested parties, the 
Commission adopted a notice on the application 
of the competition rules to access agreements in 
the telecommunications sector (
2). The notice, 
which is addressed primarily to telecommunica-
tions companies and to the national authorities 
responsible for regulating the industry or compe-
tition, is designed to clarify the way in which the 
principles of competition law as derived from 
Commission decisions and Court of Justice case 
law are applied to agreements governing access 
to telecommunications infrastructure. The Com-
mission believes that it is vital for easy, non-dis-
criminatory access to this infrastructure to be 
guaranteed for new entrants to the liberalised 
telecommunications markets so that they can 
take advantage of open access and pass on the 
benefits to users. 
84. The purpose of the notice is threefold. First, 
to set out access principles stemming from Com-
munity competition law in order to create greater 
market certainty and more stable conditions for 
investment and commercial initiative in the tele-
corns and multimedia sectors. Second, to define 
the relationship between· competition law and 
sector-specific legislation adopted for harmoni-
sation purposes under the Article 95 framework. 
And third, to explain how the competition rules 
will be applied in the sectors involved in the pro-
vision of new services. 
1.2.2. Notice concerning the status of voice 
communications on the Internet 
85. On 7 January the Commission adopted a 
notice concerning the status of voice communi-
cations on the Internet pursuant to Directive 
90/388/EEC (
3). The adoption of this notice fol-
lowed the publication for comment, on 2 May 
32  ( ' ) 1997 Competition Report, point 78. 
(
:) OJ C 265. 22.8.1998. 
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1997, of an initial draft and a public consultation 
procedure (')· 
The Commission's position is that such commu-
nications do not at present constitute voice tele-
phony within the meaning of the Community di-
rectives, since they do not yet satisfy all the cri-
teria laid down in the definition of this service 
(they must be the subject of a commercial offer 
and the service must be provided for the public 
to and from public switched-network termina-
tion points). This service may, therefore, be sub-
jected by Member States not to individual li-
censing procedures but, at the most, to declara-
tion procedures. 
However, suppliers of voice services between 
two telephone handsets connected to the PSTN 
via the Internet may be regarded as providers of 
voice telephony and will be subject to the rele-
vant regulations once they offer a quality of ser-
vice equivalent to traditional voice telephony. 
1.2.3. Draft directive under Article 90(3) 
concerning the legal separation of cable and 
telecommunications activities 
86. Further to the adoption on first reading on 
16 December 1997 (
2) of a draft directive under 
Article 86 aimed at preventing former telecom-
munications monopolies from extending their 
dominant position to cable television networks, 
the Commission organised a wide-ranging con-
sultation of interested parties. The consultation 
took place between March and June. Seventeen 
associations and companies sent in their com-
ments, as did five national authorities. With a 
view to discussing these comments further, the 
Commission also held a hearing in October 
which was attended by 43 representatives of 
businesses and national authorities. The Coun-
cil, Parliament, the Economic and Social Com-
mittee and the Committee of the Regions were 
also consulted. 
87. Anticipating its adoption, some Member 
States and dominant companies have already 
begun to implement the principles enshrined in 
the draft directive. For instance, Deutsche 
Telekom announced in May that it would create 
a structural separation between its telephone net-
work and cable networks. 
1.3. Individual cases 
SNCF/Cégétel (
3) 
88. Société nationale des chemins de fer 
(SNCF), the French national railway company, 
and Cegetel have entered into an agreement for 
the development, via Télécom Développement 
(TD), of a fixed-line telephone network using 
railway infrastructure which, together with elec-
tricity, gas or motorway networks, provides a 
means of rapidly deploying a national telecom-
munications network. Under the agreements, 
SNCF is to grant TD a 'priority right' for the 
deployment of its telecommunications network 
along railway lines and to provide a guarantee in 
the form of a penalty clause which will remain in 
force for three and a half years. 
89. In cases of this type, the Commission 
takes the view that the main objective is to 
avoid, while competition is in the process of 
emerging, a situation in which access to physi-
cal infrastructure is restricted by exclusivity 
agreements or agreements resulting in de facto 
exclusivity. In this particular case, the Commis-
sion responded favourably to the agreement. 
Given the scope of TD's deployment plan, 
SNCF's capacity for installing telecommunica-
tions infrastructure will be close to saturation 
point for several years. Under the circumstances 
it is thus justifiable to give priority access to TD 
provided that this does not prevent SNCF from 
making any spare installation capacity available 
to other operators. 
Restructuring of Inmarsat 
90. Inmarsat is an intergovernmental treaty 
organisation set up in 1979 with over 80 member 
countries, normally represented by the former 
national telecom provider. It is currently the 
major international mobile satellite operator. 
Inmarsat has put forward a restructuring plan 
under which it will be converted into a public 
company whose shareholders will be its former 
signatories. After a two-year period, Inmarsat 
envisages a public offering of shares (IPO) which 
should dilute the shareholdings of the former sig-
natories. Having been converted into a public 
company, Inmarsat will no longer have a privi-
leged position on the market. 
(') 1997 Competition Report, point 105. 
(
2) I997 Competition Report, point 109. 
(
3) Commission notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regula-
tion No 17 (OJ C 293, 22.9.1998).  33 91. The Commission gave its approval to the 
restructuring of Inmarsat on the basis that a cap-
ital increase will take place within a short period 
of time. It regards this case as a model for the 
reform of the other intergovernmental satellite 
organisations. 
2. Postal services 
92. Following the adoption of the postal ser-
vices directive (') and the Commission notice (
2) 
in late 1997, the Commission has made prepara-
tions for the second step of the liberalisation 
process. According to the postal services direc-
tive, the Commission should table a proposal for 
further liberalisation of the sector before the end 
of 1998, following a comprehensive review. By 1 
January 2000 Parliament and the Council are to 
decide on the further gradual and controlled lib-
eralisation of the postal market. 
With the aim of carrying out a comprehensive 
review of the sector, the Commission has initi-
ated a number of studies on different aspects of 
liberalisation. External consultants have been 
commissioned to carry out the following studies: 
(1) liberalisation of clearance, sorting and trans-
port, (2) costing and financing of universal ser-
vice obligations, (3) liberalisation of direct mail, 
(4) the impact of liberalisation of cross-border 
mail and (5) weight and price limits of the 
reserved area. A sixth study, on modelling and 
quantifying scenarios for liberalisation, based on 
the results of the first five studies, has also been 
commissioned. 
93. The Commission also pursued its examina-
tion of the REIMS II agreement (
3) on terminal 
dues, which is the term used for the fees that a 
postal operator sending cross-border mail has to 
pay to the receiving postal operator for delivering 
the mail to its final addressee. In a memorandum 
sent to the notifying parties, the Commission 
expressed its concerns regarding certain provi-
sions in the agreement. Following a series of con-
34 
(' ) European Parliament and Council Directive 97/67/EC on common 
rules for the development of the internal market in Community 
postal services and the improvement of quality of service (OJ L 
15,21.1.1998). 
(
2) Commission notice on the application of the competition rules to 
the postal sector (OJ C 39, 6.2.1998). 
(
3) Notification of 31 October 1997 of an Agreement for the Remu-
neration of Mandatory Deliveries of Cross-Border Mails (Case 
No IV/36.748-RE1MS II). Sixteen European public postal opera-
tors have signed the agreement. 
sultations with the Commission, 12 of the parties 
entered into a supplementary agreement amend-
ing and clarifying the original agreement. In 
November the contents of the amended REIMS II 
agreement were published in the Official Jour-
nal (
4). In that notification, the Commission 
stated that it intended to take a favourable view 
of the agreement in the light of improvements to 
benefit customers. Before doing so, it invited 
third parties to send in their comments. 
94. The public postal operators of the Nether-
lands and Sweden notified the Commission of a 
bilateral agreement on terminal dues. The Com-
mission's examination of the agreement did not 
reveal any grounds for action under Article 81(1) 
of the EC Treaty. Consequently, the Commission 
closed its file by means of a comfort letter to the 
parties. 
3. Media 
95. The audiovisual industry is being trans-
formed by digital technology and globalisation. 
Digital and interactive television are expanding 
rapidly and are impacting on existing market 
structures such as acquisition of broadcasting 
rights. As these developments continue into the 
next century, competition policy will need to 
evolve accordingly. The Commission aims to set 
out its policy in the form of various key deci-
sions. Most of these should be published in 1999 
and are expected to relate to digital platforms and 
broadcasting rights for sports events. 
3.1. Digital platforms 
96. In several Member States, digital platforms 
for television and interactive services have been 
set up and are being examined by the Commis-
sion. In this sector, two decisions were taken in 
1998 to prohibit planned mergers in Germany, 
namely Bertelsmann/Kircli/Premiere and 
Deutsche Telekom/Betaresearch (
5). In two other 
cases, the United Kingdom's British Interactive 
Broadcasting (BIB) and France's Télévision Par 
Satellite (TPS), final decisions are expected early 
in 1999. These will spell out how the Commis-
sion plans to support innovation and the develop-
ment of new services to exploit technological 
C) OJC371. 1.12.1998. 
(
5) See Chapter II — Mergers for further details of these two cases. I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
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advances in the sector whilst also ensuring that 
the competing alternatives are able to develop. 
The Article 19(3) notices published for both these 
cases outline this approach. 
Television par satellite (TPS) (') 
97. In the case of TPS, the Commission has 
stated that it intends to take a favourable view of 
the creation of a new operator as it will encour-
age competition with established pay-TV opera-
tions in France. The satellite-based digital plat-
form, which provides pay-TV to satellite sub-
scribers and cable network operators, is a part-
nership involving four French television chan-
nels, the media group CLT-UFA, France Télécom 
and Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux. 
In its Article 19(3) notice, the Commission pro-
poses to adopt a favourable attitude to a number 
of restrictions, including one preventing TPS 
shareholders from participating in similar ven-
tures and an obligation to give TPS a first option 
on their programmes as well as final refusal 
where these are offered to third parties. The 
Commission envisages granting a three-year 
exemption as regards the obligation on the four 
broadcasters to grant TPS exclusive distribution 
rights to their general interest channels. 
novation in interactive services whilst also ensur-
ing that competing services are not prevented 
from developing by the joint venture. Structural 
undertakings, such as the legal separation of BIB's 
service and subsidy recovery arms, and the end of 
exclusivity for the EPG, should achieve this aim 
without necessitating ongoing monitoring. Be-
havioural undertakings were also necessary, in-
cluding ensuring access to the set-top box for third 
parties and making information available on the 
subsidy recovery mechanism. 
3.2. Broadcasting rights forsports events 
100. The development of pay-TV services 
over digital networks in recent years is increas-
ing the importance of legal and economic issues 
related to the rights in broadcast content. As re-
gards the broadcasting of sports events, practice 
in relation to Articles 81 and 82 is being devel-
oped on a case-by-case basis. The Commission 
is examining several cases in this area and ex-
pects to be able to clarify its position in 1999 
through a series of decisions linked to the col-
lective buying of rights by the EBU, as well as 
one relating to the UEFA statute governing the 
broadcasting of football. 
British Interactive Broadcasting (BIB) (
2) 
98. The United Kingdom now has satellite, 
cable and terrestrial digital television platforms, 
the latter (BDB) benefiting from a Commission 
decision detailed in Part II. BIB, the satellite-
based joint venture between BSkyB, BT, Mid-
land Bank and Matsushita, aims to provide inter-
active shopping, services, games, etc. and inter-
active television programmes via a satellite sig-
nal and a telephone line linked to a set-top box. 
The box will initially be subsidised, the cost 
being recovered from content providers. Access 
to BIB will be controlled by conditional access 
systems provided by a Sky subsidiary. The 
viewer will navigate via a BSkyB proprietary 
electronic programme guide (EPG). 
99. Following third-party consultations, the 
Commission negotiated several undertakings 
with the parties to guarantee the benefits of the in-
(') Commission notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regula-
tion No 17 (OJ C 65, 28.2.1998). 
(
2) Commission notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regula-
tion No 17 (OJ C 322, 21.10.1998). 
4. Transport 
4.1. Airtransport 
Transatlantic airline alliances 
101. On 30 July the Commission published 
notices (
3) concerning the alliances between 
British Airways and American Airlines and be-
tween Lufthansa, SAS and United Airlines. The 
notices set out measures that the Commission 
could appropriately address to the companies in 
a Commission proposal under Article 85(1) of 
the Treaty. The draft measures were designed to 
address infringements of EC competition rules 
identified by the Commission. The companies 
themselves, and interested third parties, were in-
vited to submit their comments on the draft 
measures. 
102. The carriers of the Lufthansa, SAS and 
United Airlines alliance asked for a hearing, 
C) OJ C 239. 30.7.1998.  35 which took place on 14 and 15 December. As 
had occurred during the hearing in the British 
Airways and American Airlines case in Febru-
ary, the parties took the opportunity to give an 
extensive presentation of their views on the 
Commission's legal assessment of the case, in-
cluding its draft measures. A large number of 
third parties also submitted comments on the 
draft measures. 
The next procedural step is a meeting of compe-
tition experts of the Member States before the 
Commission adopts a proposal under Article 
85(1) of the Treaty. 
103. British Airways and American Airlines did 
not ask for a hearing on the draft measures. The 
Commission was informed that the plans to create 
an alliance between the two air carriers had been 
put on hold at the end of the year following the 
breakdown of the negotiations for an open skies 
agreement between the United States and the 
United Kingdom. No indication was given of 
when these talks would resume. 
104. The Commission also continued to inves-
tigate the alliances between Sabena/Austrian Air-
lines/Swissair and Delta Air Lines and between 
KLM and Northwest. 
4.2. Maritime transport 
105. The highlight of 1998 as regards maritime 
transport was the TACA (Trans-Atlantic Confer-
ence Agreement) case. This culminated in a Com-
mission decision finding an infringement of Arti-
cle 81 read in conjunction with Article 82 (')■ 
106. The TACA agreement superseded the 
Trans-Atlantic Agreement, which was prohibited 
in 1994. It has 17 parties representing more than 
60 % of the market for maritime transport ser-
vices between northern Europe and the United 
States. The TACA parties notified the Commis-
sion of their agreement in 1994 with a view to 
securing an exemption. 
The Commission found that several of the agree-
ment's clauses were caught by Article 81(1). These 
concerned price fixing for maritime transport ser-
vices between Europe and the United States, price 
36 
( ' ) For Article 82 aspects, see Chapter I, B.3. 
(
2) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 lay-
ing down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 
of the Treaty to maritime transpon (OJ L 378. 31.12.1986). 
fixing for inland transport services supplied within 
the territory of the Community, agreement on the 
terms and conditions under which they entered in-
to service contracts with shippers and the fixing of 
prices paid to freight forwarders. 
The first of the agreements fell within the scope 
of the block exemption for liner conferences (
2). 
The Commission refused to grant individual 
exemption for the remaining three agreements. 
107. The impact of these competition restric-
tions was heightened by the behaviour of the com-
panies party to the TACA, which were in a joint 
dominant position on the market, insofar as they 
abused that situation by encouraging two potential 
market entrants to join the agreement, thus elimi-
nating competition. The Commission noted that, 
between 1994 and 1996, two major Asian ship-
ping companies entered the transatlantic market 
and eventually signed up to the TACA. During the 
same period, none of the companies party to the 
TACA left the conference to act as an independent 
shipping company. In that context, the European 
Shippers' Council estimated that, between 1993 
and 1995, the TAA, then the TACA, imposed 
overall price increases of more than 80 %. 
108. In the decision, the Commission noted 
that the companies party to the TACA were in a 
joint dominant position on the market for con-
tainerised cargo between northern Europe and the 
United States, and that they had abused this dom-
inant position by restricting the availability to 
customers of service contracts with individual 
shipping lines and by dissuading potential com-
petitors from entering the market. As regards the 
latter point, the TACA companies had encour-
aged two of its potential competitors to join the 
organisation by offering them incentives. Thus, 
liner shipping companies which were not party to 
the agreement were induced to sign up to it by 
being authorised to charge lower prices than the 
traditional members. The dual-rate service con-
tract arrangements established by the liner con-
ference had therefore restricted competition on 
the part of independent shipping companies. In 
addition, the founding members of the TACA had 
agreed, for certain contracts, not to engage in 
competition with shipping companies which did 
not form part of the first circle. In view of the sig-
nificance of the potential competition on the mar-
ket for liner shipping services, this infringement 
was regarded as especially serious. The Commis-
sion imposed a fine of ECU 273 million on the 15 I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
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Box 4: European competition policy and airports 
The liberalisation of air transport, which has been under way for a number of years, has been reflected in 
price cuts on many routes, mainly for leisure travellers, rising supply and demand and the incipient restruc-
turing of national airlines, which have chosen, in order to adapt to the new market conditions and reduce 
their operating costs, to form alliances. Against that background, airports now represent a vital asset for 
airlines faced with increased competition. 
The growth of the market has created new needs in terms of airport services and has aggravated conges-
tion at major airports. Airport access has therefore become an important factor influencing the develop-
ment of airlines. The growth of hubs has increased demand for slots and is thus likely to give rise to tougher 
competition in airports already suffering from congestion problems. In such a context, the advantage con-
ferred on carriers solidly established in congested airports is becoming ever bigger in view of the grand-
father rights rule recognised by the code of conduct. In addition, the costs generated by airport services 
have become crucially important as cost-cutting intensifies. It is therefore important to ensure that these 
services, too, are brought into the competitive arena and that no companies are discriminated against. 
The Commission, which initiated the liberalisation of air transport, has had to be vigilant to ensure that the 
forces of competition apply in airports, in particular by facilitating access to major congested airports by 
guaranteeing equality of treatment between airlines and by bringing real competitive pressure to bear on 
the price and quality of airport services. A series of decisions adopted in recent months reflects the Com-
mission's determination to open up the Union's airports to competition. 
As regards airport access, the main problem lies in the lack of availability of slots, a situation which has 
worsened since liberalisation. Lack of availability of slots effectively puts paid to any competition. For that 
reason, the Commission gave the green light to the alliance between Lufthansa and SAS on condition that 
the airlines sold off a substantial number of slots so as to facilitate the entry of new competitors on certain 
routes between Germany and Scandinavia. 
The managing bodies of airports are often associated with the national public authorities. In some cases, 
such as those involving the airports of Brussels, Frankfurt and Paris, these bodies were sometimes less than 
impartial and tended to favour the dominant national carrier by charging discriminatory fees to new 
entrants, thus giving the national carrier a competitive edge. The Commission ordered the managers of the 
airports referred to above to put an end to these practices. 
Council Directive 96/67/EC of 15 October 1996 liberalised the groundhandling market, with the result that 
these discriminatory fees are set to disappear. The Commission has shown its determination to enforce the 
objectives of this directive, in particular by making a careful analysis of applications for exemption with a 
view to maintaining groundhandling monopolies temporarily in cases where sufficient space is not avail-
able to accommodate the competing companies. Accordingly, the Commission adopted two decisions con-
cerning Frankfurt Airport. In the first decision, it asked the German Government to limit the scope of this 
exemption, and in the second decision, which was addressed to the airport managing body, it took the view 
that the managing body's monopoly on the groundhandling market constituted an abuse of a dominant posi-
tion since the monopoly on the market for the making-available of airport infrastructure had been extended 
without any objective reason to include that for the provision of groundhandling services. 
The Commission also limited the scope of the exemptions granted by the German Government in the air-
ports of Stuttgart and Hamburg, and rejected the exemption granted to Cologne/Bonn Airport (')· How-
ever, it authorised the exemption granted to Düsseldorf Airport (
2). 
(') Decisions of 30 October 1998. not yet published in the Official Journal. 
(
2) Decision of 14 January 1998 (OJ L 173, 18.6.1998). 
37 TACA parties, half of which are non-European 
companies. 
109. This case does not call into question the 
Commission's policy with regard to traditional 
liner conferences. The Commission takes the 
view that the behaviour of the TACA parties devi-
ated from the conduct authorised by the block 
exemption. 
4.3. Application of Article 86 
to the transport sector 
110. Two cases on which the Commission had 
adopted decisions pursuant to Article 86 were 
satisfactorily concluded in 1998. 
Following a complaint lodged by British Midland, 
the Commission adopted, on 28 June 1995 ('), a 
decision pursuant to Article 86(3) of the Treaty, 
read in conjunction with Article 82, which con-
cluded that Belgium had infringed Article 86(1), 
read in conjunction with Article 82, by imposing 
on Régie des voies aériennes/Régie der Luchtwe-
gen, a public body responsible for operating Brus-
sels Airport, a system of discounts on landing fees 
which resulted in discrimination. Since Belgium 
had not complied with the aforementioned deci-
sion, the Commission called on the Court of Jus-
tice on 19 March 1997 (
2) to find that Belgium had 
failed to fulfil its obligations. By royal decree of 
20 January 1998, the Belgian Government put an 
end to the infringement and the Commission 
therefore terminated the proceedings. 
On 21 October 1997, the Commission adopted a 
formal decision pursuant to Article 86(3) of the 
Treaty, read in conjunction with Article 86, on the 
system of reductions in piloting tariffs in the port 
of Genoa (
3). By decree of 8 June 1998, the Ital-
ian Government put an end to the infringement. 
5. Insurance 
5.1. Insurance pools: an enquiry in the 
aviation insurance sector 
111. In September 1997, in order to provide 
insurance pools with a degree of certainty as to 
whether the block exemption regulation (Regula-
38 
(') OJL2I6, 12.9.1995. 
(
2) Case C-155/97 Commission ν Belgium. 
(■') OJL301,5.11.1997. 
tion (EEC) No 3932/92) applied to them and to 
clarify the Commission's policy regarding pools 
not covered by the block exemption, the Direc-
torate-General for competition started investigat-
ing an entire segment of the insurance industry, 
namely aviation. Extensive requests for informa-
tion were sent to 13 aviation pools in Europe. The 
Commission had been informed of eight of these 
pools pursuant to Regulation No 17; the other 
five had not been notified. 
112. The block exemption regulation covers 
only pools whose members have a limited market 
share (10 % for co-insurance pools and 15 % for 
co-reinsurance pools). As to pools that exceed 
these thresholds, no matter how high the market 
share is, the view is that they cannot be consid-
ered to be anticompetitive as long as pooling is 
necessary to allow their members to provide a 
type of insurance that they could not provide 
alone. This is the case when the particular nature 
of the risks involved (e.g. catastrophic risks) 
requires the pooling of capacity from different 
insurers in order to cover them profitably. 
113. The enquiry into aviation insurance pools 
showed that the geographic market is mainly 
international. Aviation pools on this market do 
not present any competition problem. Even if 
most pools count among their membership 
almost all insurance companies established in the 
Member State in question, they cover only a very 
minor share of the international market and, in 
any case, do not exceed the thresholds of the 
block exemption regulation. 
114. None the less, for small aviation risks, a na-
tional market seems to exist. These small risks are 
non-catastrophic ones (i.e. risks which have a low 
frequency but a large volume such as product lia-
bility for aircraft manufacturers), representing a 
low insured value in relation to other risks of the 
same class. Customers are smaller aircraft owners 
with limited opportunities to seek better insurance 
conditions abroad. These risks represent a very 
minor volume of aviation insurance. 
Most aviation pools cover large shares of these 
markets and do not appear to be necessary in order 
to allow their members to be present on these mar-
kets. It cannot be ruled out that, for some small 
risks for which the market is national, the pool re-
stricts competition and is not eligible for exemp-
tion, either under Regulation (EEC) No 3932/92 
or individually. Nevertheless, this potential in-
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Community level because of the very limited 
turnover generated in these national markets. 
115. The investigation was therefore concluded 
by means of comfort letters addressed to those 
aviation pools of which the Commission had 
been notified indicating that they were covered 
either by the de minimis notice or by the market 
share thresholds set out in Regulation (EEC) 
No 3932/92 as regards the international market 
for aviation insurance. The comfort letters 
included a caveat concerning national markets 
indicating that the Community interest was not 
sufficient for the Commission to formally find 
infringements if these related only to a minimum 
fraction of the aviation market business, but that 
national authorities could, in any case, intervene 
against the anticompetitive structure of these 
pools or anticompetitive behaviour by their 
members where appropriate. 
118. A second notice pursuant to Article 19(3) 
was published in October indicating that the 
Commission also intended to clear the Interna-
tional Group agreement, which lays down rules 
for competition between the members of the 
pooling agreement. This was only possible after 
the IG modified the original restrictions which 
prevented the P&I Clubs from setting rates freely. 
Once the new agreement enters into force, the 
P&I Clubs will be able to compete for the first 
time on the rates they charge to their members; in 
particular, they will be free to set the part of the 
rate corresponding to their administrative costs. 
Restrictions on the freedom to set the remaining 
part of the rate seem necessary to ensure the pool-
ing agreement functions properly. 
119. If adopted, the final decision on the P&I 
Clubs case would spell out the new policy 
towards insurance pools. 
5.2. Application of the new policy to 
the P&I Clubs case 
116. The new policy towards insurance pools 
has already been applied to a claim-sharing 
arrangement between insurance mutuais (the 
equivalent of a pool in the non-profit insurance 
sector). In the P&I Clubs case, the Commission 
intends to adopt a formal decision in the coming 
months concluding that a claim-sharing agree-
ment between mutuais covering 89 % of the 
world market for maritime third party and con-
tractual liability insurance (protection and 
indemnity insurance) is definitely not caught by 
Article 81(1) because it appears to be necessary 
to allow its members profitably to insure some 
very large maritime liability risks (e.g. marine 
pollution). 
// 7. A notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regu-
lation No 17 was published in August indicating 
that the Commission intends to clear the pooling 
agreement concluded within the International 
Group of P&I Clubs. This was only possible, 
however, after the IG had amended the pooling 
agreement to ensure that it no longer contained an 
infringement of the competition rules. In particu-
lar, the IG lowered the level of cover offered 
jointly by all its members to ensure that a sub-
stantial section of demand did not remain unsat-
isfied, following a complaint submitted by the 
Greek Shipping Committee, an association of 
shipowners. 
6. Energy 
120. The process of liberalising the internal 
market in electricity is set to begin early in 1999. 
As from 19 February 1999,25 % of consumers in 
at least 12 Member States will be free to opt for 
the supplier of their choice. This new freedom, 
stemming from transposai of the electricity direc-
tive into national law, will clearly have an impact 
on the Commission's priorities when it applies 
competition law in this sector. 
777e contribution of the directive 
121. The directive formalises the existence of 
at least two clearly distinct markets, namely elec-
tricity sales and electricity transmission. It recog-
nises that there is a natural monopoly in electric-
ity transmission by regulating this area and 
organising a competitive market in electricity. To 
that end, the directive focuses on demand (free-
dom of choice of supplier) and on supply 
(arrangements for the construction of new gener-
ating capacity). 
This opening-up of the market must be carried 
out in a way which does not undermine public 
service obligations in the general economic inter-
est imposed on certain bodies. The directive 
acknowledges the right of the Member States to 
determine such obligations, which may reflect 
objectives associated with social cohesion or  39 security of supply, and to ensure that market lib-
eralisation does not obstruct their performance. 
122. First, the directive entitles certain 'eligi-
ble' customers to purchase electricity from the 
supplier of their choice. The initial opening-up — 
involving about 25 % of the market — will con-
cern, in any event, all companies consuming 
more than 100 GWh per year on a consumption-
site basis, and will be gradually increased to 
about 33 % after 2003. 
The levels of market opening provided for in the 
directive are merely minima. Each Member State 
is free to proceed further or faster, and many have 
already done so. In response to concerns 
expressed by those Member States regarding the 
imbalances thus created — some opening up 
their market in full, with others limiting their 
action to the requisite 25 % — the directive pro-
vides for a mechanism whereby, for a transitional 
period, they may refuse to accept imports from 
those Member States which are the least open to 
competition. 
123. The granting of a right of 'eligibility' to 
certain customers would only have a symbolic 
value if access to the network by those same cus-
tomers were not organised and guaranteed. It is 
not surprising that half of the directive's chap-
ters (') deal with subjects relating to the organi-
sation and operation of the network. The practi-
cal arrangements governing access may, accord-
ing to the .directive, take one of three forms (
2). 
The choice of one or other of these options is left 
to the Member State but must, in all cases, give 
rise to an equivalent result in terms of opening-
up of the market. 
There is no need to dwell on the detailed arrange-
ments for each of the aforementioned options. It 
is sufficient to recall that access to transmission 
systems and, where appropriate, to distribution 
systems, must be guaranteed for all eligible cus-
tomers on a non-discriminatory basis irrespective 
of the identity or nationality of the customers and 
suppliers. In particular, an integrated system 
operator may not give preferential treatment to a 
parent company or subsidiary and must maintain 
an independent management structure and busi-
ness secrecy in respect of them. 
40 
(') Chapters IV, V. VI and VII. 
(
2) Negotiated access, regulated access and single buyer procedure 
without purchase obligation accompanied by negotiated or regu-
lated access. 
Access to the system gives rise to a fee which is ei-
ther negotiated between parties or paid by the 
State. The identification of a specific system ac-
cess price is a recent innovation in most of the 
Member States. Its corollary is the establishment 
of separate accounts for network activities as op-
posed to the other activities (such as generating 
activities) that may be carried out by certain inte-
grated undertakings. The objective is to guarantee 
transparency and to avoid the emergence of cross-
subsidies between system activities — caught by 
the natural monopoly — and other activities, 
which are usually subject to competition. 
124. The opening-up resulting from the direc-
tive is not limited to customers. Producers should 
also benefit from the creation of new generation 
capacity — for the purpose of own consumption 
or for sale — provided for by the directive. These 
measures, which provide, for example, for the 
granting of operating permits for new generating 
capacity on a non-discriminatory basis, should 
promote the development of a varied supply 
which makes optimal use of technological and 
environmental innovation. 
125. These changes in generating arrangements 
will be accompanied in some Member States by 
the emergence of new operators or products: elec-
tricity brokers, spot markets and derivatives will 
develop as the market is opened up. 
A competition policy geared 
to liberalisation 
126. System access is an essential element of 
liberalisation. It should also be borne in mind 
that, in contrast to a sector such as telecommuni-
cations, in which technological development led 
to the creation of new systems, the electricity sec-
tor seems unlikely to develop in a way which 
undermines the essential nature of the existing 
systems. 
There are many potential obstacles to system 
access, such as unfounded refusals on the part of 
system operators and abusive or discriminatory 
transmission tariffs. 
It will therefore be necessary to ensure that tariffs 
do not result from the knock-on effect of excessive 
or uncontrolled costs or from the invoicing of ser-
vices which have not been used. Particular atten-
tion should be paid to the latter point in cases of 
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sion prices could also be fixed using a tariff 
method involving anticompetitive effects, such as 
one favouring producers with substantial, varied 
capacity as opposed to new producers entering the 
market. Lastly, it cannot be ruled out that refusals 
may be given because of insufficient capacity. 
In cases concerning access, the Commission will 
analyse the situation of the system manager in 
terms of his independence vis-à-vis the other 
activities of the integrated group to which he 
belongs. In general, it would not necessarily be in 
the interest of an independent system manager to 
refuse to carry out a transmission. On the con-
trary, he should seek to make maximum use of his 
capacity, even to the point of creating new capac-
ity in order to meet demand. 
727. Two other questions are particularly 
important and are to be examined in depth. 
First, electrical interconnections between the 
Member States will obviously play an important 
role in the creation of a single market in electric-
ity. It is probable that interconnectors will make 
a decisive contribution to the initial phase of mar-
ket opening by enabling foreign competitors to 
generate competition. With that in view, a careful 
examination of the competition aspects of the 
development and, in particular, the optimal use of 
existing interconnections should be carried out. 
The second subject of concern as regards system 
access is known as 'pancaking'. This refers to the 
sum of transmission costs resulting from the use 
of systems belonging to several operators. A sim-
ple illustration would be a transmission between 
Lille and Amsterdam: the sum total of the charges 
of the French, Belgian and Dutch systems could 
result in a very high price compared to that 
charged for an equivalent transmission between 
Lille and Paris. An initial solution to this problem 
has been developed in Germany, where several 
system operators coexist, under the so-called Ver-
bändevereinbarung. A European solution has not 
yet been found, but it will be essential if a gen-
uine single market is to be created. The Commis-
sion will help to bring this about by using the full 
range of instruments at its disposal. For instance, 
it could investigate a case of combined costs 
resulting in double invoicing of a single service 
from the angle of competition law. 
Work on system access should be accompanied 
by measures to guarantee customers' freedom of 
choice, which risks being limited by the estab-
lishment of exclusive or long-term contracts 
between customers and suppliers. The Commis-
sion will have to examine contracts in the light of 
practice on the most competitive markets. For 
their part, the parties operating on the electricity 
market will have to adapt their business practice 
to the new framework created by the directive. 
The objectives which the previous contracts were 
designed to achieve (security of supply, return on 
investments, etc.) could be realised by other 
methods with less of a competition-restricting 
impact (contracts with several suppliers, risk-
cover instruments, etc.). 
Lastly, the guarantees to be given regarding sys-
tem access and freedom of choice for customers 
will not serve their intended purpose unless elec-
tricity is provided by a sufficient number of sup-
pliers. A detailed examination should therefore 
be made of all proposed mergers or start-ups to 
ensure that they do not have the effect of under-
mining supply. 
128. Competition policy should therefore be 
developed in parallel with legislative work, tak-
ing account of the specific characteristics of the 
electricity sector — for instance, the existence of 
services of general economic interest. 
The Commission is not the only body with a man-
date to act in these fields. It can count on the support 
of national courts, national competition authorities 
and the industry regulators established when the di-
rective was transposed into national law. 
As in. the telecommunications field, the Commis-
sion's task will be to focus on cases with a definite 
Community interest or for which its involvement 
will be an essential pre-requisite for harmonisa-
tion of the antitrust approach. In particular, the 
Commission could focus more on structural ele-
ments of the market (such as the methods used to 
calculate system access prices) than on individual 
cases (for example, a dispute resulting from im-
plementation of the aforementioned method). 
7. Competition and the environment 
129. At the Cardiff European Summit, the 
Member States recalled the provisions of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (') stipulating that Commu-
nity policies should take account of environmen-
( ' ) Article 6 of the consolidated Treaty.  41 tal protection with a view to achieving sustainable 
development, an approach which was endorsed at 
the Vienna Summit. In its XX Vth Report on Com-
petition Policy, the Commission spelt out its posi-
tion regarding implementation of the Community 
competition rules in the environmental field. In 
particular, it stated: 'When the Commission ex-
amines individual cases, it weighs up the restric-
tions of competition arising out of an agreement 
against the environmental objectives of the agree-
ment, and applies the principle of proportionality 
in accordance with Article 85(3). In particular, im-
proving the environment is regarded as a factor 
which contributes to improving production or dis-
tribution or to promoting economic or technical 
progress.' (') In that connection, 1998 was marked 
by four cases reflecting the Commission's com-
mitment to take a positive approach to environ-
mental issues in its competition analyses. 
130. The Commission approved the agreement 
signed by the European Association of Consumer 
Electronics Manufacturers (EACEM) and 16 of 
its members, all major manufacturers of television 
sets and video cassette recorders. This agreement 
is a voluntary commitment to reduce the electrici-
ty consumption of this equipment when it is in 
stand-by mode. The Commission exempted the 
agreement under Article 81(3) on the ground that 
the energy-saving and environmental benefits of 
the scheme clearly represented technical and eco-
nomic progress and, by their nature, would be 
passed on to consumers. The energy saving could 
amount to 3.2 TWh a year from 2005. This reduc-
tion in energy consumption will have a significant 
impact in terms of the management of energy re-
sources, reductions in CO, emissions and, accord-
ingly, measures to counter global warming. The 
Commission also ascertained that the scheme 
would not eliminate competition in the affected 
markets and that its restrictive effect was essential 
to achieving its full benefits. 
131. The Association of European Automobile 
Manufacturers (ACEA) has undertaken, on 
behalf of its members, to reduce CO, emissions 
from passenger cars. This effort is in line with the 
Community policy of reducing CO, emissions 
into the atmosphere (
2). ACEA has set a reduction 
target of 25 % by 2008. The Commission and the 
Member States will monitor the efforts made to 
achieve that target. The Commission also took 
the view that this agreement between European 
automobile manufacturers did not infringe the 
competition rules. ACEA determines an average 
reduction target for all its members, but each of 
them is free to set its own level, which will 
encourage them to develop and introduce new 
C02-efficient technologies independently and in 
competition with one another. Accordingly, 
ACEA's voluntary agreement does not constitute 
a restriction of competition and is not caught by 
Article 81(1). 
132. In the EUCAR case, the Commission 
adopted a favourable stance on a cooperation 
agreement between Europe's leading motor man-
ufacturers which is designed to boost research in 
the motor industry, particularly on environmental 
issues. Most of the projects that will be devel-
oped involve experimental research on, for 
example, limiting noise or emission pollution 
caused by motor vehicles. The products obtained 
from this research may not be directly usable in a 
specific type of vehicle. The Commission there-
fore took the view that the research was at the 
pre-competitive stage and that the agreements 
did not infringe Community law. 
133. Finally, the Commission approved the 
membership agreements of Valpak, a non-prof-
it-making, industry-led compliance scheme op-
erating in the United Kingdom which has been 
set up to discharge the packaging waste recov-
ery and recycling obligations of its members (
3). 
The legal framework set up in the United King-
dom to implement the directive provides scope 
for competition in the market for 
compliance-scheme services which seek to fulfil 
recovery and recycling obligations on behalf of 
a business. While Valpak is currently the largest 
compliance scheme operating in the United 
Kingdom, other competing schemes exist and 
have notified their arrangements to the Com-
mission. 
134. Following its examination of Valpak's 
membership agreements, the Commission con-
cluded that the agreements restricted competition 
within the meaning of Article 81(1) because they 
42 
(') 1995 Competition Report, points 83 to 85. 
(
2) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament of 29.7.1998. 'Implementing the Commu-
nity strategy to reduce CO, emissions from cars: an environmen-
tal agreement with the European Automobile Industry' 
(COM( 1998) 495 final). 
(-
1) These obligations were introduced in March 1997 by government 
regulations implementing the requirements of the EU directive on 
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obliged businesses wishing to join the scheme to pak and other schemes would be obliged to invest 
transfer the totality of their obligations in all in the United Kingdom's collection and/or repro-
packaging materials. This 'all or nothing' cessing infrastructure in order to meet their mem-
approach, which transposes a regulatory provi- bers' obligations in the future, the Commission 
sion, restricts the extent to which Valpak and concluded that an 'all or nothing' approach was 
other schemes will be able to compete against necessary, at least in the short term, if schemes 
one another on a material-specific basis. The such as Valpak were to succeed in securing suffi-
Commission went on to consider whether the cient funding to allow the necessary investment 
notified arrangements could benefit from exemp- to take place. The Commission informed Valpak 
tion under Article 81(3). In view of the emerging at the same time that it reserved the right to re-
nature of the market and the likelihood that Val- examine the case after three years. 
Box 5: Globalisation of markets and competition analysis 
As globalisation of markets progresses, the Commission is increasingly carrying out competition analysis 
on markets which are not confined to Europe. For that reason, it takes account of the geographical dimen-
sion of actual competition when defining the relevant market on which its analysis is based. It may also 
examine the competitive situation in geographical areas outside the relevant market when analysing poten-
tial competition. 
The concept of market to which the Commission refers when assessing an agreement, a practice or pro-
posed merger from the viewpoint of Community competition law is based on specific criteria which were 
laid down in 1997 in a Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Com-
munity competition law. Essentially, the relevant market, the place where supply and demand interact, con-
stitutes a framework for analysis which highlights the competition constraints facing the companies con-
cerned. In other words, the task is to identify the competitors of these companies which are genuinely able 
to affect their behaviour and prevent them from acting independently of all real competitive pressure. 
In determining the geographical confines of the relevant market, the Commission takes account of a num-
ber of factors, such as the reactions of economic operators to relative price movements, the sociocultural 
characteristics of demand and the presence or absence of barriers to entry, such as transport costs. It should 
also be mentioned that the Commission tends to focus on demand trends in its analyses and that this has 
an impact on the geographical dimension of the relevant market. 
As a result, the relevant market is a specific instrument of analysis and does not always reflect vaguer con-
cerns about economic reality. An economic sector of activity does not necessarily constitute a relevant mar-
ket. A product may be manufactured and sold throughout the world; supply and demand do not necessar-
ily coincide within that area. Price differences from one geographical area to another will reflect the exis-
tence of separate geographical markets. 
That notwithstanding, where appropriate and in accordance with its legislation, the Commission refers in 
its competition analyses to worldwide relevant markets. 
In recent years, as a result of merger controls, the Commission has increasingly identified world markets, 
as it did in about 20 cases in 1998. A study of merger decisions shows that the Commission has established 
the existence of world markets in a wide variety of economic sectors. For example, in the Boeing/Mac-
Donnell Douglas case, the Commission took the view that the market for large commercial jet aircraft was 
a world market. Likewise, in the Gencor/Lonrho and Anglo American Corporation/Lonrho cases, the Com-
mission acknowledged the existence of world markets in platinum and rhodium. In addition, even where 
the market is identified as European, the Commission may take account of potential competition from other 
geographical areas when assessing a transaction. In the Saint-Gobain/Wacker-Chemie/NOM case, for 
instance, while it identified two markets for silicum carbide restricted to the EEA, it also looked into poten-
tial competition from companies based in China or eastern Europe. 
43 As regards Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, in certain sectors of activity which, by their nature, involve 
European and non-European parties, the Commission regularly carries out competition analyses on mar-
kets which are larger than the European Economic Area. For example, in the TACA case, which concerned 
transatlantic shipping companies, the Commission had to take account of die transatlantic dimension of the 
agreement and, accordingly, it imposed fines not just on European companies, but also on US and Asian 
ones. The Commission has similar concerns as regards transatlantic airline alliances or strategic alliances 
in the telecommunications sector (such as Atlas/Global One or Uniworld). In some cases, with the world 
dimension of the relevant market resulting from the small number of producers, coupled with worldwide 
demand, as in the IRE/Nordion case, the Commission conducts its competitive analyses on world markets. 
While the relevant market concept provides the Commission with an instrument enabling it to carry out 
analyses and adopt decisions which take account of the world dimension of markets, it goes without say-
ing that it may face problems when it requires information available only outside the Union or when it has 
to enforce its decisions or have them enforced. For that reason it has developed a policy of international 
cooperation in competition matters with its main trading partners. 
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D — Statistics 
Figure 1 
New cases 
600 
500 --
400 --
300 
200 
100 --
400 
26 
110 
I 
264 
426 
21 
170 
235 
521 
47 
114 
360 
447 
82 
159 
206 
499 
101 
177 
221 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
509 
101 
192 
216 
1998 
I I Cases opened 
— on Commission's 
own initiative 
~J Complaints 
Notifications 
Figure 2 
Cases closed 
900 -
800 -
700 -
600 -
500 -
400 -
300 -
200 -
100 -
" 
14 
-
792 
33 
495 
27 
14 
403 
21 
367 
, 
42 
539 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
~J Formal decisions 
■J Informal procedure 
45 Figure 3 
End-of-year stock of cases over time 
1400 -r 
1200 
1000 
800 
600 
400 
200 --
806 
400 
1117 
528 521 
426 
+ 
1280 
417  447 
1 h 
388 
1262 
499 
1204 
581 
517 509 
H 
1993 
~J Input of cases 
1994 1995 
~J Output of cases 
1996  1997 1998 
-+^— End-of-year stock of cases 
46 — MERGER CONTROL 
A — Introduction 
135. The 'merger wave' that can be traced back 
to at least the beginning of 1997 continued 
through 1998 and showed no sign of abating by 
the end of the year. The number and nature of the 
cases examined by the Commission in 1998 nat-
urally reflects this trend in merger activity. It has 
potentially important consequences and implica-
tions for the work of the Commission in this area. 
To remain effective and efficient, Community 
merger control will have to continue to adapt 
rapidly to the significant challenges posed by 
changes in the economic environment on the one 
hand, and legal and policy developments on the 
other, all within the context of a desire to min-
imise regulatory costs, delays and uncertainties. 
136. Against this background, therefore, it is 
unsurprising that the first keynote of the year has 
been a continuation of the significant upward 
trend in the number of mergers examined by the 
Commission. This has grown by substantially 
more than 10 % in each of the last four years. This 
year, the annual total number of notifications re-
ceived under the merger regulation (') exceeded 
200 forthe first time. The year's total of 235 repre-
sents an increase of 36 % on last year's, a rate of 
growth equal to last year's record level and well 
above the rate for any other year. Similarly for de-
cisions. The year's total of 238 'final' decisions is 
also by a large margin the highest ever, and shows 
an increase of over 66 % on last year, reflecting the 
continuing very high rate of growth. 
137. Various factors, not all of them easily iden-
tified, drive the level of merger activity. In 1998, 
however, an important factor in the large, fre-
quently multinational mergers dealt with by the 
Commission may well have been the advent of the 
single European currency, creating the possibility 
of synergies from simplified financial and com-
mercial operations within groups of companies, 
especially those with substantial interests in sev-
eral Member States. This appears to have been a 
factor in several mergers in sectors as diverse as 
banking and finance, automotive components, 
and pharmaceuticals. Another likely factor, re-
flected in the higher than usual level of merger ac-
tivity in the oil sector and those associated with it, 
was the fall in oil prices worldwide, prompting 
major restructuring operations aimed at maintain-
ing profitability in the face of lower margins. 
138. Nor has the complexity of the Commis-
sion's caseload reduced. The year's total of 12 
decisions to open more detailed investigations 
('phase II proceedings' — Article 6(1 )(c) of the 
merger regulation) remains stable, though 
slightly below last year's as a proportion of the 
total caseload. There were also slightly fewer 
cases decided at phase II. That should not, how-
ever, be taken as an indication that the proportion 
of large-scale mergers which have potentially 
serious anticompetitive effects on trade in the 
Community is declining. Account needs also to 
be taken of the significant number of cases where 
the Commission's new powers to accept formal 
remedies in the first stage of investigation (Arti-
cle 6(1 )(b) as amended) have been used — 12 in 
all, over the nine months since the powers were 
introduced. In addition, there have been several 
cases, including some (e.g. KPMG/Ernst & 
Young (
2), Wienerberger/Cremer und Breuer (
3), 
Wolters Kluwer/Reed Elsevier (
4) and LHZ/Carl 
Zeiss) (
5) where the phase II investigation was 
already under way, where the parties decided to 
abandon their merger plans ahead of a potentially 
adverse final decision. 
1998 also saw the first imposition by the Com-
. mission of a financial penalty on an enterprise for 
failure to notify a concentration in time (
6). 
Changes to the thresholds for cases qualifying for 
investigation, and to the way in which certain joint 
ventures are treated under the regulation, were al-
so introduced in 1998. Overall, the impact of these 
changes is relatively small compared with that of 
the other factors mentioned, but they have none 
the less increased the number of cases dealt with 
under the regulation, and one of the joint-venture 
cases (BT/AT&T) (
7) has been the subject of a de-
cision to open phase II proceedings. 
139. The trend towards 'globalisation' — the 
creation of businesses with worldwide leadership 
in particular product areas, in contrast to the 
diversification and conglomeracy that were fea-
tures of the merger 'wave' of the 1980s — also 
appears to have continued. The need for compe-
( ' ) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (OJ L 395,30.12.1989), as 
amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 (OJ L 180, 
9.7.1997). 
(
2) Case No IV/M. 1044. 
(') Case No IV/M. 1047. 
C) Case No IV/M. 1040. 
(') Case No IV/M. 1246. 
C') Case No IV/M.920. Samsung/Ast. 
C) Case No J V. 15.  47 tition authorities to be capable (whether alone or 
jointly) of effective action across national bound-
aries has likewise intensified. In the light of expe-
rience, the Commission has developed methods 
for ensuring that cooperation with non-member 
countries — in particular the USA — on merger 
control matters is efficient and constructive; it 
will continue to keep them under review. 
140. Another notable consequence of the trend 
towards globalisation and specialisation in 
merger activity is the increased occurrence of 
mergers in markets that could be described as oli-
gopolistic — where there are only a few large 
players but no single potentially dominant firm. 
The judgment of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in the Kali und Salz case ('), discussed fur-
ther below, confirmed the application of the reg-
ulation to collective dominant positions (i.e. to 
oligopoly), and the Commission is reviewing its 
approach to such cases in the light of this judg-
ment (
2) and of other developments. 
141. The year also saw final decisions on a num-
ber of other important cases, of which perhaps 
those dealing with the rapidly evolving markets in 
digital television services and the Internet 
should be highlighted. In the linked cases Bertels-
mann/Kirch/Premiere and Deutsche 
Telekom/Betaresearch (
3), the Commission decid-
ed to prohibit a major German-based project in 
digital television services. This intervention was 
necessary to prevent foreclosure of the emerging 
markets in this sector to other suppliers of pay-TV 
and related systems and services — notably cable 
network access, set-top digital decoder technolo-
gy, and films and other programming. The two 
mergers would create a grouping with major 
strengths in all the key components of the package 
of goods and services required to bring digital TV 
services onto the market, one or other of the par-
ties having a very strong position in each of the 
sectors concerned, even though the horizontal 
overlaps produced were not, in all instances, so 
significant. Attempts to reach agreement with the 
parties on satisfactory undertakings to remedy the 
competition problems so that the deal could go 
ahead proved unsuccessful; prohibition was the 
only alternative. This decision underlines the 
Commission's determination to act where neces-
48 
(') Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 French Republic. SCPA and 
EMC ν Commission (1998) ECR1-1375. 
(
:) See, for example, Case No IV/M.1016, Price Waterhouse/Coop-
crs and Lybrand, also discussed below. 
(■') Cases Nos IV/M.993 and IV/M. 1027. 
sary to ensure that newly emerging markets are 
not foreclosed. Only in a competitive environ-
ment can their expected potential for growth, nec-
essary to satisfy the increasing consumer demand, 
be fully realised. 
142. In Worldcom/MCI (
4), foreclosure of an-
other relatively new product area — the Internet 
— was also the main issue. Here, a satisfactory so-
lution was found, involving the divestment of 
MCI's Internet activities to a new entrant. This di-
vestment was at the time the largest ever to result 
from antitrust action. After a full investigation the 
Commission found that both parties to this very 
large merger, covering a wide range of telecom-
munications activities, were significant suppliers 
of 'universal connectivity' — the ability to offer 
access throughout the Internet without having to 
pay others to complete the connections. They 
would together become dominant on that market, 
with the ability to dictate terms to competitors 
needing this important service. Another signifi-
cant feature of this case was that, like a growing 
number of others, it involved a carefully coordi-
nated assessment and negotiation of remedies 
with the US competition authorities, in this in-
stance the Department of Justice (DoJ). 
B. — New developments 
1. Market definition 
Internet infrastructure and access services 
143. The Commission dealt during the year 
with a number of cases concerning the supply of 
Internet services. Some of these cases also 
involved full-function joint ventures which 
required an examination of the possibility of sub-
stantial coordination of the activities of the par-
ents, under the new procedures adopted as part of 
the review of the merger regulation. These cases 
are discussed in more detail in Box 7. From the 
viewpoint of market definition, however, Internet 
services raise a number of interesting issues, 
some of which were analysed by the Commission 
in the abovementioned Worldcom/MCI case. As a 
newly emerging sector, it was necessary for the 
Commission to construct an approach to market 
definition on the basis of information assembled 
C) Case No IV/M. 1069. Il — MERGER CONTROL 
Box 6: Merger review 
The quickening pace of developments has been the year's second keynote. Following the completion of 
the review of the regulation last year, described in the XXVIIth Competition Report ('), a package of 
changes was introduced with effect from the beginning of March. Probably the most significant change, in 
practical terms, was that regarding acceptance of undertakings in phase I, mentioned above. The formali-
sation of phase I undertakings has proved of interest and benefit to merging parties and the Commission 
alike. It enables die delay and consequent uncertainty over the outcome of a notified transaction to be 
reduced, and avoids the need to deploy some of the substantial extra resources (at the Commission as well 
as by the parties) required for a full phase II investigation and decision. Experience with the new power 
shows clearly that the revised system is able to deal both quickly — in a matter of weeks, rather than sev-
eral months — and efficaciously with mergers where a potential dominant position may be created. How-
ever, for the new procedure to be applicable, it is essential that the issues can be clearly identified and effec-
tive — and readily implementable — remedies found and agreed wimin the short timescale. It is encour-
aging to note that in several of these cases the merging parties frankly acknowledged, from the outset, both 
the likely existence of competition problems, and also their willingness to offer suitably specific remedies 
— which generally involve the divestment of part of the existing or acquired businesses — and to coop-
erate fully with the Commission in the search for a solution. There will, of course, continue to be cases 
where, even with good will and careful preparation, a full investigation is needed in order to properly iden-
tify and assess the competition problems, and examine alternative outcomes — including prohibition. But 
without the positive factors just mentioned, the prospects for early resolution are bound to be severely 
reduced. 
The supplementary turnover thresholds (
2), introduced with the aim of reducing the problem of merging 
parties having to notify the same transaction to several national authorities, also appear to be having the 
expected effect. Fourteen cases in all of this type were notified in the year, amounting to 6 % of all cases 
notified. This is broadly in line with the Commission's estimates. Moreover, in most of the cases in ques-
tion, the parties had substantial operations in several Member States, such that an effect on competition in 
national or EU markets might be expected to arise, and notification to several Member States was likely 
to have been necessary. 
Revised Commission notices on various aspects of the regime were also published in March, and work on 
the important task of producing a revised version of the notice on restrictions ancillary to a concentration 
continued throughout the year. Other changes that were introduced following the review — notably regard-
ing the treatment of full-function joint ventures — are discussed elsewhere in this report. 
The review of the regulation has also, however, highlighted the importance of the Commission continuing 
to strive to optimise its merger control processes, against a background of the increasing caseload on the 
one hand and the need to contain resource expenditure on the other. A significant issue in this area is the 
treatment of the substantial number of notified cases which are prima facie unlikely to raise competition 
problems. The Commission has therefore begun exploring options for streamlining and simplifying the 
handling of these cases. 
(') 1997 Competition Report, points 148 to 157; SEQ1998) 636 final, pp. 49-51. 
(
2) Regulation (EC) No 1310/97, Article 1 ( 1 )(b). 
49 especially for the purpose. Reliable and compre-
hensive information on, for example, market 
shares was not publicly available, and — together 
with the US DoJ — the. Commission organised 
the collection of information and views on the 
merger from the many businesses active in the 
sector as well as from the parties themselves. 
This was in itself a considerable task, albeit 
greatly facilitated by the ability — via the Inter-
net — to communicate and exchange data rapidly 
worldwide with a large number of third parties. 
144. It became clear from the phase II investiga-
tion in particular that, although superficially the 
Internet presented many of the characteristics of a 
fragmented market with low entry barriers, the ba-
sic market structure was in fact hierarchical or 
pyramidal, with different characteristics at differ-
ent levels. Whereas at the lower levels there were 
generally a range of suppliers and few barriers to 
entry, at the top of the pyramid the industry was 
much more concentrated. So-called 'universal 
connectivity' — the ability to offer access to all 
points on the Internet, worldwide, without having 
to pay others to complete the connection — was 
found to be a vital component of any package of 
Internet services. Entry barriers at this level were, 
however, significant, enhanced by the so-called 
'network effect', whereby subscribers will prefer 
to connect to the largest available network. This 
aspect of Internet services was accordingly found 
to constitute a separate — worldwide — market, 
in which_there was only a small number of (very 
large) suppliers, among them the parties. 
Accountancy services 
145. In analysing, for the first time, two major 
concentrations in the sector, the Commission was 
required to develop an approach to market defin-
ition in the provision of accountancy services. 
The proposed mergers between Price Waterhouse 
and Coopers and Lybrand (cleared after a phase 
II investigation (') and between KPMG and Ernst 
& Young (subsequently abandoned) would have 
revealed little cause for concern if measured in 
terms of overall market share, whether nationally 
or on a wider geographic basis. However, in an 
assessment which bore certain similarities to that 
of the Internet sector just discussed, the Com-
mission found that at the highest levels of this 
sector's pyramidal structure there was a very 
high degree of concentration. Third party con-
tacts confirmed the existence of a separate mar-
ket for the supply of accountancy services (and, 
in particular, statutory audits) to very large, usu-
ally multinational, firms. For these customers it 
was essential to be able to provide a comprehen-
sive service from a worldwide network of offices 
and staff with the necessary locally recognised 
qualifications and specialist expertise. Together 
with the importance of choosing a firm with an 
established reputation in order to maintain share-
holder confidence in the financial results, this 
meant in effect that, for many large companies, 
the market was restricted to the so-called 'Big 
Six' accountancy firms — which would reduce to 
four if the two proposed mergers went ahead. 
Insurance markets 
146. The insurance company sector is one in 
which mergers have rarely been found to give 
rise to competition problems, even though in 
recent years the sector has become more concen-
trated. Insurance (and reinsurance) for large risks 
tends to be carried out on an international basis, 
with customers able to chose (either on their own 
or with the aid of a broker) between a number of 
suppliers in various countries. At the level of sup-
ply to the small business or private consumer, 
markets remain predominantly national owing to 
issues of language, custom and local laws and 
taxation provisions. In most such markets there 
is, again, a satisfactory range of suppliers, large 
and small, and entry is not generally difficult, at 
least for established financial institutions such as 
banks. Moreover, supply-side substitution 
between products is generally relatively easy, so 
that most large insurers can offer a full product 
range and move into new product areas without 
difficulty. In Allianz/AGF (
2), however, the Com-
mission found that certain products constituted 
distinct markets, notably so-called 'del credere' 
credit insurance (i.e. insurance against the risk 
that, as a result of the insolvency of the buyer, a 
supplier will not be paid). Del credere insurers 
require a detailed knowledge of the (predomi-
nantly national) markets and buyers in and for 
which they offer cover. This can take a long time 
to develop, since it can as a rule only be acquired 
through experience, and meanwhile the insurer is 
exposed to risks which, in contrast to those of 
many other types of insurance underwriting, can-
50  (') Case No IV/M. 1016.  (
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not be accurately quantified. Entry barriers were 
therefore found to be sufficiently high for this 
product area to constitute a separate market. Sub-
sequent analysis identified a risk that the merger 
would create a dominant position in this market, 
and the parties gave undertakings to divest 
AGF's holding in a subsidiary active in it, in 
order to resolve this problem. 
2. Dominance assessment 
Joint/collective dominance 
147. The most significant development in the 
Commission's approach to this subject was the 
delivery, in March, of the judgment of the ECJ in 
the Kali und Salz case. The judgment, in response 
to applications by the French Government and 
the French parties to the merger, dealt with vari-
ous procedural and substantive points, and con-
cluded that the Commission's (1993) decision to 
allow the merger, but subject to certain undertak-
ings, should be annulled. It was, however, also 
notable as the first instance in which the ECJ had 
had to examine the Commission's approach to 
the analysis of oligopoly ('collective domi-
nance') as opposed to the more classical domi-
nance by a single firm (or, at most, two firms). In 
the Court's view, to establish collective domi-
nance in a merger situation the Commission 
needed to establish that the notified operation 
would lead to a significant reduction in competi-
tion between the parties to the merger and one or 
more third parties by giving them collectively the 
ability, as a result of the existence of 'correlative 
factors' amongst them, to adopt a common policy 
on the market(s) concerned and to act substan-
tially independently of other competitors, cus-
tomers and consumers. These correlative factors 
need not, it appears, include structural links, in 
the strict sense of cross-shareholdings, contracts 
etc. between the alleged dominant firms, 
although where such links are cited, it is neces-
sary to show how they would lead to the elimina-
tion of competition between the firms concerned. 
But whatever factors are employed should at 
least provide for, as well as support, the existence 
of a typical oligopoly market structure and trad-
ing conditions, convincing evidence of the exis-
tence among the firms concerned of a common 
interest in not competing actively against each 
other. This common interest might be demon-
strated by an analysis of factors such as the 
degree of symmetry of the market shares, pro-
duction capacities and cost structures of the 
alleged dominant firms. The Commission con-
sidered all these factors, to some extent, in its 
original decision. The Court, however, whilst 
recognising the difficulties of analysis and evi-
dence-gathering posed by the short timescales for 
investigation under the merger regulation, found 
that they had not been sufficiently well estab-
lished to properly motivate the decision, and 
accordingly annulled it. It was then necessary for 
the Commission to re-examine the case in the 
light of the judgment, and an account of that 
action is given elsewhere in this report (see 
'Rules and procedures' below). 
148. Since the decision, the Commission has 
been reviewing its approach to oligopoly in 
merger cases, and this work is continuing. Many 
aspects require further consideration; for exam-
ple, the assessment of cost structures. However, 
the oligopoly issue was examined in some detail 
in two other phase II cases in 1998 — the accoun-
tancy case Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand 
and the Scandinavian paper and board case 
Enso/Stora (')· 
149. In Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand, 
the relevant product market, for auditing and 
accountancy services to large firms (see above 
under 'Market definition'), was found to be 
highly concentrated, although there was not 
found to be a single dominant firm. Combined 
market share post-merger would be below 40 % 
in any Member State and four other competitors 
would remain. To analyse the oligopoly aspects 
of the case, the Commission based its approach 
on the criteria used previously in, among others, 
the Gencor/Lonrho case of 1996 (
2), which also 
appear to have been broadly accepted by the 
Court in Kali und Salz. Essentially, these are that 
collective dominance is more likely to arise in 
heavily concentrated markets where there are in 
addition features likely to further restrict com-
petitive behaviour — such as homogeneous 
products, transparent pricing, high entry barriers, 
mature technology, static or falling demand, links 
between suppliers, absence of countervailing 
buyer power, etc. In these conditions there are 
likely to be incentives for suppliers to engage in 
parallel pricing and other oligopolistic behaviour. 
The Commission found that several of these 
(') Case No IV/M. 1225. 
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characteristics were present. For example, 
demand was static, innovation unlikely, and 
prices relatively transparent (in some countries, 
audit fees had to be published in the audited com-
pany's accounts). However, it was considered 
that the number of remaining competitors post-
merger was relatively large to support an effec-
tive oligopoly — the larger the number of partic-
ipants, the harder it becomes to maintain and, if 
necessary, enforce coherence of competitive 
behaviour among them. Customers did not con-
sider that oligopolistic behaviour was already 
occurring before the merger, and there was evi-
dence that customers were willing and able to 
move their business between suppliers in order to 
obtain improved terms, notwithstanding the 
long-term nature of most audit relationships. 
150. In the absence of the merger between 
KPMG and Ernst & Young (which was aban-
doned earlier in the year after the Commission 
decided to open a phase II investigation) there 
was no risk of a joint dominant position arising 
between the two largest firms. Moreover, the 
market shares of the competitors would all be 
substantially less than that of the merged firm, 
and they also varied considerably between the 
different (national) geographic markets. This 
implied substantially asymmetrical cost struc-
tures, which would further increase the difficulty 
of sustaining anticompetitive parallel behaviour. 
To secure coherence across a large part of the 
market, it would be necessary for the merged firm 
to ensure parallel behaviour on the part of several 
of these smaller competitors, rather than just one 
or two of them. Accordingly the Commission 
decided to clear this merger. 
151. In Enso/Stora, the oligopoly issue con-
cerned the markets for newsprint and magazine 
paper. The merging parties — Enso of Finland and 
Stora of Sweden, together constituting the largest 
integrated paper and board group in the world — 
were two of only six significant suppliers of 
newsprint (accounting together for around three 
quarters of total capacity) in the EEA market. The 
combined group would become the largest of 
these. The market structure in magazine paper was 
only slightly less concentrated. The Commis-
sion's detailed investigation found that these mar-
kets displayed many of the characteristics of an 
anticompetitive oligopoly — low demand 
growth, concentrated supply side, homogeneous 
products, mature technology, high entry barriers, 
similar cost structures. The merger would signifi-
cantly increase the level of concentration in both 
markets. However, the Commission also found 
that other key oligopoly characteristics were not 
present: in particular, there was no market trans-
parency — information on prices and quantities 
supplied was not readily available to competitors, 
and indeed there were secret discounts. Moreover 
there was evidence that customers — principally, 
large publishing groups — could exercise a mea-
sure of countervailing power. Accordingly the 
Commission concluded that this aspect of the 
merger would not lead to the creation or strength-
ening of a dominant position which would signifi-
cantly impede competition in the common market 
or a substantial part of it. 
Foreclosure through ties 
with customers/suppliers 
152. Two phase II cases completed in the year 
dealt with the creation of a dominant position via 
ties with customers and/or suppliers. In Hoff-
mann-La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim ('), the 
relevant markets were in the sector of certain 
clinical chemistry test products. Competition 
concerns arose in regard to in vitro diagnostics 
because not only would the merged company 
have a combined share of between 40 % and 80 % 
(depending on the national market involved) in 
the products themselves, but also it would bene-
fit from the parties' unequalled strength in the 
'installed base' of instruments on which the in 
vitro tests are performed. There was a risk that 
customers would become 'locked in' to supplies 
of the test products from the merged company — 
and other suppliers excluded — because of their 
dependence on it for service, maintenance, etc. of 
the instruments. Consequently the Commission 
accepted a remedy whereby Roche undertook to 
divest the majority of its clinical chemistry prod-
ucts business in certain Member States. 
153. In Agfa-Gevaert/Du Pont (
2), the Com-
mission found competition concerns to arise in 
the markets for negative plates for offset printing. 
In this EEA market, Agfa and Du Pont — each of 
which already had substantial market shares — 
also had various finance arrangements with plate 
manufacturers and exclusive dealing arrange-
ments with the main distributors of its plates and 
related equipment. Again, the concern was that 
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competitors would be unable to gain access to 
supplies or to distribution of their products, 
enabling the parties to raise prices above the 
competitive level. To address this concern, Agfa 
offered to terminate its exclusive arrangements 
with equipment suppliers and distributors; this 
would allow competitors to offer their own plates 
to distributors and thereby develop their sales. 
The Commission accepted this remedy and the 
operation was approved on that basis. 
Dominance in neighbouring markets 
154. In Wolters Kluwer/Reed Elsevier, a pro-
posal which would have resulted in the creation of 
one of the world's largest publishers of profes-
sional and specialist information, the Commis-
sion found grounds for concern about the merger's 
impact on competition in several neighbouring 
product markets, of differing geographic dimen-
sions: the market for academic journals and books 
(worldwide); for professional books on law and 
taxation (in various Member States); for educa-
tional publishing for schools (in the United King-
dom); for various kinds of business publication 
(the Netherlands); for Dutch dictionaries; and for 
services provided from transport databases 
(Europe-wide). Each of these markets presented 
its own competition problems. However, the par-
ties' strength across such a wide-ranging series of 
closely related markets, and the resulting very 
large size of the merged entity — several times 
that of any other publisher of professional infor-
mation in the Community — was a further source 
of concern. In the Commission's view, such a mar-
ket structure could prevent the maintenance of 
competition in the supply of legal, fiscal and sci-
entific information, with a consequent adverse ef-
fect on prices. In addition, there could be a fore-
closure effect, since the combination of the par-
ties' financial resources and their ownership of 
copyrighted material would be likely to discour-
age investment by existing and potential competi-
tors. In the event, however, it was not necessary 
for the Commission to reach a final view on these 
matters, as, following the opening of a phase II in-
vestigation at the end of 1997, in March this year 
the parties announced that they had decided to 
abandon their current merger plans. 
Vertical links 
155. The two, linked, German digital pay-TV 
cases — Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere and 
Deutsche Telekom/Betaresearch — already 
referred to, gave rise to concerns over the cre-
ation of dominance through vertical market links, 
rather than the traditional horizontal overlaps. In 
order to supply a complete 'package' of digital 
pay-TV services to consumers, various elements 
are needed — notably, 'set-top box' technology 
(to decode the programmes being sold and to 
record details for charging purposes), broadcast-
ing facilities, access to cable and/or satellite net-
works, and programming content. The proposed 
operations would have brought together leading 
suppliers of all these elements to the German 
market. They involved the development of Pre-
miere as a joint digital pay-TV channel and mar-
keting platform. Premiere would use Kirch's cur-
rent digital TV activities and its 'd-box' technol-
ogy (the set-top decoder box that is required for 
digital reception), together with the related tech-
nical services (provided by Deutsche Telekom) 
and content (from an existing joint venture 
involving Bertelsmann and Kirch CLT-UFA). 
156. These concentrations would, it was con-
sidered, create or strengthen dominant market 
positions in the key areas. Premiere would have 
achieved a dominant position on the market for 
pay-TV in Germany (and the rest of the German-
speaking area of Europe). Currently, it is one of 
only two providers of pay-TV in Germany. The 
combination of this already strong position, giv-
ing access to a large base of subscribers, plus the 
important programme resources of Kirch and 
CLT-UFA would, the Commission found, have 
prevented the development of an alternative 
broadcasting and marketing platform by other 
firms, since the merged entity would be able to 
determine the conditions on which other broad-
casters could enter the pay-TV market. Similarly, 
in regard to technical pay-TV services, the parties 
would have become, permanently, the dominant 
supplier of these services for satellite TV, and the 
only supplier of them for cable pay-TV All digi-
tal pay-TV providers in the area currently use the 
Betaresearch-access technology and the related 
d-box decoder, which employs a proprietary 
encryption/decryption system. An alternative 
technology was not considered likely to be devel-
oped, so other service providers would have to 
obtain a licence for it from Betaresearch; again 
creating the ability for the merged entity to fore-
close this market to competitors. As regards cable 
networks, Deutsche Telekom already had the 
largest share of subscribers. The operation would 
have made it harder for other cable network oper- 53 ators to compete, because they would have had to 
adopt Deutsche Telekom's transparent transmis-
sion model for digital pay-TV Premiere would 
have been unlikely to accept a different market-
ing model developed by the competitors, which 
they would need in order to be able to finance the 
development of their own networks. 
157. The merged entities would, accordingly, 
have been able to act independently of competi-
tors in all the major aspects of the supply of dig-
ital pay-TV and associated services, and in the 
absence of agreement with the parties on reme-
dies, prohibition was the only alternative. 
Potential competition 
158. In assessing a merger's effect, the Com-
mission takes account of potential competition as 
well as actual competition, and the former aspect 
can sometimes be decisive for the outcome. In 
ITS/Signode/Titan (') the Commission examined 
competition in the supply of steel and plastic strap-
ping in western Europe, and found possible 
grounds for concern in regard to the parties' com-
bined share in steel strapping. In the course of a de-
tailed investigation (phase II), the Commission 
found that — contrary to indications in the initial 
investigation — plastic strapping could be substi-
tuted for steel effectively and without cost penalty 
in many applications. On this basis the combined 
market share of the parties in the relevant geo-
graphic market was of the order of 40 %, most of it 
in the steel sector. Entry into steel strapping was 
found to be difficult, but plastic strapping was con-
sidered relatively easy to produce and market, and 
demand for it (by contrast with that for the steel va-
riety) was growing. Consequently, the likelihood 
of new entry into the plastic strapping sector in the 
event of an attempt by the parties to raise prices for 
their products, and in particular for the steel vari-
ety, was considered to provide an adequate safe-
guard to competition following the merger, given 
also that customers appeared to have at least some 
countervailing power. Accordingly the Commis-
sion decided to clear the operation. 
Countervailing buyer power 
159. The issue of the ability of one or more pow-
erful customers to effectively neutralise the posi-
tion of a potentially dominant supplier was also 
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considered in detail in Enso/Stora in respect of the 
market for liquid packaging board (used, e.g., for 
milk and fruit juice cartons). The effect of the 
merger would be to reduce the number of suppli-
ers in this specialised market in the EEA to three, 
with the merged entity becoming by some way the 
leader in market share terms. Technical and com-
mercial entry barriers were found to be high and 
total demand growth modest, making new entry 
unlikely. However, the market was also heavily 
concentrated on the demand side, with one firm in 
particular — Tetra Pak — accounting for a very 
substantial share. The two other main buyers 
(Elopak and SIG Combibloc) did not purchase 
such large quantities as Tetra Pak. However, they 
too appeared to possess a measure of countervail-
ing power, since they imported 'strategic' quanti-
ties from the USA. Overall, the Commission's in-
vestigation suggested that these circumstances 
produced, exceptionally, a situation of mutual de-
pendence between buyers and sellers, which the 
merger was unlikely to disturb, and the operation 
was cleared. 
3. Remedies 
Phase I 
160. As has already been noted, there was a 
significant number of cases in which it proved 
possible to use the Commission's new powers to 
resolve possible issues of dominance at phase I 
by means of a formal undertaking, without the 
need for the expense and delay of a phase II 
investigation. As remarked above, this procedure 
is not suitable for all cases which raise competi-
tion problems. If the problem, and a satisfactory 
solution for it, cannot be readily identified, if the 
remedy cannot be speedily implemented, or if the 
parties are unwilling or unable to cooperate with 
the Commission in achieving a solution within 
the short timescale allowed, then the normal 
process, i.e. a full phase II investigation, will be 
appropriate. It is, of course, essential that parties 
wishing to offer an undertaking at phase I do so 
within the prescribed time limit of three weeks 
from the date of notification. The time limit also 
means that it is vital that the remedy proposed is 
a genuine attempt by the parties to clearly resolve 
the competition problem as identified by the 
Commission, and thus remove the grounds for 
the 'serious doubts' about the operation's com-
patibility with the common market which are the Il — MERGER CONTROL 
basis for opening phase II proceedings, rather 
than some kind of 'opening offer' which might be 
improved on later if the Commission insists. 
There is very little scope for substantive revision 
of proposals under this procedure. Where phase I 
undertakings are offered, the Commission needs, 
among other things, to ensure that Member States 
have an opportunity to comment on the remedy 
and, if appropriate, 'market test' it with interested 
third parties before deciding whether or not to 
accept it. The Commission is not obliged to 
accept any remedy at phase I, and it will not allow 
the process to be abused by parties holding back 
from offering a fully effective remedy until the 
last moment, in the hope that something less 
might prove sufficient. 
161. Given the general framework laid down in 
the revised regulation, it was to be expected that 
the remedies adopted in most cases where phase 
I undertakings were accepted would be relatively 
simple and straightforward divestments of over-
lapping businesses, and such was the result ('). 
The first case of this kind — Owens-Illinois/BTR 
Packaging (
2) — was in many respects typical. 
This large transaction affected many sectors of 
the packaging industry. But the Commission 
found competition problems likely in only one 
area — namely the glass container (bottles, jars, 
etc.) market in the UK and Ireland — due to the 
significant overlap between the parties in this 
highly concentrated sector. The remedy agreed 
upon was that BTR would divest the whole of its 
glass container business, carried on at four plants 
operated by its subsidiary Rockware, together 
with its interest in an associated glass recycling 
business, to an appropriate third party. 
162. In Pakhoed/Van Ommeren (
3), by contrast, 
agreement could not be reached on satisfactory 
undertakings, and the parties abandoned their 
merger plans. Overlaps of concern were found in 
regard to the supply of tank storage for various 
products in the harbours of Amsterdam, Rotter-
dam and Antwerp (collectively known as the ARA 
area). Following discussion with the Commis-
sion, satisfactory divestments were agreed for all 
these except petroleum products, where there 
would, however, have been a combined share 
post-merger of some 90 % at Rotterdam. Whether 
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or not this was the appropriate geographic market 
— as, in contrast to the parties, third parties con-
sidered it to be — was in the Commission's view a 
complex issue, which could only be properly clar-
ified in the course of a full phase II investigation. 
In the event, however, the parties decided, shortly 
before the deadline for a phase I decision, to aban-
don the merger rather than offer further divest-
ment to address the Commission's concerns. 
Phase II 
163. Of the nine phase II cases decided in 
1998, five involved clearances subject to formal 
undertakings regarding remedies, and in one 
other (Enso/Stora) the Commission took note, in 
clearing the merger, of certain assurances offered 
by the parties. The remedies in Agfa-Gevaert/Du 
Pont and Hoffmann-La Roche/Boehringer 
Mannheim have already been mentioned. In 
Veba/Degussa (
4) the competition problem arose 
in the market for fumed silica — a speciality 
chemical for which the market was highly con-
centrated. Veba was active in this market on its 
own account, whereas Degussa's activity was 
carried out via a joint venture with one of only 
two other suppliers — Cabot Hüls AG. The rem-
edy adopted was for Veba to sell its stake in the 
joint venture to a third party independent of the 
merged company, thereby ensuring that there 
would remain three independent competitors on 
this market, as before. 
164. In Worldcom/MCI, the remedy adopted — 
divestment of the overlap in the market of con-
cern — was not itself a novel one. However, the 
undertaking also contained some additional pro-
visions, designed to ensure the effectiveness of 
the divestment and to coordinate the process with 
the US authorities who were also examining the 
operation. It was important to ensure that the 
divestment was made to a new entrant, rather 
than to an existing player; otherwise customer 
choice would still be substantially reduced. In 
addition, there were requirements designed to 
prevent the merging parties from setting up a new 
business which competed with the one divested 
(and which, given the parties' overall strength, 
could rapidly have neutralised it) and to provide 
the buyer of the divested business with the ser-
vices necessary to operate it effectively. These 
included servicing/maintenance of the acquired 
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Worldcom/MCI network through so-called 
'peering' arrangements. The parties offered the 
same undertaking jointly to the Commission and 
the US DoJ, and the means of enforcement had to 
reflect the differing procedures of the two inves-
tigating authorities. Thus, although the Commis-
sion took, as usual, powers to appoint an inde-
pendent trustee to oversee and, if necessary, carry 
out the divestment, the powers were held in 
reserve while the parties were given an opportu-
nity to complete the divestment, under the super-
vision of the DoJ, before closing the merger. This 
helped to ensure that the divestment was com-
pleted in a matter of months — a short rimescale 
for such a major divestment. The adoption of 
these provisions also reflects the particularly 
close cooperation with the US authorities in this 
case, as regards remedies and also other aspects. 
DoJ observers attended the hearing of the Com-
mission case in Brussels, and there were also 
joint Commission/DoJ meetings with the parties 
— the first time such meetings had taken place. 
165. In Skanska/Scancem ('), the Commis-
sion's investigation focused on the markets force-
ment and concrete (both dry and ready-mixed) 
and concrete products in Sweden, Finland and 
Norway. The combined market shares produced 
by the merger in some markets were very high — 
as much as 90 % in cement. The merger also pro-
duced substantial vertical effects, however, since 
both parties also had substantial activities at all 
three main levels of the construction industry — 
raw materials (cement and aggregates), construc-
tion materials (concrete, concrete products) and, 
finally, construction itself. Most of the parties' 
competitors were not vertically integrated, further 
reducing their ability to compete effectively after 
the merger. In order to remedy the dominant posi-
tions identified, Skanska undertook to divest the 
whole of its shareholding in Scancem and further-
more to dispose of Scancem's cement business in 
Finland. The first part of the remedy is designed to 
end the vertical links which gave rise to concern; 
the second, to create an independent source of sup-
ply of cement of suitably high quality. 
166. As already mentioned, Enso/Stora was 
cleared without conditions or obligations. The 
Commission took account of certain undertak-
ings which had been offered by the parties (some 
of them in the course of the first phase of the 
investigation) in order to address concerns about 
the position of Elopak and Combibloc in the 
more concentrated market for liquid packaging 
that would result from the merger. These were as 
follows. Enso would divest its shareholding in a 
joint conversion operation with Elopak, since this 
vertical link could weaken Elopak's countervail-
ing power. The merged company would offer 
Elopak and Combibloc a price protection 
arrangement. Broadly, under this arrangement 
any changes in the prices charged to all three buy-
ers will be the same unless justified by objective 
cost data; a measure designed to ensure that the 
smaller customers are not subject to unjustified 
price discrimination in comparison with Tetra 
Pak. Finally, the parties undertook not to oppose 
an application for a duty-free quota for liquid 
packaging board from outside the Community. 
The adoption of such a quota would make 
imports more competitive and thus encourage 
other suppliers. 
4. Referrals to Member States 
167. Member States made four requests for a 
case falling under the merger regulation to be 
referred back to their national competition juris-
diction (Article 9). All were granted. 
¡68. In Vendex/KBB (
2) the request was made 
by the Dutch authorities, on the basis that the 
operation threatened to lead to the creation of a 
dominant position in non-food retailing in the 
Netherlands. The Commission accepted that con-
sumer tastes and habits were important factors 
for competition in retailing markets, and that they 
showed marked national, and possibly even 
regional or local characteristics. Non-food retail-
ing in the Netherlands could accordingly be con-
sidered a 'distinct market within a Member State' 
as required by Article 9. Both Vendex and KBB 
had major shares of such a market; they were, for 
example, the only retailers in the Netherlands 
who owned department stores there. There was 
accordingly a risk that a dominant position or 
positions would be created or strengthened by the 
merger. The precise boundaries of the geographic 
and product markets affected by the merger, and 
the precise impact of the merger on competition 
in those markets, could only be determined by a 
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more detailed investigation, which, given the 
sector and area concerned, could best be carried 
out by the relevant national competition author-
ity rather than by the Commission. The merger 
had no significant effects in other Member States. 
Accordingly the Commission concluded that the 
criteria for reference back to a Member State 
under Article 9 of the merger regulation had been 
met, and that there were no other factors which 
could make it appropriate for the Commission to 
retain it. It therefore referred the case to the 
national authorities as regards the non-food retail 
sector in the Netherlands, and cleared the remain-
der of the operation. 
169. In Krauss-Maffei/Wegmann ('), the Ger-
man authorities requested the referral of this joint 
venture on the ground that it threatened to create 
a dominant position in the market for the supply 
of armoured military vehicles in Germany. 
Mainly on the basis of purchasers' behaviour, the 
Commission found this to be an essentially 
national market, accessible to foreign competi-
tion only to a limited extent. The parties' activi-
ties were complementary; Krauss-Maffei was an 
important supplier of the vehicle chassis, and 
Wegmann of turrets. Nevertheless, by combining 
major suppliers of these key 'subsystems', the 
merger could give the parties a competitive 
advantage in providing a complete vehicle 'pack-
age' as a result of which they might be able to 
foreclose the vehicles market to other suppliers. 
The Commission's own investigations were 
unable to resolve these concerns. There were no 
significant effects in other markets, and no other 
factors which would make it appropriate for the 
Commission to retain the case. Accordingly the 
Commission decided to refer the case back to the 
German authorities as regards the market for 
armoured military vehicles, and to clear the 
remainder of the operation. 
170. In Alliance Unichem/Unifarma (
2), the 
Italian authorities requested referral of this 
merger in the area of pharmaceutical wholesal-
ing, because of the risk that it would create or 
strengthen a dominant position in this market in 
certain parts of Italy, notably in the north-west. 
The Commission found pharmaceutical whole-
saling to be a market essentially regional or local 
in scope (as in previous cases in the sector), 
although the precise boundaries in a given case 
could only be established after more detailed 
analysis — which the Italian authority was better 
placed to undertake. The merger would create the 
largest wholesaling group in the north-west of 
Italy, with a substantial share both in absolute 
terms and relative to that of competitors. More-
over there were shareholding links between the 
parties and some of their competitors. The nature 
of the market, with its requirements for a sub-
stantial stock and frequent and regular delivery 
service to pharmacies even in remote areas, made 
entry difficult, and there was no significant coun-
tervailing buyer power. Accordingly the Com-
mission decided to refer the whole of the opera-
tion to the Italian authorities. 
5. Rules and procedures 
Several issues of interest in this area arose during 
the year. 
Revised notices 
171. As part of the merger regulation revisions, 
the Commission introduced a new implementing 
regulation and a modified notification form 
(Form CO) (
3) and published revised versions of 
its notices on the concept of undertaking con-
cerned, the concept of concentration, turnover 
calculation, and full-function joint ventures (
4). 
For the most part the changes are technical or 
clarificatory and stem from the changes to the 
regulation itself. Perhaps the main substantive 
change concerns the ending of the distinction 
between 'concentrative' and 'cooperative' joint 
ventures as determinative for the applicability of 
the merger regulation. Jurisdiction will now be 
determined by applying the criterion of full func-
tionality, on which the relevant notice gives some 
further guidance. It is intended that guidance on 
the substantive issues concerning cooperative 
aspects of full-function joint ventures will be 
issued in due course, after the Commission has 
had sufficient experience in dealing with them. 
Incomplete notifications 
172. The total number of notifications con-
cerning merger cases which have been declared 
incomplete by the Commission (pursuant to Arti-
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small, but has undergone a certain increase in 
recent years. The Commission is keen to find 
ways of reducing the number of incomplete noti-
fications. Accordingly it was pleased to enter into 
discussions on this matter with representatives of 
the legal community, as a result of which some 
'Best Practice Guidelines' have been drafted and 
published on the Directorate-General IV website 
on the Internet ('). 
173. The Commission found that in most cases 
where a notification was declared incomplete, 
there had been no, or only very minimal, discus-
sion of the case or the content of the notification 
with the Commission before it was submitted. Ab-
sence of substantive pre-notification discussion 
(and/or submission of an advance draft of the 
Form CO) inevitably increases the risk that a noti-
fication will be found incomplete. There was a va-
riety of reasons why it had been necessary to de-
clare notifications incomplete, but three main cat-
egories could be identified. Some notifications 
could not be accepted because certain formal re-
quirements were not met — for example, not all 
the relevant parties had been included, or the noti-
fication was made before sufficiently clear agree-
ments to bring about the concentration were in ex-
istence. In others (possibly the largest single cate-
gory) the information provided with the notifica-
tion was insufficient — for example, as regards 
the markets considered to be affected by the merg-
er and the, parties' and competitors' shares in them 
— or insufficiently clearly presented, to enable a 
proper competition assessment to be undertaken 
in the time available. The latter point can be of par-
ticular importance in the — not uncommon — 
cases where the supporting documentation is vo-
luminous and the possible markets numerous or 
complex. The third category comprised cases 
where the Commission's investigation revealed 
the existence of potential affected markets which 
had not been identified by the notifying parties — 
although, in some instances at least, they arguably 
could, and therefore should, have been — and on 
which further information was required which 
could not be provided and/or properly assessed 
within the time remaining. 
174. The Commission recognises that parties 
to mergers, and their advisers, will want to min-
imise the amount of effort and delay required to 
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comply with Community merger control proce-
dures. At the same time, however, the scale and 
complexity of many of the cases that it is required 
to decide on means that the information that has 
to be submitted at the outset will need to be exten-
sive and detailed. It also needs to be relevant and 
focused on potential problem areas — even if the 
parties consider that they can show that the 
potential problems will not in fact materialise. 
The guidelines cover such aspects as prenotifica-
tion, timing issues, the desirability of adopting a 
prudent approach to market definition and iden-
tification (e.g. where there is scope for debate 
over geographic market definition, providing 
market data on a national basis as well as a wider 
one such as the EU as a whole) and the important 
contribution that can be made by the attendance 
at prenotification meetings of representatives 
from the notifying parties who possess a detailed 
understanding of the commercial activities and 
markets involved. If followed, they will min-
imise the chances that a notification is declared 
incomplete, as well as the need for further infor-
mation from the parties after the notification is 
made; although the Commission of course 
remains free to proceed with such declarations 
where appropriate. 
Re-examination after annulment by the 
Court — Kali und Salz 
/ 75. In the light of the annulment of the origi-
nal 1993 decision in this case — the first time a 
Commission decision in a merger case has been 
annulled — it was necessary for the Commission 
to re-examine it. This unprecedented process, 
which culminated in a decision to clear the 
merger at the first phase (Article 6( 1 )(b) of the 
merger regulation) gave rise to a number of pro-
cedural and substantive issues, of which the fol-
lowing are perhaps of most general interest. 
176. The regulation (Article 10(5)) provides 
that, where the Court of Justice makes a judg-
ment annulling a Commission decision in whole 
or in part, the time periods laid down ,in the reg-
ulation for initial examination of the case and for 
taking a decision on it are to start again from the 
date of the judgment. However, in the Commis-
sion's view it did not follow that the timetable 
would restart automatically. Article 10(1) pro-
vides that the initial examination period begins 
on the day after receipt of the notification or, if 
the notification is incomplete, on the day after 
receipt of a complete one. If the sole basis for that Il — MERGER CONTROL 
examination was the situation obtaining at the 
time of the original notification (so-called ex tunc 
basis), then other things equal, no further infor-
mation would be necessary for the Commission 
to carry out its assessment and the original noti-
fication could be regarded as complete. If, on the 
other hand, the current situation has to be exam-
ined (ex nunc basis), then — in view of the pas-
sage of time and the possibility that relevant facts 
(e.g. market shares, number of competitors, etc.) 
had changed meanwhile — the original notifica-
tion would not necessarily contain all the infor-
mation that was likely to be required, and in that 
case it would be incomplete until the appropriate 
revised or additional information was provided. 
777. In the case in point, the Commission con-
sidered a mixture of the two approaches to be 
appropriate. The Commission's jurisdiction to 
deal with the case under the regulation had not 
been contested. Accordingly the Commission did 
not find it necessary to re-examine that issue, and 
to that extent the approach may be regarded as ex 
tunc. The competitive assessment, on the other 
hand, needed to reflect the present situation (i.e., 
ex nunc). In its decision the Commission was 
required, as in more normal cases, to declare that 
the operation was or was not compatible with the 
common market — not whether it had been com-
patible at some time in the past. It was therefore 
necessary to undertake a completely new com-
petitive assessment based on facts pertaining to 
the current market situation, including also those 
parts of the contested decision which had been 
upheld by the Court (such as the market defini-
tions). It followed that the original notification 
was, at the time of the judgment, incomplete. 
778. It was, however, found necessary to make 
an exception to the ex nunc basis of the competi-
tive assessment in the case of the 'failing com-
pany defence' originally advanced by the parties, 
since the situation to which it related no longer 
obtained and could not be re-created. The 
acquired company MdK was subsequently 
restructured and transformed into a limited com-
pany under German law, and it would have been 
impossible to have separated this newly created 
economic entity into its former component parts 
for assessment purposes — e.g. in order to decide 
whether or not there might be a potential alterna-
tive acquirer. 
779. On receipt of the complete notification, 
the Commission carried out an initial examina-
tion of the case on the above basis, in the usual 
way. It found that in the present circumstances 
no dominant position was likely to be created or 
reinforced in the relevant markets, which, as be-
fore, were those for potash-based products for 
agricultural use in Germany, and in the rest of 
the EU, respectively. In Germany, Kali und Salz 
GmbH remained a de facto monopolist. Howev-
er, for the reasons outlined in the Commission's 
original decision and subsequently upheld by 
the Court (notably, the 'failing firm defence', 
which — see above — had to be examined 'ex 
tunc') the proposed concentration would not be 
responsible for a deterioration in the competi-
tive structure of the market. Moreover, follow-
ing the ending of the commercial links between 
SCPA and Kali und Salz, SCPA was also now 
supplying Germany. In the rest of the EU, the 
combined market share of the parties was now 
below 50 %, and the export cartel that was ob-
served in the original investigation had been 
ended, as had the close commercial links be-
tween Kali und Salz and the other main com-
petitor, SCPA. Kali und Salz GmbH was now 
established as an independent competitor in 
France. Accordingly the operation was cleared 
(Article 6(1 )(b) of the regulation). 
Fine imposed for breach of the regulation 
180. The Commission this year imposed the 
first fine on a company for failure to notify a con-
centration under the regulation in time, and for 
putting it into effect without the Commission's 
authorisation. In February, the Korean company 
Samsung was fined a total of ECU 33 000 in 
respect of the acquisition of AST Research Inc. 
(AST) ('). The operation was notified to the 
Commission in April 1997. According to infor-
mation in the Commission's possession, how-
ever, Samsung had already acquired control of 
AST for the purposes of the merger regulation in, 
or before, January 1996. The regulation (Article 
4) requires that a notifiable concentration be noti-
fied not more than a week after the event — such 
as the acquisition of a controlling interest — giv-
ing rise to the concentration. Moreover it must 
not be implemented until it has been authorised, 
whereas this acquisition had been completed and 
implemented for some time before it was noti-
fied. In setting the amount of the fine, the Com-
mission took into account, in mitigation, the fact 
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that no damage to competition had resulted, that tant company with significant European activi-
the infringement had not been intentional and the ties, Samsung could be expected to be aware of 
parties had eventually notified the operation, and the Community's merger control rules. The rela-
that Samsung had recognised the breaches and tively small amount of the fines imposed took 
cooperated with the Commission in its investiga- account of these factors and also of the fact that 
tions. Nevertheless the breaches had continued this was the first time that the Commission had 
for a considerable period. Moreover, as an impor- taken such action. 
Box 7: Implementation of the new Article 2(4) of the merger regulation 
The new merger regulation came into force on 1 March 1998, incorporating a number of amendments 
which extended the regulation's scope to include joint ventures known as full function cooperative joint 
ventures. This amendment brings into the ambit of the merger regulation a number of joint ventures which 
would formerly have been examined under Regulation 17/62. 
Article 2(4) applies to all joint ventures constituting a concentration within the meaning of Article 3, albeit 
only 'to the extent that (they have as their) object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour 
of undertakings that remain independent'. In 1998, 13 of the 76 joint venture cases decided under the 
amended merger regulation necessitated an analysis under Article 2(4). The most in-depth analyses were 
made in cases within the telecommunications and Internet areas. So far, remedies to settle Article 2(4) con-
cerns have been included in only one case (Case No IV/M. 1327 — Canal+/CDPQ/BankAmerica of 3 
December 1998, see below). A second-phase examination was opened in one other case (Case No JV.15 
— BT/AT&T, see below). 
In the Canal+/CDPQ/BankAmerica case, the spill-over effects were found on a market upstream from the 
joint venture, namely in the market for the wholesaling of TV rights in Spain (although the notified transac-
tion concerned the downstream market in France). On the Spanish market, Canal+ had strong or dominant 
positions on the pay-TV market and on the upstream market for content. The notified transaction was found, 
through the balance of power in the joint venture, to give Canal+ a strong incentive to favour Cableuropa 
(controlled by CDPQ and BankAmerica) in the sale of Spanish pay-TV rights. The remedies accepted will 
eliminate the possibility of discrimination against other competitors on the Spanish pay-TV market. 
The Canal+/CDPQ/BankAmerica case shows the potential use of Article 2(4). Firstly, the notified trans-
action did not create or strengthen the dominant position of Canal+; rather, it gave rise to a situation where 
the company's commercial incentives would change so that there would be an increased risk of discrimi-
nation against other pay-TV operators in Spain. Secondly, the remedy basically sets a benchmark for 
Canal+'s future behaviour on the Spanish market for pay-TV content, but leaves the notified transaction 
structurally unchanged. In the absence of Article 2(4), this remedy could have been more difficult to accept 
under the merger regulation. 
The Commission dealt with four cases in the Internet field. 
The Telia/Telenor/Schibsted case is worth describing in detail as it helped to establish the Commission 
methodology in handling Article 2(4) issues under the merger regulation. Telia, the incumbent télécoms 
operator in Sweden, Telenor the Norwegian incumbent and Schibsted, a Norwegian publishing and broad-
casting company, formed a joint venture to provide Internet gateway services and offer website production 
services. Internet gateway services are designed to enable users of the Internet to access content more eas-
ily. This content may be provided by the gateway service provider or other third parties and may be free 
of charge to the user (normally financed by advertising) or content for which the user has to pay for access 
('paid-for content'). 
In its analysis of the case, the Commission found that the supply of gateway services in themselves did not 
amount to a market as such, but that advertising on web pages and paid-for content could be considered rele-
vant markets. These two markets were relevant markets for the purposes of dominance, as was the production Il — MERGER CONTROL 
of websites. Website production was also considered to be a candidate market for the analysis of coordination 
under Article 2(4) as the joint venture and two of the parent companies (Telia and Telenor) were present on 
this market. The other candidate market was the provision of dial-up Internet access where both Telia and Te-
lenor (through its stake in the Swedish telecommunications company Telenordia) were present. 
In its analysis of the operation, the Commission had two distinct situations to assess under Article 2(4). 
First, the website production market involved the presence of the joint venture and two of the parent com-
panies on the same market. The combined market share of the parent companies and the joint venture was 
less than 10 % on the narrowest possible and most unfavourable market definition to the parties. Accord-
ingly, the Commission concluded that, even if the parent companies were to coordinate their activities on 
this market, it would not amount to an appreciable restriction of competition. In the second part of its Arti-
cle 2(4) reasoning, on the dial-up Internet access market in Sweden, die Commission found that that mar-
ket was characterised by high growth, relatively low barriers to entry and low switching costs. The market 
shares which Telia and Telenordia enjoyed on this market were 25-40 % and 10-25 % respectively, but the 
Commission found that these market shares were of limited significance in such a growing market and, 
therefore, the market structure is not conducive to the coordination of competitive behaviour. In addition, 
the likelihood of coordination was reduced further by the relative size of the dial-up Internet access mar-
ket (which accounted for over 90 % of Internet revenue in Sweden) compared with the size of the other 
markets on which the joint venture would be active. The Commission therefore concluded that there would 
be no likelihood of the parent companies coordinating their behaviour on this market. 
The Commission also considered eight cases in the field of telecommunications which involved an inves-
tigation under Article 2(4). 
The Commission decided to open a detailed enquiry into a proposed joint venture between British Telecom-
munications and AT&T, two of the world's largest telecommunications operators. The joint venture will 
provide a broad range of telecommunications services to multinational corporate customers and interna-
tional carrier services to other carriers. The Commission decided to carry out a second-phase inquiry into 
the effects of the venture on several global telecommunications markets and also some in the UK. Subse-
quent to its preliminary inquiry, the Commission has expressed concerns in the following areas: the par-
ties' combined market position on the markets for the provision of global telecommunications services to 
large multinational companies and for international carrier services, the effect of the creation of the joint 
venture being the possible creation or strengthening of a dominant position for certain telecommunications 
services in the UK; and the possible coordination effects of the proposed joint venture in the UK between 
ACC, a wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T, and between BT and Telewest, in which AT&T through TCI 
will have a jointly controlling stake. The final decision is expected in April 1999. 
The Commission's first cases to have included an examination of Article 2(4) effects have already dis-
played some common themes. The relative size of the Article 2(4) market and the joint venture's market, 
which is assessed for dominance purposes, has been important in assessing the likelihood of coordination. 
Normally, the commercial incentives, and hence the risk of coordination, are smaller if the joint venture's 
market is significantly smaller than the Article 2(4) market. However, this cannot be considered a suffi-
cient condition for the absence of coordination between the parent companies. The nature of the markets 
themselves will also play a part in the Commission's assessment. The nature of existing links between the 
parent companies is also relevant for the determination of causality between the notified operation and the 
Article 2(4) effects, though their existence does not automatically imply that there is no effect. Again, other 
factors would have to be taken into account before that analysis can be made. 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
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A — General policy 
1. Improving the efficiency of State aid 
monitoring 
181. . In 1998 the Commission continued with 
its initiative for the reorientation and modernisa-
tion of State aid monitoring. The sixth survey on 
State aid in the European Union, adopted by the 
Commission in July, covers the period 
1994-96 (')· Over this period an average of ECU 
38 billion a year, or 3 % of value added and ECU 
1 238 per job, was granted to the manufacturing 
sector in the Union of Fifteen. The survey reveals 
that, after peaking in 1993 and 1994, State aid 
volumes are now showing a downward trend. As 
with the previous survey, the most marked trend 
can be observed in the continuing high volumes 
of aid granted on an ad hoc basis to individual 
enterprises and not covered by schemes promot-
ing cross-industry, sectoral or regional objec-
tives. In the manufacturing, financial services 
and air transport sectors taken together, a limited 
number of individual aid measures involving 
large sums account for a disproportionate share 
of total aid granted. Ad hoc aid, which is granted 
mainly for rescuing and restructuring companies, 
increased in volume from 6 % of total aid to these 
sectors in 1992 to 16 % in 1996. 
182. High levels of State aid continue to create 
distortions of competition. A tough State aid pol-
icy and close monitoring remain important if 
Europe is to become more competitive on world 
markets. At the European Council meeting in 
Cardiff, Member States emphasised the need to 
promote competition and to reduce distortions 
such as State aid. Only thus can the continuing 
disparities between the levels of aid granted by 
Member States be attenuated, lending support to 
the objective of economic and social cohesion. 
183. The aim of the modernisation drive is to 
improve transparency and legal certainty, to 
make the State aid monitoring system more effi-
cient, to reinforce vetting, in particular in cases 
involving large volumes of ad hoc aid, and to 
simplify the monitoring system for more minor 
cases. In 1998 the Commission focused its efforts 
on simplifying and clarifying the procedural 
rules and on concentrating resources on closer 
monitoring of the most important cases. It used 
Article 89 for the first time since the Treaty 
entered into force. This article provides that the 
Council, on a proposal from the Commission, 
may make any appropriate regulations for 
reviewing State aid. The Commission presented 
proposals for two such regulations: on 16 
November the Council agreed a Commission 
proposal for a procedural regulation (
2), and on 7 
May it adopted the Commission proposal for a 
regulation enabling the Commission to exempt 
certain categories of horizontal, or cross-indus-
try, aid from the notification requirement (
3). 
184. In addition to these regulations, the Com-
mission adopted a notice on the application of the 
State aid rules to measures relating to direct busi-
ness taxation on 11 November (
4) and a frame-
work on training aid on 22 July (
5). In June the 
Council adopted a regulation laying down new 
rules on aid to shipbuilding (
6). The multisectoral 
framework on regional aid for large investment 
projects is to apply from 1 September for a period 
of three years (
7). 
2. Block exemptions for State aid 
185. On 7 May the Council adopted a regula-
tion which forms the legal basis on which the 
Commission, by adopting regulations, may 
exempt en bloc certain types of horizontal State 
aid measures from the notification require-
ment (
8). Aid for SMEs, R&D, environmental 
protection and employment and training, 
together with regional aid schemes may thus be 
declared exempt. In addition, the Commission 
may adopt a regulation in connection with the de 
minimis rule. The Commission has started to pre-
pare the block exemptions. 
186. The reason for this regulation is that the 
Commission has to concentrate its efforts on the 
more important cases and should be relieved of 
the task of assessing the compatibility of most 
(') COM(1998)4l7 final. 
(
2) Proposal for a Council regulation (EC) laying down detailed rules 
for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ C 116, 
16.4.1998). 
(?) Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the appli-
cation of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty to certain categories of 
horizontal State aid (OJ L 142, 14.5.1998). 
C) OJC384, 10.12.1998. 
(
5) OJC343, 11.11.1998. 
(
6) OJL202. 18.7.1998. 
(
7) OJ C 107, 7.4.1998. 
(*) Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998, referred to 
above.  65 standard cases, where such assessment is a mere 
formality. The areas covered by the enabling reg-
ulation have been subject to guidelines and 
frameworks for some time. Member States 
devise their aid schemes according to these rules. 
It can therefore be assumed from experience that 
these horizontal aid measures are usually com-
patible with the common market. However, the 
Commission retains the right to monitor them 
and to assess whether a given aid measure com-
plies with the Treaty. Member States will have to 
keep a register of aid measures and send the 
Commission annual reports. Incorrect applica-
tion of the rules exempting aid from the notifica-
tion requirement will not only be subject, as at 
present, to the consequences of a decision finding 
aid to be unlawful under Commission proceed-
ings but may also be referred to a national court. 
3. Procedural regulation 
187. The most important legislative effort in 
the area of State aid policy in 1998 was the codi-
fication of the rules on the Commission's proce-
dures for monitoring State aid. On 18 February 
the Commission adopted, pursuant to Article 88 
of the EC Treaty, a proposal for a regulation (') 
which seeks to codify the various aspects of the 
procedure for reviewing aid, while strengthening 
the Commission's monitoring powers where 
appropriate. On 16 November the Council meet-
ing on industrial affairs reached political agree-
ment on the regulation. The Council will be able 
to adopt it formally at the beginning of 1999, 
once Parliament has delivered its opinion. Thus 
for the first time, there will be a basic instrument 
on Community monitoring of State aid which 
incorporates all procedural rules in a single, 
coherent text. 
188. The regulation is important for two rea-
sons. First, it codifies the various procedures al-
ready in use which are based on Commission prac-
tice and on the case law of the Court of Justice. 
Thus, all these fragmentary rules will from now on 
be replaced by a transparent, binding instrument. 
Codifying all the procedural rules in one regula-
tion will doubtless have an impact on State aid pol-
icy in the medium to long term. In addition to pro-
viding legal certainty, the regulation will make the 
66 
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rules more accessible and give this area of policy a 
higher profile. This should result in all those con-
cerned being more familiar with the rules and be-
coming more involved. However, the regulation 
does more than simply codify the procedures al-
ready in place. It will also enable the Commission 
to intensify its monitoring of aid in certain re-
spects; it gives the Commission new powers 
which should better equip it in its work to combat 
unlawful aid and aid misuse. 
189. In certain circumstances, for example, the 
Commission will be able to require the immedi-
ate provisional recovery of aid unlawfully 
granted until it has taken a decision on the com-
patibility of the aid with the common market. The 
regulation also lays an obligation in principle on 
the Commission to require the recovery of aid 
unlawfully granted which is not compatible with 
the common market. The Member State must 
recover the aid without delay in accordance with 
its domestic-law procedures, provided they allow 
the immediate and effective execution of the 
Commission's decision. Furthermore, it must 
take all necessary measures, including provi-
sional ones, to obtain this result. 
Another new principle established by the regula-
tion is that the Commission may undertake 
on-site monitoring visits in cases where it has 
serious doubts about whether decisions authoris-
ing aid are being complied with. If required, 
Member States must afford the necessary assis-
tance to the Commission officials to enable them 
to carry out their inspection. 
In order to ensure legal certainty in respect of 
unlawful aid granted some time ago, the regula-
tion lays down a ten-year limitation period: the 
Commission may no longer order recovery if 10 
years have passed since the aid was granted. 
190. Lastly, the regulation is also intended to 
speed up procedures. It therefore sets a time limit 
on the formal investigation procedure of eighteen 
months from the date on which proceedings are ini-
tiated; at present there is no limit on the time it takes 
to complete the procedure. When this period is up, 
the Member State may request the Commission to 
take a decision, which the Commission must do 
within two months of receiving the request. With 
the same end in view (shortening the 
decision-making process), the regulation provides 
that from now on the initiation of proceedings will 
be published in the authentic language version 
only, accompanied by a summary notice in the oth-— STATE AID 
er languages. Final decisions, however, will con-
tinue to be published in full in all official languages. 
4. State aid contained in tax systems 
191. The Commission's notice on the applica-
tion of the State aid rules in the field of direct 
business taxation (') is in line with its commit-
ment to strict control of State aid in all its forms. 
This commitment complements the efforts of 
Member States within the Code of Conduct 
Group to put an end to harmful tax competition. 
On the basis of this notice, the Commission will 
assess or reassess, case by case, all specific tax 
schemes in the Member States. The notice sets 
out the circumstances in which tax measures fall 
under the State aid rules and outlines the proce-
dural consequences of their doing so. 
192. The document indicates that, to fall under 
the State aid rules, a tax benefit must be specific in 
the sense of benefiting certain enterprises or the 
production of certain goods. The tax benefit may 
be provided in various forms, including lower rates 
of taxation, tax deductions, accelerated deprecia-
tion and tax debt cancellation. Under the notice, a 
tax benefit will be regarded as specific where it de-
rives from an exception to the generally applicable 
tax rules, unless this exception is justified by the 
nature of or rationale for the system, or from a dis-
cretionary practice on the part of the tax authori-
ties. Tax rules that are, for example, aimed at a cer-
tain region, a certain sector or a certain function 
within an enterprise (such as financial services) 
will be regarded as specific under the State aid 
rules. In the Irish corporation tax cases (
2), the 
Commission made clear that it no longer considers 
the preferential treatment of manufacturing over 
services to be a general measure. Developments in 
the concept of State aid over time and a stricter in-
terpretation of Article 87 of the ECTreaty may lead 
to a revision of earlier Commission decisions, in 
which case the Commission will propose appropri-
ate measures under Article 88( 1 ) of the EC Treaty. 
Β — Concept of aid 
193. Any State aid that falls foul of all four tests 
in Article 87( 1 ) of the EC Treaty is in principle in-
compatible with the common market. More 
specifically, to be caught by Article 87( 1 ), the aid 
must (i) confer an economic advantage on the re-
cipient, (ii) be granted by the State or through 
State resources, (iii) be granted selectively to 'cer-
tain undertakings' or to 'the production of certain 
goods' and thus distort competition, and (iv) affect 
trade between Member States. The form in which 
the aid is provided (grant, interest rebate, tax re-
lief, loan guarantee, etc.) is not relevant to the ap-
plication of Article 87. 
194. The way in which measures are classed as 
State aid within the meaning of Article 87( 1 ) is of 
importance to national authorities, obliged as 
they are under Article 88(3) to notify the Com-
mission of any plans to grant aid or alter existing 
aid measures. The issue becomes relevant for 
countries in the process of negotiating the incor-
poration of Community law into their own legal 
systems in order to prepare for their accession to 
the EU. The definition is also important to 
national courts with jurisdiction to rule on the 
existence and legality of State aid and to formu-
late and address requests for preliminary rulings 
to the Court of Justice under Article 234 of the EC 
Treaty. Finally, guidance on the definition of 
State aid is crucial to potential aid recipients inas-
much as they are required to examine with dili-
gence the legality of the aid they hope to receive. 
In the course of 1998 the Commission took a 
number of decisions which are of interest as 
regards the concept of State aid. These decisions 
are described below. 
1. Advantage to a firm or firms 
195. An economic advantage may be conferred 
through a variety of means and circumstances. 
The Court of First Instance ruled in Ladbroke (
3) 
that the decision of the French Minister for the 
Budget to allow Pari Mutuel Urbain to defer pay-
ment of part of the State's share of levies on bets 
taken on horse races had the effect of conferring 
a financial advantage on that organisation and 
thus improved its position on the market for bet 
taking, both at home and abroad. 
196. In Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Sta-
to (
4), the Commission found that an economic ad-
(') OJC384, 10.12.1998. 
(
2) Cases E-l/98 and E-2/98 (OJ C 395. 18.12.1998). 
(■') Case T-67/94 Ladbroke Racing ν Commission ( 1998) ECR II-1. 
(
4) Case C-64/98 (ex NN-95/97). not yet published in the Official 
Journal.  67 vantage may be conferred on publicly controlled 
undertakings through the conclusion of exclusive 
contracts to supply services or goods to the State 
where those contracts are remunerated above the 
normal market rate. The contracts may simply 
help to ensure the recipients' continued operation 
and enable them to cross-subsidise their commer­
cial activities. The recipient in the above case op­
erates in the coinage sector, which is not the sub­
ject of intra-Community trade. However, it won 
two contracts with non-EU countries, and was 
suspected of having defeated its European com­
petitors through cross-subsidisation. 
197. In its decision concerning rescue aid to 
Case di Cura Riunite ( ' ), the Commission consid­
ered that the provision of a State guarantee to this 
Italian health institution did not confer an eco­
nomic advantage. Given that the recipient's weak 
financial situation would not allow it to obtain 
credit on the market, the Commission considered 
that the aid element equalled the entire amount of 
credit obtained as a result of this guarantee mech­
anism. However, the State was Case di Cura's 
main customer and owed the company a signifi­
cant amount derived from normal commercial 
transactions, exceeding by more than four times 
the guaranteed credit. Since the State could not be 
subjected to liquidation proceedings, as opposed 
to any other debtor in similar circumstances, Case 
di Cura was at a significant disadvantage com­
pared with its competitors selling services to pri­
vate custorners. The guarantee was granted only 
until such time as the State should repay its out­
standing debts. In this case, the State was not 
granting any unjustified support to the undertak­
ing but only reducing some of the financial disad­
vantages which it itself had caused the undertak­
ing by not repaying its outstanding debts. 
198. An economic advantage may be gained as 
a result of the terms on which undertakings have 
access to or exploit infrastructures. Undertakings 
allowed to benefit from an infrastructure devel­
opment, e.g. by moving to a business park, obtain 
a gratuitous advantage if they do not pay a fee. In 
its decision to initiate proceedings under Article 
88(2) in respect of a package of aid granted by the 
Austrian authorities to Lenzing Lyocell (
2), the 
Commission noted that certain infrastructure 
developments were made specifically for the 
benefit of this enterprise and questioned whether 
a private investor operating a business park 
would provide company-specific development 
free of charge. 
199. In particular with regard to site decontam­
ination, the Commission takes into account the 
'polluter pays' principle and, when applicable, 
the Community guidelines on State aid for envi­
ronmental protection (
3). In a case involving 
State funding provided to an Austrian company 
carrying out decontamination work on a site (
4), 
the Commission decided that an economic 
advantage was conferred on the site owner in the 
form of savings on decontamination costs. Under 
domestic law, the landowner bears subsidiary lia­
bility after the polluter. In the case in point, the 
polluter was being wound up and had ceased 
trading. It was thus possible to conclude that the 
polluter could no longer derive any advantage 
from the decontamination. 
200. In the wider context of the provision of 
State assistance to property developers, it was 
considered in the case of the English Partner­
ships scheme (
5) that funding provided in order to 
cover the estimated gap between the value of the 
undeveloped asset plus the cost of its develop­
ment and the allegedly lower value of the fin­
ished project constituted State aid within the 
meaning of Article 87(1). The funding made 
available under this scheme is meant to provide a 
quantifiable incentive to investors/developers to 
carry out work on a site whose unattractive con­
dition or location discourages private investors. 
201. The private investor principle has been ap­
plied regularly by the Commission. On the basis of 
this criterion, the Commission assesses whether 
the State, when assisting public undertakings or 
private undertakings partially owned by it, does so 
on more favourable terms than would a private in­
vestor operating under normal market conditions. 
If so, the State's action involves State aid within 
the meaning of Article 87( 1 ). The Court of First In­
stance delivered two rulings which refer to the ap­
plication of this criterion. In Cityflyer Express (
6), 
it held that, where the Commission concludes that 
a private investor would not have acted on the 
terms on which the State has acted, it must further 
examine which terms would have been satisfac-
68  (') Case N-461/97 (OJ C 149. 15.5.1998). 
(
2) CaseC-61/98(cxNN-189/97), (OJC9, 13.1.1999). 
(
3) OJC72, 10.3.1994. 
C) Case C-24/98 (ex N-663/97) Kiener Deponie Bachmanning (OJ 
C 201, 27.6.1998). 
(
3) CaseE-2/97. 
(
6) Case T-16/96 Cityflyer Express ν Commission ( 1998) ECR 11-757. — STATE AID 
tory to the private investor. In BP Chemicals ('), 
the Court ruled that, even if the State has already 
twice acquired stakes in a company, thereby twice 
granting State aid to that company, this should not 
automatically mean that a third capital injection 
may not be considered on its own merits as an au­
tonomous investment and be examined in the light 
of the private investor criterion. In the case in 
question, however, considering that the first two 
capital injections were not profitable, the Court 
asked the Commission to determine whether a pri­
vate investor would have made a third capital in­
jection. 
202. The Commission concluded in the Ponsal 
case (
2) that no aid was involved in a waiver of 
public debts on the occasion of this enterprise's 
liquidation; its conclusion was based on alterna­
tive calculations submitted by the national 
authority confirming that other means of liquida­
tion permitted under national law would have 
entailed higher losses. The authorities also pro­
vided evidence that they had complied fully with 
domestic insolvency law. 
203. In assessing the selling price of a public 
steel company (
3), the Commission concluded, on 
the basis of a detailed examination of the two 
methods used by independent auditors, namely 
property evaluation and future cash-flow evalua­
tion, that the private investor criterion was met. 
Price levels were calculated according to a pes­
simistic and an optimistic scenario; the actual 
price was deemed to correspond to the market lev­
el because it fell within this range. The argument 
that added value was obtained after the company's 
flotation on the stock exchange serves to prove af­
ter the event that the above analysis was valid, but 
is not sufficient evidence in itself that the private 
investor criterion was met and therefore that the 
existence of aid could be ruled out. 
204. In deciding to initiate Article 88(2) pro­
ceedings in respect of the granting of preferential 
electricity tariffs by the French public enterprise 
EDF to certain paper mills (
4), the Commission 
examined, among other issues, whether there was 
any commercial logic in EDF's behaviour. The 
Commission doubted whether this discrimina­
tory behaviour was justified by a commercial 
rationale, i.e. vying with competitors for cus­
tomers while at the same time managing to cover 
at least variable and certain fixed costs. 
205. In two cases involving companies 
entrusted with the operation of a service of gen­
eral economic interest (the construction of the 
natural gas network and gas distribution in Den­
mark) (
5) the Commission concluded that a series 
of tax-relief measures granted to these companies 
constituted State aid within the meaning of Arti­
cle 87( 1 ). The tax relief was offered to enterprises 
which had not been chosen by a public tendering 
procedure, in order to offset their initial invest­
ment in the construction and expansion of the 
natural gas system. However, the Commission 
decided to approve this aid on the basis of Article 
86(2) of the EC Treaty since it was demonstrated 
that application of the competition rules would 
hinder performance of the particular tasks 
assigned to the recipients. In applying Article 
86(2), the Commission accepted that trade would 
not be affected to an extent contrary to the Com­
munity interest, mainly because the measures in 
question would be renotified after 2000 in the 
context of the implementation of the EU directive 
aimed at liberalising the internal gas market (
6). 
2. Origin of resources 
206. On the topic of conferring an advantage 
through legislation, the Court of Justice examined 
a number of joined cases in which an undertaking 
was exempted from compliance with the general­
ly applicable legislation on fixed-term employ­
ment contracts (
7). The Court concluded that this 
exemption did not transfer State resources direct­
ly or indirectly to the undertaking in question. 
3. Specificity criterion 
207. It is important, especially in the case of 
taxation or social policy measures, to distinguish 
between the situation whereby the beneficiaries 
are certain undertakings or the production of cer-
( ' ) Case Τ-11 /95 BP Chemicals ν Commission, not yet reported. 
(
2) Case C-32/97 Porcelanas del Norte (Ponsal)/Comercial Europa 
de Porcelanas (Comepor), not yet published in the Official Jour­
nal. 
(-
1) Case NN-83/98 Preussag Stahl, acquisition of the company by the 
German authorities, not yet published in the Official Journal. 
C) Case C-39/98 (ex NN-53/98). not yet published in the Official 
Journal. 
(') Cases N-449a/97 and NN-50/98, not yet published in the Official 
Journal. 
C') Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun­
cil of 22 June 1998 (OJ L 245, 4.9.1998). 
(
7) Joined Cases C-52/97, C-53/97 and C-54/97 Viscido and Others ν 
Ente Poste Italiane (1998) ECR 1-2629.  69 tain goods, as specified in Article 87(1), and that 
whereby the measures in question have a 
cross-sectoral impact and are intended to favour 
the whole of the economy. In the latter case, there 
is no State aid within the meaning of Article 
87( 1 ), but a general measure. 
208. In the Uidbroke judgment (') the Court of 
First Instance had the opportunity to elaborate on 
the specificity criterion. The fact that aid awarded 
to an economic actor may indirectly benefit other 
actors whose activities depend on the activity of 
the recipient does not suffice to conclude that the 
aid is a general measure not caught by Article 
87(1). It may possibly afford scope for allowing 
a derogation on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) (aid 
to promote the development of certain economic 
activities). The undertaking Pari Mutuel Urbain 
is exclusively competent to organise a specific 
type of betting on horse racing in France and is 
subject to a tax regulation which is specific to the 
horse racing sector in France. The Court agreed 
with the Commission that the special regulations 
which were being examined in this case should 
not be regarded as a derogation from the general 
tax rules, but should be viewed in the context of 
the tax system applied in the horse racing sector. 
Furthermore, it ruled that the temporary or per­
manent nature of the measures was of no rele­
vance to the interpretation of Article 87(1). Also, 
the fact that the measures did not address an ad 
hoc operation was irrelevant in the light of the 
established case law that only the effects of aid 
matter in order to characterise it as State aid, and 
not its causes or aims. 
209. Payments made to the redundant workers 
of an insolvent company after termination of 
their employment contracts, in order to ensure 
more suitable unemployment cover for them con­
stitute a measure which gives them additional 
coverage going beyond the company's legal 
obligations. The Commission concluded in one 
case (
2) that such a measure did not amount to 
State aid to the insolvent company, but to extra­
ordinary assistance having a basic positive effect 
on the social protection position of the workers. 
210. In July the Commission re-examined the 
preferential treatment of manufacturing over ser­
vice companies in the system of corporation tax 
in Ireland. In 1980, at a time when trade in ser­
vices was less liberalised than in the late 1990s, 
the Commission had considered that this treat­
ment accorded to the manufacturing sector, vir­
tually the only sector open to competition, con­
stituted a general measure. In its decision of 22 
July (
3), proposing appropriate measures under 
Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty, the Commission 
decided that this preferential treatment consti­
tuted not only State aid but operating aid which 
could no longer be authorised in the context of 
Ireland's loss of 87(3)(a) assisted region status. It 
therefore needed to be eliminated through the 
adoption of a unified tax rate for both the manu­
facturing and the service sector of the economy. 
4. Distortion of competition and effect 
on intra-Community trade 
211. As the Court of First Instance ruled in 
Flemish Region ν Commission (
4), when the State 
confers even a limited advantage on an undertak­
ing which is active in a sector characterised by 
intense competition, there is a distortion or risk of 
distortion of competition. In order to establish the 
impact on trade between Member States it is suf­
ficient to conclude that the beneficiary exercises, 
even partially, activities involving significant 
trade between Member States. 
272. In the case of a British scheme concerning 
the extension of tax relief, namely the 'non-fos­
sil-fuel obligation' in favour of electricity gener­
ators using renewables (
5), the Commission con­
sidered that trade in electricity between Member 
States was likely to be affected, notably as 
regards trade between the UK and France via the 
cross-Channel link. 
213. Aid to enterprises in support of foreign 
direct investment may affect trade between 
Member States. It is possible that competitors of 
the recipient may be trying to increase their mar­
ket share in the third country in question unaided. 
This position was confirmed in the Commis­
sion's negative final decision on the first notified 
case of foreign direct investment aid granted to a 
large enterprise (
6). The Commission examined 
70 
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whether the derogation in Article 87(3)(c) could 
apply. It should be noted that it is the Commis-
sion's practice to authorise foreign direct invest-
ment aid to small and medium-sized enterprises 
if it is granted within the terms of the guidelines 
on State aid to SMEs. 
framework. The Austrian authorities decided to 
abandon their plans for KNP Leykam. The Ger-
man authorities also decided to withdraw their no-
tification in the Biotec case, finding that part of the 
aid came under a scheme previously approved by 
the Commission and deciding to withdraw the rest 
of the aid. 
C — Assessing the compatibility 
of aid with the common market 
1. Horizontal aid 
1.1. Research and development 
214. In applying the 1996 Community frame-
work for State aid for research and develop-
ment ('), the Commission is particularly con-
cerned to ensure that the aid notified to it is actu-
ally granted to research and development pro-
jects and acts as an incentive for these projects to 
be carried out. In 1998 the Commission initiated 
Article 88(2) proceedings in several cases 
involving aid for research and development 
where there were doubts about at least one of 
these conditions; these were in the fields of elec-
tronics (Sican) (
2), paper (KNP Leykam) (
3), 
packaging (Biotec Biologische Naturverpackun-
gen GmbH) (
4) and printers (Océ NV) (
5). 
215. In the Sican case, the Commission, follow- · 
ing complaints, found that aid of more than ECU 
100 million had been disbursed without having 
been notified by the German authorities. More-
over, the information provided by those authori-
ties was not such as to enable the Commission to 
assess the aid's compatibility with the Communi-
ty framework on R & D aid. In the Océ case, the 
Commission decided to launch a formal investiga-
tion as it had serious doubts about whether the 
work which had been carried out could be defined 
as research and development: the information pro-
vided to the Commission suggested that the aid 
planned by the Dutch authorities was for work 
which was very close to the market and which 
could not therefore be defined as research and de-
velopment within the meaning of the Community 
(') OJC45. 17.2.1996. 
(
2) Case C-20/98 (ex NN-166/97, NN-169/97 and NN-170/97) (OJ 
C 307, 7.10.1998). 
(') Case C-23/98 (ex N-895/96) (OJ C 296, 24.9.1998). 
C) Case C-8/98 (ex N-237/97 and NN-151/97) (OJ C 219, 
15.7.1998). 
C) Case C-18/98 (ex N-939/96) (OJ C 270, 29.8.1998). 
276. In numerous other cases, the Commission 
found that the notified aid met the criteria laid 
down in the Community R&D framework (in 
particular as regards the research and develop-
ment character of the projects and the incentive 
effect of the aid) and was therefore compatible 
with the EC Treaty. An example is the Commend 
case notified jointly by the Dutch (
6) and 
French (
7) authorities: this Eureka project 
involves Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, French and 
German manufacturers and has as its objective 
the acquisition of know-how which is largely 
upstream of the development of marketable prod-
ucts. The project corresponds to industrial 
research within the meaning of the framework. 
The aid granted by the Dutch and French Gov-
ernments should enable cooperation at Commu-
nity level on an ambitious technological project 
which will also allow widespread diffusion of its 
results. The Commission therefore considered 
that the planned aid was an incentive to the recip-
ients to step up their R&D efforts and to coop-
erate on work which was more ambitious and 
involved higher risks than the work they would 
otherwise have carried out. 
1.2. Employment and training 
217. One of the major challenges facing the 
Community is finding ways to improve the em-
ployment situation. Promoting a 'high level of 
employment' has become a matter of common 
concern to Member States. The new title on em-
ployment that is to be inserted in the EC Treaty re-
quires Member States to develop a coordinated 
strategy for employment and for promoting a 
skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and 
labour markets responsive to economic change. 
The important part played by training, both in en-
hancing the Community's competitiveness and in 
creating and maintaining jobs, has encouraged 
Member States to promote investment in training. 
The Commission has set up various initiatives in 
(") Case N-506/97 (OJ C 192. 19.6.1998). 
(
7) Case N-664/97 (OJ C 192, 19.6.1998).  71 the training sphere. It has endeavoured to integrate 
the training dimension and its favourable ap-
proach thereto into other Community policies, in-
cluding competition policy. 
218. On 22 July the Commission adopted a 
framework on training aid (')■ This specifies in 
which circumstances public financing provided 
to firms for the purpose of training their workers 
may fall within the scope of the competition rules 
relating to State aid. Only a very small proportion 
of public financing provided for training workers 
is actually covered by the framework. Most State 
measures in this field do not constitute aid pur-
suant to Article 87(1), but rank as general mea-
sures. This applies to measures directly targeted 
at workers irrespective of the firm in which they 
work or to measures which are open to all firms 
without discriminating, for example, through tax 
incentives. This kind of measure does not raise 
any competition concerns and is, on the contrary, 
encouraged by the Commission. 
219. However, where State assistance benefits 
certain firms only by reducing the costs they 
would normally have to bear in order to train their 
workers, this gives them an advantage over their 
competitors and is therefore likely to distort com-
petition. The framework sets out the criteria which 
the Commission will use to assess the compatibil-
ity of such aid with the common market. The crite-
ria are intended to avoid distortions of competi-
tion between firms where such distortions cannot 
be justified by the training objectives. 
220. When assessing compatibility, the Com-
mission takes a very favourable view of aid 
which effectively benefits workers and improves 
their employability. Training providing workers 
with skills that are readily transferable to other 
firms effectively increases their employability. 
Authorisable aid amounts are therefore greater 
for this kind of measure than for company-spe-
cific training which is of less benefit to the work-
ers themselves. 
The Commission also considers that lower levels 
of spending on training in small and 
medium-sized enterprises and in the most disad-
vantaged areas, and the difficulties faced by cer-
tain categories of worker on the labour market, 
may justify larger amounts of aid. 
These principles are reflected in a range of inten-
sity thresholds below which aid may be consid-
ered compatible with the common market. The 
thresholds vary between 25 % of expenditure by 
large firms on specific training projects and 90 % 
of expenditure on general training projects by 
SMEs in Article 87(3)(a) areas whose workers 
are considered to be at a disadvantage on the 
labour market. 
1.3. Environment 
221. In 1998 the Commission had various 
opportunities to further clarify its interpretation 
of the guidelines on State aid for environmental 
protection (
2). On one occasion, it stressed that 
environmental considerations did not justify aid 
exceeding the intensity authorised for regional 
aid where the recipient did no more than adapt its 
plant to the legal requirements, notwithstanding 
the fact that those requirements were particularly 
strict because the plant was situated in a nature 
reserve (
3). 
222. The Commission authorised, for limited 
periods of up to five years, operating aid for the 
use of renewable forms of energy (
4). Also, in sev-
eral Dutch cases with regard to environmental tax-
es on waste treatment (
5), the Commission applied 
its practice of approving under certain conditions 
operating aid for environmental purposes. 
1.4. Rescue and restructuring aid 
223. Aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in 
difficulty accounts for a high proportion of the 
aid given to individual recipients on an ad hoc 
basis. The sixth State aid survey (
6), published in 
July and covering the period 1994-96, found that 
the high levels of ad hoc aid in the manufactur-
ing, financial services and air transport sectors 
reported in the fifth survey had continued. The 
Commission remains concerned at this trend, 
given the particular distortions which can be 
caused by the maintenance in existence of firms 
which would otherwise exit the market. 
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224. The Commission continued to work on 
tightening the guidelines on aid for rescuing and 
restructuring firms in difficulty. Pending comple-
tion of this process the Commission extended the 
validity of the existing guidelines (') until March 
1999 (
2). In applying the guidelines the Commis-
sion has in many cases made clear that aid for 
restructuring cannot be found compatible with 
the common market if there is no viable restruc-
turing plan. 
2. Regional aid 
225. In December, in accordance with its deci-
sion taken in December 1997 when it set the ceil-
ing for regional aid coverage for the period from 
2000 to 2006 at 42.7 % of the Union's population, 
the Commission updated the national coverage 
ceilings on the basis of the most recent data 
(1994-96 for per capita GDP and 1995-97 for 
unemployment). It has informed Member States 
of their respective ceilings. They are now in pos-
session of all the information they need to notify 
their regional aid maps, which will be valid for 
the period from 2000 to 2006. They have been 
asked to do so before 31 March 1999, so that the 
exercise can be completed in good time, failing 
which no regional aid can be granted after 31 
December 1999. 
226. Following the adoption of the guidelines 
on national regional aid in December 1997, the 
Commission has been examining all schemes 
notified since then in the light of the new rules; 
however, it has not applied the new intensities, 
which will enter into force on 1 January 2000. 
Moreover, with a view to ensuring equal treat-
ment and pursuant to Article 88( 1 ) of the Treaty, 
it proposed appropriate measures to the Member 
States in February with two objectives in mind: 
first, to set an expiry date of 31 December 1999 
for the current maps of areas eligible for regional 
aid so that they would have a uniform expiry date 
which also matched that of the Structural Funds, 
and second, to amend, if necessary, all existing 
schemes due to remain in force after 31 Decem-
ber 1999 so as to ensure that they are applied in a 
manner consistent with the new rules as from 1 
January 2000. All the Member States accepted 
these appropriate measures. In cooperation with 
them, the Commission is monitoring the mea-
sures' implementation. 
227. This year the Commission took the last 
two decisions on regional maps in the Member 
States drawn up under the previous regional aid 
guidelines (
3). The countries concerned are Swe-
den (
4) and Austria (
5). The maps in question will 
expire on 31 December 1999. The Commission 
also approved the new regional aid scheme for 
Greece, concerning the granting of national 
regional aid throughout the country (
6). 
3. Aid to outward foreign direct 
investment 
228. Government support measures for foreign 
direct investment constitute State aid. Neverthe-
less, they may be compatible with the common 
market if, apart from their effect on the competi-
tiveness of Community industry, they promote 
other Community objectives such as the devel-
opment of SMEs. When assessing aid to outward 
foreign direct investment by SMEs, the Commis-
sion therefore continued to apply the guidelines 
on aid to SMEs. 
229. Aid to large firms, however, is assessed on 
a case-by-case basis. In the Lift GmbH case (
7) the 
Commission took a negative decision on aid for an 
investment in China. It found that the aid might af-
fect the competitive situation of European com-
petitors in the relevant market. In its decision to 
initiate the proceedings the Commission had an-
nounced that it would check, among other criteria, 
the necessity of the aid and its intensity in the light 
of the international competitiveness of the Euro-
pean industry and/or the risks involved for an in-
vestment project in certain third countries. The 
Member State failed to prove that, for a global 
player with a turnover of ECU 180.5 million, aid 
amounting to ECU 0.13 million was a necessary 
precondition for establishing a factory in China, 
where the company had already rented premises. 
With this decision the Commission has no inten-
tion of prejudging its future policy on State aid in 
support of foreign direct investment. It does not 
rule out the possibility that foreign direct invest-
(') OJ C 368, 23.12.1994. 
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State aid where it can be established that the pro-
ject in question does not create an incompatible 
distortion of competition within the EEA. Fur-
thermore, in this context, any potential element 
of export subsidisation should be carefully exam-
ined in the light of the Community's international 
obligations and, in particular, the prohibition of 
export subsidies contained in the WTO Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM). 
4. Sectoral aid 
4.1. Sectors subject to specific rules 
4.1.1. Shipbuilding 
230. The Commission's commitment to phas-
ing out operating aid for shipbuilding was 
impeded by the continued absence of ratification 
of the OECD shipbuilding agreement by the 
United States. In June the Council therefore 
adopted a regulation establishing new rules on 
aid to shipbuilding (') to succeed the seventh 
Council directive on aid to shipbuilding. It will 
enter into force on 1 January 1999 and will apply 
until 31 December 2003. It will lead to a shift 
away from operating aid (which will be abolished 
at the end of 2000) to other forms of support such 
as closure, aid, aid for research and development 
and environmental protection, restructuring aid, 
regional investment aid for improving the pro-
ductivity of existing installations, and investment 
aid for innovation. The current ceilings for oper-
ating aid of 9 % (4.5 % for smaller vessels and 
conversions) will be maintained until their aboli-
tion on 31 December 2000. The regulation pro-
vides for the Commission to undertake a regular 
review of the market situation. 
231. On 21 January and on 29 July the Com-
mission submitted its first two monitoring reports 
to the Council on the restructuring of the publicly 
owned shipyards in Spain and of MTW-Schiff-
swerft and Volkswerft Stralsund in Germany (
2). 
The reports provided information on the progress 
made in implementing the restructuring plans 
and on compliance with the conditions attached 
to the Commission's approval of the associated 
aid such as capacity reductions and limitations on 
production. 
With respect to compliance with capacity limita-
tions the Commission found reason to initiate the 
procedure provided for in Article 88(2) of the 
Treaty to examine the exceeding of new building 
capacity limitations by the German yard 
Kvaerner Warnow Werft (
3). 
232. One of the few opportunities the Com-
mission has had to address the misuse of previ-
ously approved aid by the recipient was in the 
negative final decision concerning the misuse of 
ECU 400 million by Bremer Vulkan Group (
4). 
Bremer Vulkan had received the aid on condition 
that it be used exclusively for the restructuring of 
its two East German shipyards MTW Schiff-
swerft Wismar and Volkswerft Stralsund. In fact, 
the ECU 400 million was used for other pur-
poses, mainly for the benefit of other subsidiary 
companies of Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG that 
had become insolvent in the meantime. The 
Commission decided that the German Govern-
ment should recover the misused aid as part of the 
insolvency proceedings. In addition, the German 
Government should take all suitable steps to 
recover any partial amounts from companies pre-
viously belonging to the Bremer Vulkan Group. 
233. The Commission also placed under 
scrutiny the control of development aid in ship-
building, where it is often not easy to verify 
whether the conditions are subsequently com-
plied with. In February the Commission partly 
terminated the procedure with a negative deci-
sion in a case in which Germany had granted 
development aid in connection with the building 
of a dredger by Volkswerft Stralsund and its sale 
to PT Rukindo in Indonesia (
5). The development 
project had been approved by the Commission in 
1994 on condition that the vessel be used only in 
Indonesia. However, since 1995 the vessel had 
been employed in Malaysia for more than 300 
days. The Commission considered that the aid 
had been misused and that it was incompatible 
with Article 4(7) of the shipbuilding aid directive. 
It therefore requested that the development aid be 
repaid with interest. 
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234. In May the Commission initiated pro-
ceedings under Artide 88(2) in respect of a 
French development aid project ('). The aid was 
to be granted in connection with the sale of two 
cruise vessels by Chantiers de l'Atlantique to 
Renaissance Financial, which employ the vessels 
in French Polynesia. Renaissance Financial was 
domiciled in Paris and was a subsidiary of the 
American company Renaissance Cruise Inc. 
When assessing development projects the Com-
mission checks that the actual shipowner is domi-
ciled in the beneficiary developing country. Since 
in this case the owner was domiciled in Paris, the 
Commission was not satisfied that the aid pro-
posal complied with the requirement. Also, the 
Commission was not convinced that the project 
had a genuine development content, given that 
the immediate beneficiaries were the investors 
investing in the company in Paris. In fact, it 
appeared that French Polynesia would benefit 
only in the sense that from time to time passen-
gers would visit the islands. 
4.1.2. Steel 
235. In 1998 the Commission continued to 
apply the sixth Steel Aid Code (
2). No use has yet 
been made of the new possibility to grant aid for 
partial closures; however, several companies 
have taken advantage of the new provisions on 
environmental protection, which allow greater 
aid amounts for companies whose investment 
results in a significantly higher level of environ-
mental protection than that required by manda-
tory standards. None the less, the Commission 
has taken negative decisions where it has found 
that aid does not pursue the objectives laid down 
in the code. This applies, for example, to the ESF 
Feralpi case (
3), in which the Commission 
ordered that the aid be recovered, considering 
that it was not possible to make a distinction 
between different types of activity within an 
ECSC company and that aid approved by the 
Commission for a stated purpose could not be 
used for other purposes. 
4.1.3. Coal 
236. On 3 June the Commission took three deci-
sions concerning the coal industry in Spain. First, 
it authorised (
4) Spain to grant supplementary fi-
nancial assistance for the 1994,1995 and 1996 fi-
nancial years totalling ECU 416.7 million (ESP67 
053 million). Of this amount, ECU 127.1 million 
(ESP 20 452 million) was linked to current pro-
duction, while ECU 289.6 million (ESP 46 601 
million) went to cover inherited liabilities. Fur-
thermore, the Commission authorised (
5) the grant 
of financial assistance for the 1997 financial year 
totalling ECU 1 068.3 million (ESP 177 234 mil-
lion). Of this amount, ECU 704.5 million (ESP 
116 877 million) was linked to current production, 
while ECU 363.8 million (ESP 60 357 million) 
went to cover inherited liabilities. Finally, it ap-
proved (
6) aid for 1998 totalling ECU 1 164.8 mil-
lion (ESP 193 817 million). Of this amount, ECU 
762.3 million (ESP 126 855 million) is linked to 
current production, while ECU 402.4 million 
(ESP66 962 million) covers inherited liabilities. 
237. On 20 July the British coal producer RJB 
Mining pic filed an action before the Court of First 
Instance of the European Communities to obtain 
annulment of the decisions concerning Spain (
7). 
238. On 10 June the Commission authorised (
8) 
Germany to grant financial assistance for the 
1997 financial year totalling ECU 5 331.2 million 
(DEM 10 470.4 million). Of this amount, ECU 4 
.919.1 million (DEM 9 661.2 million) was linked 
to current production, while ECU 412.1 million 
(DEM 809.2 million) went to cover inherited lia-
bilities. On 20 July RJB Mining filed an action 
against this decision also before the Court of First 
Instance to obtain its annulment (
9). 
239. On 29 July the Commission, following 
two complaints lodged by a British anthracite 
producer, declared (
l0) illegal the use of ECU 7.1 
million (DEM 13.55 million) in State aid granted 
by Germany and originally authorised (") for the 
1996 financial year. ECU 3.5 million (DEM 6.8 
million) in State aid granted by Germany for the 
1997 financial year before the relevant Commis-
sion decision had been taken has also been 
declared illegal. The recipients (Preussag 
(') Case C-37/98 (ex N-124/98) (OJ C 307, 7.10.1998). 
(
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have been paying back the aid. 
240. On 29 July the Commission authorised ( ' ) 
the acquisition of Saarbergwerke GmbH and 
Preussag Anthrazit GmbH by Ruhrkohle AG. 
The new company, Deutsche Kohle AG, will 
control all German coal production. On 29 Sep-
tember RJB Mining brought a further action 
before the Court of First Instance for annulment 
of this decision (
2). 
241. On 2 December the Commission, having 
examined the German coal industry restructuring 
plan for the years 1998-2002, authorised (
3) Ger-
many to grant financial assistance for the 1998 
financial year totalling ECU 4 803.6 million 
(DEM 9 427 million). Of this amount ECU 4 
288.4 million (DEM 8 416 million) is linked to 
current production, while ECU 515.2 million 
(DEM 1011 million) covers inherited liabilities. 
4.1.4. Motor vehicle industry 
242. In 1998 the Commission applied the new 
Community framework for State aid to the motor 
vehicle industry (
4). Among the decisions taken 
in the course of 1998, the following may be men-
tioned. 
243. The Commission decided (
5) not to raise 
any objections to training aid granted by the Por-
tuguese Government to AutoEuropa, a joint ven-
ture set up in 1991 by Ford and Volkswagen near 
Setúbal. The Commission had approved regional 
investment aid and training aid for the plant to be 
built and brought into operation. The implementa-
tion of the 1991 decision approving this aid was 
monitored and it was found that the company had 
continued to receive training aid after the launch 
of production in 1995. With the cooperation of the 
Portuguese authorities and the company, the sums 
paid out in excess of those allowed under the 
framework on training aid have been recovered. 
244. The Commission approved regional aid 
totalling ECU 38 million to be granted to LDV 
Ltd for an investment project involving the man-
ufacture of a new range of vans in a joint venture 
with Daewoo (
6). The investment will be made in 
an LDV plant in Birmingham, United Kingdom. 
This is the first decision adopted under the cur-
rent motor vehicle industry framework involving 
an alternative site in a central or eastern European 
country. Instead of concentrating all its European 
production of light commercial vehicles at its 
plant in Lublin, Poland, Daewoo has decided to 
use LDV's existing facilities in Birmingham to 
manufacture some of the vehicles. 
245. The Commission continued to monitor 
the restructuring plans for Seat SA (
7) and San-
tana Motor SA (
8) in Spain, together with major 
investment projects whose implementation is 
spread out over several years, and payments 
made by the national authorities in the Fiat Mez-
zogiorno (
9) case in Italy. 
4.1.5. Synthetic fibres industry 
246. In 1998 the Commission continued to be 
vigilant in applying the latest code on State aid to 
the synthetic fibres industry, which came into 
force in 1996 for a period of three years (
10). The 
Commission decided on 16 December to extend 
the validity of the code until August 2001, at 
which point a decision could be taken on whether 
or not to bring the industry within the scope of the 
multisectoral framework on regional aid to large 
investment projects (")· Among the decisions 
taken this year the following may be mentioned. 
247. The Commission decided to terminate the 
Article 88(2) proceedings it had initiated in 
March 1997 in respect of the Portuguese Gov-
ernment's proposal to award aid for investments 
by the rope and cord producer Cordex SA (
12). In 
the course of the proceedings the Portuguese 
authorities agreed to modify their original notifi-
cation by omitting from the list of eligible costs 
those activities which came within the scope of 
the code, including support for new capacity for 
the extrusion of polypropylene filament yarn. 
Since the project fell within an approved scheme, 
the Commission was able to authorise aid 
totalling ECU 2.69 million. 
248. On 25 March the Commission decided to 
initiate Article 88(2) proceedings in respect of the 
Spanish authorities' proposal to award State aid 
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amounting to ECU 1.2 million to the synthetic 
fibres producer Brilén SA ('). The investment 
project concerned the technological rationalisa-
tion and upgrading of the company's polyester 
yarn production plant. Since the project appeared 
to involve an increase in capacity for one of the 
fibres covered by the code on aid to the synthetic 
fibres industry (polyester filament yarn), the 
Commission had doubts about whether the pro-
posed aid would fulfil the authorisation criteria 
laid down in the code. 
249. The Commission decided to initiate Arti-
cle 88(2) proceedings in respect of the German 
authorities' proposal to award State aid for a 
greenfield investment by a newly created com-
pany Saxonylon Textil GmbH (
2), a subsidiary of 
the Singaporean Toloram Group. The aid would 
support an increase in capacity of polyamide, tex-
tile and industrial filament yarn. Furthermore, it 
was proposed to award the maximum regional 
aid intensity permitted in the former East Ger-
many and the aid did not seem likely to contribute 
directly to the restructuring and reduction of 
capacity in the synthetic fibres industry as a 
whole in that region. 
250. Finally, the Commission decided to termi-
nate with a final partly negative decision Article 
88(2) proceedings initiated in October 1997 in 
respect of aid granted to the viscose and synthetic 
fibres producer SNIACE SA (
3). 
4.1.6. Textiles and clothing 
257. In view of the specific nature of the textile 
and clothing industry, the multisectoral frame-
work on regional aid for large investment pro-
jects (
4), which entered into force on 1 Septem-
ber, provides for specific treatment of this sector. 
An aid measure in support of new investment in 
the textile industry must be notified individually 
if the overall project cost exceeds ECU 15 mil-
lion (instead of the of ECU 50 million 
project-cost threshold for other sectors), the 
intensity exceeds 50 % of the eligible ceiling in 
the region in question and the aid per job created 
or maintained exceeds ECU 30 000 (instead of 
ECU 40 000) (
5). 
(') Case C-25/98 (ex N-851/97) (OJ C 199, 25.6.1998). 
(
2) Case C-63/98 (ex N-362/98), not yet published in the Official 
Journal. 
(
3) Case C-68/97 (ex NN-118/97), not yet published in the Official 
Journal. 
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(') See 1997 Competition Report, point 210. 
4.1.7. Transport 
252. In 1998 the Commission adopted 35 deci-
sions on aid in the transport sector. 
Air transport 
253. In the air transport sector, the Commis-
sion continued to monitor compliance with the 
conditions laid down in decisions authorising 
restructuring aid to airlines: 
254. On 3 June it decided not to object to pay-
ment of the second instalment, worth ECU 
258.23 million (ITL 500 billion), of an increase 
in the capital of Alitalia. This decision followed 
the positive decision adopted on 15 July 1997 
with regard to a capital increase for the company 
totalling ECU 1420.26 million (ITL 2 750 bil-
lion) payable in three instalments provided cer-
tain conditions were met, ensuring in particular 
that the restructuring plan was monitored, that 
arrangements for its implementation were trans-
parent and that Alitalia's problems were not 
passed on to its competitors. While stressing the 
importance of making good the delays in cost 
reductions, particularly with regard to crews, the 
Commission found that the restructuring plan 
had been implemented satisfactorily and that 
Italy had given further undertakings intended 
both to ensure that the aid would not be used to 
finance promotional campaigns and to enable 
competing airlines to benefit from traffic rights to 
non-EEA countries. 
255. On 14 August the Commission authorised 
restructuring aid to Olympic Airways comprising 
loan guarantees, a reduction in the airline's debt 
and a capital injection. This aid, initially autho-
rised in October 1994, had been partially frozen 
for more than two years owing to the Greek Gov-
ernment's failure to comply with certain condi-
tions of the authorisation decision. The Commis-
sion was satisfied that the Greek authorities were 
now acting in accordance with the undertakings 
given and that the aid, which is part of a revised re-
structuring plan extended until 2002, was compat-
ible with the competition rules. However, it re-
duced the authorised capital injection from ECU 
165 million (GRD 54 billion) to ECU 125 million 
(GRD 40.8 billion), extended until 2002 the con-
ditions initially laid down and made its decision 
subject to compliance with further conditions. 
256. Following the annulment by the Court of 
First Instance of the Commission decision of 27  77 78 
July 1994 (') authorising the recapitalisation of 
Air France to the tune of ECU 3.05 billion (FRF 20 
billion), owing to insufficient reasoning on two 
points, one relating to the purchase of new aircraft 
and the other to the competitive position of Air 
France on routes outside the European Economic 
Area, the Commission decided on 22 July to adopt 
a new decision authorising the same amount and 
clarifying its position regarding the two points 
raised by the Court. It stressed first of all that the 
aid was granted in the context of a restructuring 
plan considered convincing by the Court, that the 
air transport sector was expanding rapidly, that 
there was no change in the number of seats offered 
by Air France and that all the aid granted to the air-
line was intended to reduce its debt burden and not 
to finance the purchase of new aircraft Secondly, 
the Commission pointed out that the general con-
ditions laid down offered sufficient guarantees in 
themselves with regard to the non-EEA routes, in 
particular since they involved a reduction in mar-
ket share throughout the world, since the aid had a 
much greater effect on the competitive situation 
for intra-EEA routes than for other routes, and 
since too tight a restriction on Air France's capac-
ity on non-EEA routes would essentially benefit 
the airlines of non-member countries. 
257. In cases other than those involving 
restructuring aid, the Commission authorised the 
following: 
• on 29 July, pursuant to Article 87(2)(a), social 
aid to· residents of the Canary and Balearic 
islands for intra-archipelago flights; a similar 
decision was adopted on 27 August in respect 
of aid granted to residents of Madeira for 
flights between the island and the rest of Por-
tugal; and 
• on 11 November, under the Community 
guidelines on State aid for environmental pro-
tection, a grant of ECU 150 944 (NLG 332 
637) awarded by the Netherlands to Martinair 
for the installation of new equipment 
designed to reduce pollutant emissions. 
258. However, on 21 January the Commission 
adopted a negative final decision in respect of two 
grants of ECU 24407 and 6 696 respectively (BEF 
984 600 and 270 116) to be paid by the Flemish 
Region to the airline Air Belgium and the tour op-
erator Sunair in exchange for their using Ostend 
airport. None the less, the Commission did not op-
pose the payment to Sunair of a sum of ECU 
111 500 (BEF4.5 million) corresponding to the fi-
nancing by the Flemish Region of a campaign to 
promote Ostend and Antwerp airports. 
Sea transport 
259. In the maritime transport sector, the Com-
mission authorised, pursuant to the Community 
guidelines on State aid to maritime transport ('), 
several aid schemes designed to reduce tax and 
social security contribution burdens on shipping 
companies. Where tax relief schemes were 
applied to companies part of whose fleet operated 
under a non-Community flag, the Commission 
asked the Member States concerned, in accor-
dance with the guidelines, to submit a report 
enabling it to assess the effects of the aid scheme 
on the Community-registered fleet and on the 
employment of Community seafarers. 
By a decision adopted on 7 April the Commission 
initiated Article 88(2) proceedings in respect of 
several aid measures connected with the restruc-
turing of the French shipping company Brittany 
Ferries owing, on the one hand, to serious doubts 
about the positive effect of the measures on the 
company's viability and, on the other, to the risk 
of distortion of competition between shipping 
companies from different Member States. On 9 
December the Commission decided to extend the 
proceedings to include a plan to grant FRF 80 
million more in aid to Brittany Ferries and any 
other additional aid granted in connection with 
the company's restructuring. 
On 18 February the Commission also initiated Ar-
ticle 88(2) proceedings in respect of aid granted by 
Spain to the shipping company Transmediter-
ránea under a public service contract which the 
company had with the Spanish State. The Com-
mission had doubts about the terms of the contract 
and the circumstances in which it was awarded. 
On 9 December the Commission initiated Article 
88(2) proceedings in respect of various presumed 
aid measures to the French company Corsica 
Marittima, a subsidiary of SNCM, a shipping 
company with public service obligations to pro-
vide transport between Corsica and mainland 
France. 
On the same day the Commission adopted a neg-
ative final decision in respect of measures 
(') Joined Cases T-371/94 and T-394/94 British Airways and Others 
ν Commission (1998) ECR 11-2405. STATE AID 
planned by the Irish Government to reduce the 
labour costs borne by shipowners as a conse-
quence of employing Community seafarers on 
board their ships. Contrary to the requirements of 
the Community guidelines on State aid to mar-
itime transport, ships other than only those regis-
tered in a Member State would benefit from the 
measures and the Commission therefore consid-
ered them to be incompatible with Article 87 of 
the Treaty. 
Port sector 
On 22 December the Commission initiated pro-
ceedings under Article 88(2) of the Treaty in 
respect of aid measures to reduce operating costs 
for port companies in Italy. The Commission had 
serious doubts about the compatibility of the 
measures, which supplement those intended for 
the restructuring of the Italian port sector, them-
selves the subject of a parallel investigation 
under Article 88(2). 
Rail transport 
260. In the rail transport sector, the Commis-
sion decided on 22 December not to object to a 
plan to grant aid notified by the British authori-
ties and involving additional measures to finance 
the construction, maintenance and management 
of the CTRL, the rail infrastructure for 
high-speed trains between London and the Chan-
nel Tunnel. In assessing the notified aid, the 
Commission drew a clear distinction between aid 
to the infrastructure manager and aid to the train 
operator. Since the CTRL forms part of the 
Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam-London 
line, one of the 14 priority projects in the context 
of the development of trans-European networks, 
the Commission considered that the measures to 
assist the infrastructure manager were compati-
ble with the common market pursuant to Article 
87(3)(b) of the Treaty. Regarding the aid for the 
train operator, the Commission took account of 
the fact that the aid was intended to offset infra-
structure utilisation charges, and it therefore 
authorised the aid pursuant to Article 3(1 )(b) of 
Regulation (EEC) No 1107/70. 
Road transport 
261. In the road transport sector, the Commis-
sion decided on 4 February to initiate proceed-
ings under Article 88(2) of the Treaty in respect 
of a toll-relief system on the Tauern motorway in 
Austria ('), since the measures constituted oper-
ating aid. It also decided on 25 March to initiate 
proceedings in respect of aid to road haulage and 
combined transport in Italy (
2), given its doubts 
about the admissibility of the measures under 
Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty. 
262. On 1 July the Commission adopted a 
partly negative final decision on a Spanish aid 
scheme for the purchase of industrial vehicles. It 
considered that the aid granted to public bodies 
and public service providers at local level and to 
natural persons and SMEs in sectors other than 
transport which conducted local or regional busi-
ness only did not constitute aid within the mean-
ing of Article 87( 1 ) of the Treaty. All other aid 
granted by the Spanish authorities was consid-
ered incompatible and the Commission therefore 
ordered its recovery. On 28 October the Com-
mission decided to initiate proceedings in respect 
of the extension of the same scheme in 1997. 
263. Lastly, in its White Paper 'Fair pay ment for 
infrastructure use' (
3) adopted on 22 July, the 
Commission stressed the growing importance of 
the role played by State aid rules as Member States 
turn more to private companies for the develop-
ment and management of transport infrastruc-
tures. In this context, the Commission intends to 
clarify and update its approach to aid in the inland 
transport sector by proposing a revision of Coun-
cil Regulation (EEC) No 1107/70 (
4). 
4.1.8. Agriculture 
264. In 1998 several new rules entered into 
force regarding State aid in the agricultural sec-
tor: Community guidelines for rescuing and 
restructuring firms in difficulty (
5), and rules on 
aid for research and development (
6) and on sub-
sidised short-term operating loans in agricul-
ture (
7). Concerning aid for rescue and restruc-
turing, it is interesting to note that no Member 
State, when notifying these aid measures, has so 
far requested the application of the special rules 
devised for the agricultural sector (point 3.2.5 of 
the Community guidelines). The few notifica-
ci OJ C 205, 5.7.1997. 
(
2) OJC 198,24.6.1998. 
C) OJC2I1,7.7.1998. 
C) COM0998) 466 final. 
(') OJL 130, 15.6.1970 (Special Edition 1970(11), p. 360). 
C) OJC 283, 19.9.1997. 
(
7) Commission communication amending the Community frame-
work for State aid for research and development (OJ C 48, 
13.2.1998).  79 tions concerning this type of aid were based on 
the general rules applicable to all sectors. 
265. No particular problems were raised by the 
application of the new rules for research and 
development, requiring compliance with the fol-
lowing criteria: ( 1 ) general interest of the project 
for the specific sector concerned; (2) need to 
spread information in adequate publications at 
least of national relevance and not restricted to 
members of specific organisations; (3) availabil-
ity of the results of the work to all interested par-
ties; and (4) compliance with the conditions laid 
down in Annex II ('Domestic support: the basis 
for exemption from the reduction commitments') 
to the agreement on agriculture concluded in the 
course of the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations (')· 
266. More problematic was the entry into force 
of the rules concerning subsidised short-term oper-
ating loans. By letter dated 19 December 1997 (
2) 
the Commission informed the Member States that, 
starting from 30 June 1998, the Commission com-
munication on subsidised short-term loans in agri-
culture (
3), as interpreted by Commission letter 
dated 19 December 1997 (
4), would enter into force 
again and that the procedure pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty would be initiated in respect 
of the aid which would come into orremain in force 
after 30 June 1998 and which did not comply with 
the new rules. This, strictly speaking, meant that 
the new rules would be applicable to national con-
tributions to pay interest on short-term loans expir-
ing after 30 June 1998. Notwithstanding the re-
quest of a Member State, the Commission refused 
to postpone again the entry into force of the com-
munication, and initiated the procedure provided 
for in Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty against an Ital-
ian regional aid scheme which did not seem to 
comply with the new rules, as interpreted by the 
Commission. Other national regional draft 
schemes were notified, but their examination, for 
the time being, is still pending. 
4.1.9. Fisheries 
267. The guidelines for the examination of 
State aid to fisheries and aquaculture form the 
80 
(') Commission communication on subsidised short-term loans in 
agriculture (OJ C 44,16.2.1996, as interpreted by Commission let-
ter dated 19 December 1997 (SG(97)D/10801)). 
(
2) OJL 336, 23.12.1994. 
(') SG(97)D/10801. 
C) OJC44, 16.2.1996. 
basis on which the Commission has been able to 
assess both planned aid and aid which has existed 
since 1985. The guidelines were based to a large 
extent on the currently applicable structural leg-
islation, Council Regulation (EC) No 3699/93 of 
21 December 1993 laying down the criteria and 
arrangements regarding Community structural 
assistance in the fisheries and aquaculture sector 
and the processing and marketing of its prod-
ucts (
5). 
4.2. Specific sectors not subject to special 
rules 
4.2.1. Financial sector 
268. Following a request by the Amsterdam 
European Council of June 1997, and on the basis 
of answers to a questionnaire submitted to Mem-
ber States, the Commission drew up a report on 
'services of general economic interest in the 
banking sector'. The report was submitted to the 
Council meeting on economic and financial 
affairs on 23 November. 
269. The report examines whether, in the differ-
ent Member States, credit institutions render ser-
vices of general economic interest and whether 
the provision of a comprehensive and efficient fi-
nancial infrastructure is deemed to constitute such 
a service. The report also examines the necessity 
of an exception under Article 86(2) of the EC 
Treaty for any such tasks and the comparability of 
situations in the different Member States. 
The information received from the Member 
States suggests a distinction between three types 
of activity, which are consequently discussed in 
the report: 
(i) The provision of a comprehensive, efficient 
financial infrastructure for the entirety of 
their territories is considered by two Member 
States to be a service of general economic 
interest. However, no Member State claimed 
that such overall territorial coverage entails 
extra costs which would have to be compen-
sated by the public authorities. Only Sweden 
compensates a credit institution for the extra 
cost of operating branches in remote areas. 
(ii) Aid granted to certain credit institutions in 
order to perform special tasks on behalf of the 
(') SG(97)D/1080I. STATE AID 
State, e.g. granting social housing loans, 
might fall under Article 86(2) of the EC 
Treaty. An examination will take place on a 
case-by-case basis. 
(iii) Fund-raising activities of special institutions 
exclusively for non-commercial, non-com-
petitive public purposes should not pose 
problems under the competition rules of the 
Treaty if repercussions on commercial activ-
ities are avoided. 
On the basis of this report the Commission will 
examine in the future the application of Article 
86(2) of the EC Treaty to aid in the banking sec-
tor on a case-by-case basis. 
270. Regarding specific cases of State aid to the 
banking sector, the Commission approved supple-
mentary restructuring aid, estimated at between 
ECU 8 billion and ECU 15 billion (FRF 53 billion 
and FRF 98 billion), granted by France to Crédit 
Lyonnais (') in addition to the aid of ECU 6.8 bil-
lion (FRF 45 billion) and of some ECU 600 mil-
lion (FRF 4 billion) already granted in 1995 and 
1996. Such aid amounts are unique in the history 
of the Community. The aid was approved on con-
dition that Crédit Lyonnais reduce its balance 
sheet by ECU 47.26 billion (FRF 310 billion) in 
Europe and worldwide, over and above the reduc-
tions imposed on the bank in 1995, which would 
entail a total reduction in its balance sheet by more 
than a third since 31 December 1994. These com-
pensatory measures were considered all the more 
necessary since, in the banking sector, aid corre-
sponding to a capital injection relaxes the solven-
cy constraints to which other banks making losses 
and not receiving aid are subject, which con-
straints would normally oblige them, if their own 
funds did not exceed the solvency requirement, to 
reduce their liabilities and their activity. Crédit 
Lyonnais will also have to reduce the number of its 
branches in France to 1 850 by the year 2000. Last-
ly, the French Government has undertaken to pri-
vatise Crédit Lyonnais by October 1999, by means 
of an open, transparent and non-discriminatory 
procedure. 
277. On 29 July the Commission approved aid 
granted to Banco di Napoli (
2) by the Italian Gov-
ernment for its restructuring and privatisation. 
The estimated net cost to the State of this aid is 
somewhere between ECU 1.14 billion and ECU 
6.14 billion (ITL 2217 billion and ITL 11 895 bil-
lion) (the maximum amount of the State guaran-
tee). As a compensatory measure, the bank will 
have to sell or close 18 branches in addition to the 
already completed sales of 59 branches and seven 
subsidiaries or offices abroad which the Com-
mission took into account in assessing the aid's 
compatibility with the common market. 
4.2.2. Audiovisual sector 
272. During 1998, the Commission's depart-
ments attempted to set in place a framework 
within which complaints concerning the public 
financing of certain broadcasters in different 
Member States could be assessed. On 15 Sep-
tember the Court of First Instance found against 
the Commission under the Article 232 procedure 
for failing to fulfil its obligation to act under the 
Treaty (
3). The court proceedings were initiated 
in 1996 by Gestevision, a Spanish private broad-
caster which lodged a complaint against RTVE 
— the Spanish public broadcaster — and against 
the Spanish regional broadcasters in 1992. 
According to the judgment, the Commission 
should not have prolonged its preliminary inves-
tigation for such a long period without taking a 
position. The Commission is now required to 
take a position within a reasonable period and 
with due diligence. 
273. The attempt to develop a framework 
under which all pending cases could be assessed 
resulted in the presentation of a discussion paper 
to the Member States on 20 October. The major-
ity of Member States were against the adoption of 
guidelines and expressed a preference for a 
case-by-case approach. In parallel, the Commis-
sion departments held two public hearings with 
the private and public operators concerned (on 4 
and 18 December respectively) in order to obtain 
a more complete picture from an economic point 
of view of the issues involved. 
4.2.3. Cultural sector 
274. The Commission had the opportunity to 
apply Article 87(3)(d) in three cases where it con-
cluded that the aid measure in question served the 
(') OJ L 346, 31.12.1993, replaced on 20 November 1998 by (codi-
fied) Council Regulation (EC) No 2468/98 of 3 November 1998 
(OJL312, 20.11.1998). 
(
2) Case C-47/96(OJL22I, 8.8.1998). 
(
3) Case C-40/96, not yet published in the Official Journal. 
(
4) Case T-95/96 Gestevision Telecinco ν Commission, not yet 
reported.  81 purpose of promoting culture and heritage conser-
vation in a reasonable way. In decisions of 3 June, 
29 July and 25 November (') it confirmed its ap-
proach as already expressed in Cases N-32/97 
(Ireland) and N-917/96 (Denmark) to approve aid 
to the film industry in applying Article 87(3)(d) of 
the EC Treaty to a French and Dutch scheme to 
support the production of films. The level of aid is 
limited to 50 % of production costs. 
275. The derogation under Article 87(3)(d) 
also gives room for supporting the export of 
books. Unlike the film industry, book publishing 
and distribution in Europe is, in principle, not 
dependent on public support. The Commission 
authorised in June, in a case concerning aid to 
Coopérative d'Exportation, Livre Français 
(CELF) (
2), the granting of aid for the exporting 
of books to non-French-speaking countries, pro-
vided it is intended to offset the extra cost 
involved in handling small orders. In May 1993, 
the Commission did not raise any objections to 
the aid to CELF. This decision, however, was 
partly annulled by the Court of First Instance on 
the ground that, given the competition in the 
book market, the Commission had failed to fully 
analyse the impact of the aid on the common mar-
ket (
3). In its new decision, the Commission 
applied the cultural derogation. It concluded that 
this aid measure only pursues a cultural objective 
and does not support the other, commercial, 
activities of CELF. 
4.2.4. Energy sector 
276. Differences in excise duties on fossil fuel 
for cars may lead to a competitive imbalance 
among petrol stations close to State borders. In 
1997, the Dutch Government introduced an aid 
scheme to compensate for the disadvantage to the 
owners of 624 Dutch petrol stations on the border 
with Germany resulting from the increase in 
excise duty on light oil. The aid consists of a sub-
sidy, which is based on the quantity of light oil 
supplied. It decreases in proportion to the dis-
tance to the German border. The duration of the 
scheme is three years and a ceiling of ECU 100 
000 per service station will apply for this period. 
The Dutch Government therefore considers that 
the measure should fall under the de minimis rule. 
277. On 3 June, the Commission decided to 
initiate proceedings under Article 88(2) of the EC 
Treaty in respect of this scheme (
4). It has doubts 
whether the de minimis rule is applicable in this 
case (
5). Even if each service station could be 
considered a separate undertaking for the pur-
poses of the de minimis rule, the rule may not 
apply if the aid has an effect on trade and compe-
tition between Member States. In the present 
case, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the 
measure affects trade and competition with at 
least one Member State (Germany). 
D — Procedures 
2 78. Case law over the last year has been partic-
ularly rich as regards the procedural rules applica-
ble in the State aid field. The main developments 
have been in relation to the rights of third parties, 
the recovery of unlawful aid and the consequences 
for the validity of the administrative procedure of 
a judgment annulling a decision. 
1. Rights of third parties 
279. Given the essentially bilateral nature of 
the various procedures laid down in Article 93, 
which are based principally on a dialogue 
between the Member State concerned and the 
Commission, the rights which third parties are 
recognised as having in the State aid field are 
necessarily more restricted than their rights under 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Case law has 
shown that third-party rights are essentially rele-
vant in the context of the procedure under Article 
88(2). 
280. In a judgment given on 2 April (
6) the 
Court of Justice clarified the legal rules on com-
plaints which denounce national measures as 
State aid and which are lodged with the Com-
mission by third parties; in particular, the Court 
set out the extent of the Commission's obliga-
tions to investigate such complaints. 
First, the Court established the principle that the 
Commission is required, in the interests of sound 
administration of the basic Treaty rules on State 
aid, to conduct a diligent and impartial examina-
82 
( ' ) Cases N-3/98 and N-486/97, not yet published in the Official Jour-
nal. 
(
2) CaseC-39/96. 
(·') Case T-49/93 SIDE ν Commission (1995) ECR 11-2501. 
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tion of the complaints it receives, which may 
make it necessary for it to examine matters not 
expressly raised by the complainant. However, 
this principle does not imply that the Commis-
sion is under any obligation to examine of its own 
motion objections which the complainant would 
certainly have raised had it been aware of the 
information obtained by the Commission in the 
course of its investigation. 
Second, the Court confirmed that the Commis-
sion is not under any obligation to hear com-
plainants during its initial investigation into aid 
pursuant to Article 88(3) of the Treaty. 
281. Then, in joined Cases T-371/94 and 
T-394/94 ('), the Court of First Instance ruled that 
interested third parties within the meaning of 
Article 88(2) of the Treaty cannot enjoy the same 
rights to a fair hearing as those which individuals 
against whom proceedings have been instituted 
are recognised as having. The former have only 
the right to be involved in the administrative pro-
cedure to the extent appropriate in the light of the 
circumstances of the case. The extent of their 
rights to participate and be informed may there-
fore be limited, in particular when the amount of 
information in the Commission's possession is 
already relatively extensive, leaving outstanding 
only a small number of doubts likely to be dis-
pelled by information supplied by the third par-
ties concerned. 
Where this is the case, the Commission, while 
providing such parties with general information 
on the essentials of the planned aid, may con-
fine itself to concentrating, in its notice initiat-
ing the adversarial investigation procedure un-
der Article 88(2), on those aspects of the 
planned aid concerning which it still harbours 
doubts. 
282. In a judgment given on 15 September (
2) 
the Court of First Instance held that, once the 
Commission has terminated proceedings under 
Article 88(2) with a decision to approve aid sub-
ject to conditions, it is not entitled to depart from 
the scope ofthat initial decision without reinitiat-
ing the proceedings. It follows that, if one of the 
conditions to which approval of an aid measure 
was subject is not satisfied, the Commission may 
not normally adopt a decision derogating from 
that condition without reinitiating Article 88(2) 
proceedings and thus giving notice to the parties 
concerned to submit their comments, unless it is 
a relatively minor deviation from the initial con-
dition, leaving the Commission in no doubt as to 
whether the aid at issue is still compatible with 
the common market. 
283. The concept of party concerned within the 
meaning of Article 88(2) of the Treaty was 
defined more closely. In an order of 18 Febru-
ary (
3) the Court of First Instance recognised that 
organisations representing the workers of an 
undertaking which is receiving aid might, as 
interested parties, submit their comments on con-
siderations of a social nature which could be 
taken into account if appropriate by the Commis-
sion in its assessment of whether or not aid within 
the meaning of Article 88(1) is compatible with 
the common market. 
284. As regards the admissibility of actions for 
annulment of Commission decisions brought by 
interested third parties, the Court of First Instance 
held in Cases T-11/95 (
4) and T-189/97 (
5) that the 
fact that a third party is concerned by a case is not 
sufficient in itself for that party to be regarded as 
individually concerned in the same way as the 
addressee of the final decision. It follows from 
the definition given by the Court of Justice in the 
Intermitís judgment (
6) that the concept of parties 
concerned within the meaning of Article 88(2) of 
the Treaty covers an indeterminate group of nat-
ural and legal persons such that a third party's 
being concerned is not sufficient for it to be con-
cluded that it is individually concerned by a final 
decision within the meaning of the fourth para-
graph of Article 230. 
Consequently, in its order in Case T-189/97 (
7) 
the Court of First Instance held that organisations 
representing the workers of an undertaking 
which is receiving aid cannot claim on that basis 
to be individually concerned, within the meaning 
of the fourth paragraph of Article 230, by a neg-
ative final decision. 
285. In Case T-95/96 (
8) the Court of First In-
stance examined the conditions under which an 
(') British Airways and Others v Commission (1998) ECR 11-2405. 
(
2) Case T-140/95 Ryanair v Commission, not yet reported. 
C) Case T-189/97 Comité d'entreprise de la Société française de pro-
duction and Others v Commission ( 1998) ECR 11-335. 
(
4) BP Chemicals v Commission, not yet reported. 
(') See footnote 203. 
(
6) Case 323/82 Intermitís v Commission (1984) ECR 3809. 
(') See footnote 203. 
(") Gestevision Telecinco v Commission, not yet reported.  83 action for failure to act brought by a third party 
is admissible. The Court ruled that an action for 
failure to act brought by a complainant in re­
spect of the Commission's failure to adopt a de­
cision in response to the complaint is admissible 
if, the Commission having begun a preliminary 
investigation in accordance with the procedure 
under Article 88(3) of the Treaty, the com­
plainant is directly and individually concerned 
by the institution's failure to take any decision 
terminating that procedure. 
286. The implications for the rights of inter­
ested third parties of the requirement to provide 
a statement of reasons laid down in Article 253 
of the Treaty were also spelled out. In joined 
Cases T-371/94 and T-394/94 ('), the Court of 
First Instance found that, where the Commis­
sion authorises aid, the requirement to provide 
reasons is not determined solely on the basis of 
the interest which the Member State to which 
that decision is addressed may have in obtaining 
information. Thus, even though it is not re­
quired in its statement of reasons to discuss all 
the issues of fact and law raised by interested 
parties during the administrative procedure, the 
Commission must none the less take account of 
all the circumstances and all the relevant aspects 
of the case so as to make clear both to the Mem­
ber States and to the persons concerned the cir­
cumstances in which it has applied the Treaty. 
288. In a judgment given on 29 January (
4) the 
Court of Justice ruled that the authorities of a 
Member State may not plead that it is absolutely 
impossible for them properly to implement a 
Commission decision ordering them to recover 
unlawful aid without taking any step whatsoever 
to recover the aid from the undertakings in ques­
tion and without proposing to the Commission 
any alternative arrangements for implementing 
the decision which would enable the difficulties 
to be overcome. Although insuperable difficul­
ties may prevent a Member State from comply­
ing with its obligations under Community law, 
mere apprehension of such difficulties cannot 
justify a failure by a Member State to apply Com­
munity law correctly. 
289. In Case T-67/94 (
5) the Court of First 
Instance confirmed that it is not for the Member 
State concerned, but for the recipient undertak­
ing, in the context of proceedings before the pub­
lic authorities or before the national courts, to 
plead the existence of exceptional circumstances 
on the basis of which it had entertained legitimate 
expectations leading it to decline to repay the 
unlawful aid. Consequently, the Commission 
may not give as a reason for limiting in time a 
Member State's obligation to recover unlawful 
aid the fact that the contents of a national court's 
ruling were such as to give rise to a legitimate 
expectation on the part of the recipient of the aid 
that the latter was lawful. 
2. Recovery of aid 
287. At 20 % of all cases dealt with by the 
Commission, the number of State aid measures 
that have not been notified to the Commission is 
still too high. It is therefore significant that the 
Community courts have confirmed the Commis­
sion's policy of consistently ordering the recov­
ery of aid that has been granted in breach of the 
notification obligation and is incompatible with 
the common market. The Commission also 
examines, in line with the Deggendorf decision 
of the Court of Justice (
2), the cumulative effect 
of former unlawful aid and new aid, if the unlaw­
ful aid has not yet been repaid (
3). 
84 
(') See footnote 201. 
(
2) Case C-355/95 Ρ Germany and Textilwerke Deggendorf ν Com­
mission (1997) ECR 1-2549. 
(
3) Case C-44/97 Aid in favour of Magefesa, not yet published in the 
Official Journal. 
3. Consequences of a judgment 
annulling a decision 
290. Lastly, in a judgment of 12 November (
6) 
the Court of Justice clarified the consequences of 
one of its judgments partially annulling a final 
decision on the ground that the Commission had 
wrongly dispensed with examining the compati­
bility of an aid measure in the light of Article 
87(3). Since the investigation measures taken by 
the Commission as part of the procedure laid 
down in Article 88(2) of the Treaty allowed an 
exhaustive analysis to be made of the compati­
bility of the aid having regard to Article 87(3), the 
procedure for replacing the annulled decision 
could be resumed at that point with a fresh analy-
C) Case C-280/95 Commission ν Italy (1998) ECR 1-259. 
(
5) Ladbroke Racing ν Commission (1998) ECR II-1. 
(
6) Case C-415/96 Spain ν Commission, not yet reported. STATE AID 
sis of the investigation measures, the reliability of 
which had not been challenged. 
4. Application of the State aid rules by 
national courts 
297. Although the Commission has primary 
responsibility in the State aid field, national 
courts may, under various circumstances, also be 
called upon to rule on aid-related matters. The 
Commission has already drawn attention to the 
scope for action at national level, particularly as 
regards unlawful aid (')· 
(') Commission notice on cooperation between national courts and 
the Commission in the State aid field (OJ C 312, 23.11.1995). 
292. The main conclusion reached by a study 
on the practice of national courts commissioned 
by the Commission was that the number of State 
aid cases referred to national courts is very small. 
In some countries there has not been a single case 
yet. Moreover, most (76 %) of the 115 cases cov-
ered by the study did not involve actions brought 
by competitors; of those which were brought by 
competitors, only three yielded the result desired 
by the competitor. This state of affairs would 
appear to be due in particular, to a lack of trans-
parency as regards the rules of State aid law and 
thus a limited knowledge of them among national 
judges and lawyers. Since legal instruments exist 
at national level, better use should therefore be 
made of them. 
85 E — Statistics 
Figure 6 
Trend in the number of aid cases registered (other than in agriculture, fisheries, transport and 
coal) between 1994 and 1998 
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Figure 7 
Trend in the number of decisions taken by the Commission (other than in agriculture, fisheries, 
transport and coal) between 1994 and 1998 
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Figure 8 
Number of decision by Member State (other than in agriculture, fisheries, transport and coal) 
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A — Enlargement 
1. Pre-accession 
1.1. Implementing rules 
293. With a view to further completing the 
legal framework for relations between the Com-
munity and the 10 associated countries of central 
and eastern Europe (CEECs) in the field of com-
petition, two sets of implementing rules have 
been negotiated with the CEECs. The first con-
cerns the implementation of the competition pro-
visions of the Europe agreements applicable to 
undertakings. The second relates to the rules con-
cerning State aid. 
294. Implementing rules for the competition 
provisions applicable to undertakings have 
already been adopted for five CEECs, namely the 
Czech Republic ('), Poland (
2), the Slovak 
Republic (
3), Hungary (
4) and Bulgaria (
5). The 
Commission has presented its proposal to the 
Council for implementing rules for the three 
Baltic States and Romania. These are expected to 
be adopted in early 1999. The wording of the 
implementing rules is basically the same for all of 
the associated countries. They contain mainly 
procedural-type rules, i.e. rules regarding com-
petence to deal with cases, procedures for notifi-
cation of cases to the other party, consultation, 
comity and the exchange of information. 
295. On 24 June the EU-Czech Association 
Council approved implementing rules for State 
aid in the Czech Republic. It is the first associated 
country where such rules are now formally in 
force in the field of State aid. The implementing 
rules constitute a two-pillar system of State aid 
control. On the Community side, the Commis-
sion assesses the compatibility of State aid 
granted by EU Member States on the basis of the 
Community State aid rules. On the side of the 
Czech Republic, the Czech national monitoring 
authority is to monitor and review existing and 
(') Decision No 1/96 of the Association Council of 30 January 1996 
(OJL 31,9.2.1996). 
(
2) Decision No 1/96 of the Association Council of 16 July 1996 (OJ 
L208, 17.8.1996). 
(
3) Decision No 1/96 of the Association Council of 15 August 1996 
(OJL 295, 20.11.1996). 
C) Decision No 2/96 of the Association Council of 6 November 1996 
(OJL 295, 20.11.1996). 
(') Decision No 2/97 of the Association Council of 7 October 1997 
(OJL 15, 21.1.1998). 
new public aid granted by its country, on the basis 
of the same criteria as arise from the application 
of the Community State aid rules. The imple-
menting rules include procedures for consulta-
tion and problem solving, rules on transparency 
(i.e. the Czech Republic is to draw up and there-
after update an inventory of its aid programmes 
and individual aid awards), and rules on mutual 
exchange of information. 
296. Generally, the adoption and proper appli-
cation of implementing rules for State aid is, 
apart from wider policy considerations, also seen 
as an important step towards reducing any trade 
friction between the Community and the third 
country in question as it may, if properly imple-
mented, eliminate the need for either party to 
have recourse to action under the WTO Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM) to deal with subsidisation issues, e.g. 
the imposition of countervailing measures. 
1.2. Enhanced pre-accession strategy 
297. A major element of the enlargement 
process is the so-called enhanced pre-accession 
strategy which centres on accession partnerships 
and increased pre-accession aid. The accession 
partnership serves as a new single framework 
which covers in detail for each applicant the pri-
orities to be observed in adopting the Union 
acquis, or existing body of rules, and also the 
financial resources available for that purpose, in 
particular the Phare programme. Legislative 
alignment, enforcement and institution building 
in the field of competition are among the most 
important short-term (1998) and medium-term 
priorities which the Commission has identified in 
the different accession partnerships. The same 
applies to the so-called national programmes for 
the adoption of the acquis which were adopted by 
each associated country on the basis of the acces-
sion partnerships. 
1.3. Progress in alignment of competition 
rules 
298. The Commission agreed to report regu-
larly to the European Council on progress made 
by each of the candidate countries towards acces-
sion. The first progress reports for the 10 CEECs, 
Cyprus and Turkey were submitted at the end of 
1998. The reports take into consideration  89 progress since the delivery of the Commission 
opinions of 1997 (')· 
299. In the past year, most of the CEECs have 
taken decisive steps to adopt or prepare new leg-
islation, or amendments to existing legislation, in 
order to further align their legislation with Com-
munity law. This is certainly the case in the field 
of antitrust. For example, new competition acts 
came into force in Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia 
and Latvia. The competition authorities of the 
CEECs have also now gained some experience in 
the enforcement of the law. However, on several 
occasions the Commission has emphasised the 
need to further strengthen the CEEC competition 
authorities, in particular with regard to their 
investigative and fining powers, their indepen-
dence and their resources. 
300. In contrast to antitrust policy, the introduc-
tion of State aid control in the CEECs has proven 
to be much more controversial and difficult to 
bring about. While a number of countries have 
started introducing or preparing rules on the con-
trol of State aid, a lot of work remains to be done. 
The most urgent priority is to create transparency 
in the granting of State aid by establishing a State 
aid inventory of all existing direct and indirect aid. 
While some CEECs provided reports to the Com-
mission on their respective State aid schemes dur-
ing 1998, the Commission has generally been crit-
ical of the lack of a comprehensive picture of the 
State aid situation in most CEECs. 
301. A .second priority is the setting-up or 
strengthening of an independent State aid moni-
toring authority, and of a system for implementing 
this monitoring. Most of the CEECs have now es-
tablished such a monitoring authority. However, 
legal procedures and the necessary powers to en-
sure genuine control of new and existing State aid 
in these countries are still lacking. 
302. Finally, with respect to approximation of 
legislation, while certain countries have taken 
steps to lay down or prepare substantive and pro-
cedural rules in this field, the Commission has 
noted that they are generally lagging behind the 
level that is required for this stage in the run-up 
to accession. 
1.4. Technical assistance 
303. In view of these remaining shortcomings, 
technical assistance in the field of competition 
90  C) I997 Competition Report, point 323. 
remains an essential tool to prepare the candidate 
countries for accession. While it is for the candi-
date countries themselves to devote the necessary 
resources to focused and cost-efficient imple-
mentation of competition law, Community assis-
tance serves as a catalyst. Along with specific 
actions in the framework of the national Phare 
programmes, DGIV has pursued a proactive pol-
icy of further intensifying its contacts with the 
competition authorities of the CEECs and 
between those authorities. 
304. New electronic information links are in 
place which will intensify mutual exchange of 
information. Cooperation includes consultation 
on new policy developments. For example, the 
CEECs were consulted on the Commission's 
Green Paper on vertical restraints (both in writ-
ing and at an oral hearing). 
305. DG IV continued, with Phare, to support 
the organisation of multi-country technical assis-
tance programmes in the field of competition. In 
particular, joint training sessions for experienced 
and non-experienced competition officials from 
the candidate countries took place between 
December 1997 and January 1998 and between 
November and December 1998. These pro-
grammes include lectures by Commission 
experts and discussion on practical cases pre-
sented by the participants. 
306. Most of the candidate countries have 
established some form of working group struc-
ture with DG IV which facilitates informal and 
technical discussions at expert level on competi-
tion approximation, institution building and 
enforcement. These informal meetings, but also 
the numerous personal contacts between offi-
cials, have contributed to the enhancement of 
both the legal framework and the enforcement 
practice of the candidates' competition authori-
ties. In view of the problems regarding State aid 
described above, assistance will in the future be 
focused on the establishment of a State aid inven-
tory, regional aid maps and a proper framework 
for aid to sensitive sectors, and on the assessment 
of individual cases. 
307. The fourth Competition Conference of the 
CEECs and the European Commission took 
place on 25 and 26 May in Bratislava. The dele-
gations included high-level officials from the 
competition and State aid authorities of the 
CEECs and the Commission. The annual confer-
ence serves as a forum for the exchange of views 
and experience in the field of approximation of IV — INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITES 
legislation and enforcement. It also served to 
establish and strengthen professional contacts 
between officials responsible for competition in 
the Community and in the CEECs. 
2. Accession negotiations 
308. Following the opening of the Intergovern-
mental Conference on 30 March the screening 
exercise started on 3 April with the first multilat-
eral meeting involving all of the candidate coun-
tries. Between 9 and 19 October, six candidate 
countries, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus, partici-
pated in the screening of the competition chapter, 
i.e. the analytical examination of the acquis in the 
competition field. The objective of the exercise 
was to inform — during a day of multilateral 
screening — the applicants fully about the Com-
munity acquis and — at subsequent bilateral 
meetings — to identify, within each applicant 
country, possible substantive problems that could 
arise during the accession negotiations proper. 
309. On 11 May a multilateral screening meet-
ing on competition policy took place with five oth-
er countries, namely Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania and Slovakia. The screening of the Arti-
cle 86 directives, in particular in the field of 
telecommunications, took place between 28 April 
and 7 May for the first six countries, and on 23 June 
for the other five countries, as part of the screening 
of the entire telecommunications chapter. 
Β — Bilateral cooperation 
1. North America 
1.1. United States 
1.1.1. Implementation of the 1991 
cooperation agreement (') 
310. The Commission adopts each year a 
report to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment on its cooperation activities with the US 
under the 1991 agreement. There have been three 
such reports up to now: 
— the first covered the period from 10 April 
1995 (date of entry into force of the 1991 
agreement) to 30 June 1996 (
2); 
— the second covered the period from 1 July 
1996 to 31 December 1996 (
3); 
— and the third covered the period from 1 Janu-
ary 1997 to 31 December 1997 (
4). 
During 1998 the Commission cooperated with the 
US DoJ and the US FTC in a substantial number of 
cases. Beyond the specific case-related benefits 
arising out of this intensive cooperation for both 
competition authorities and private parties in-
volved (in terms of a more rapid and coherent 
management of the case on both sides of the At-
lantic), the close daily contact between case teams 
in the Commission (DG IV) and the US DoJ and 
FTC is conducive to mutual confidence building 
and trust, accrued knowledge of the substantive 
and procedural rules of the partner, convergence 
by example and, finally, the development of 'best 
practices' in all phases of the procedure. 
311. One of the most interesting transatlantic 
cooperation cases so far involved the World-
Com/MCI merger, which received clearance in 
July 1998. The notified merger plan did not raise 
concerns about transatlantic cable capacity hold-
ing in the same acute form as the proposed 
BT/MCI merger (scrutinised by the Commission 
in 1996 and finally abandoned by the parties), but 
it did raise issues regarding competition among 
providers of Internet access and connectivity. 
The Commission's investigations, and negotia-
tions of remedies, were undertaken in parallel 
with the examination of the case by the US DoJ. 
The process was marked by a considerable level 
of cooperation between the two authorities, 
including exchanges of views on the analytical 
method to be used, coordination of information 
gathering and joint meetings and negotiations 
with the parties. The timetable for divestiture 
afforded the parties the opportunity, subject to 
clearance from the US DoJ and the Commission, 
to agree a sale in advance of, but conditional on, 
(') Agreement between the European Communities and the Govern-
ment of the United States of America regarding the application of 
their competition laws (OJ L 95, 27.4.1995. as corrected by OJ 
L. 131, 15.6.1995). 
(
2) Adopted on 8 October 1996. C0M(96) 479 final; see 1996 Com-
petition Report, points 299 to 311. 
(■') Adopted on 4 Julyl997, COM(97) 346 final; see 1996 Competi-
tion Report, points 312 to 318. 
(
4) Adopted on 3 September 1998. C0M(I998) 510 final; see 1997 
Competition Report, points 317 to 327.  91 the merger. Under the terms of their undertakings 
submitted the parties sought the consent of the 
two competition authorities to the proposed 
buyer of the divested activities. The two authori-
ties continued to cooperate until the undertakings 
were fully implemented and exchanged formal 
letters to this effect in accordance with the 1991 
EC-US agreement. Remedies included the possi-
bility for the Commission, in appropriate circum-
stances, to appoint a trustee to oversee compli-
ance with the undertakings and, if necessary, to 
ultimately take control of the sale process (i.e. 
finding a buyer and drawing up an agreement). 
312. Another example of successful EU-US 
cooperation was the Dresser/Haliburton merger 
cleared by the Commission in July. The merger 
involved two US-based companies. Halliburton 
is one of the largest energy services companies in 
the world. Dresser, which is active in the same 
range of activities, is smaller in size and more 
specialised. The parties had overlapping activi-
ties in the oilfield services industry, in particular 
in drilling fluids, directional drilling services and 
completion products and services. Within the lat-
ter two segments the combined market shares 
were not substantial, whereas there are a number 
of competitors with comparable strength and a 
number of customers with effective countervail-
ing buyer power. As far as the market for drilling 
fluids was concerned, however, the concentration 
would result in significant market shares. The 
parties had already negotiated a divestiture plan 
with the US DoJ, as a result of which the market 
overlap would be removed. On this basis, the 
Commission did not have any further concerns 
about the drilling fluids market. In this respect 
the case is an interesting example of coordinated 
merger review procedures in the EU and the US 
and, to some extent, of work allocation between 
the two authorities. 
313. Other cases where close transatlantic co-
operation occurred were Price Waterhouse/Coop-
ers & Lybrand, Exxon/Shell, Daimler-Benz/ 
Chrysler, Seagram/Polygram, Hercules/Betz 
Dearborn, Marsh McLennan/Sedgwick and 
BP/Amoco. Details on the substance of these cas-
es are given in Part II of the report. (Case-related 
EC-US cooperation is further discussed in detail 
in the fourth report to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament for 1998 (')· 
1.1.2. Adoption of the 1998 EC-US positive 
comity agreement (
2) 
314. On the basis of a mandate from the Coun-
cil, the Commission negotiated with the United 
States an agreement which strengthens the rele-
vant provisions of the 1991 agreement as regards 
the exercise of positive comity. The product of 
these negotiations, the 1998 EU-US positive 
comity agreement, was signed in Washington and 
entered into force on 4 June. It spells out more 
clearly the circumstances in which a request for 
positive comity will normally be made and the 
manner in which such requests should be treated. 
In contrast to the 1991 agreement, the EU rules 
on merger control are in principle not within the 
scope of the 1998 agreement due to EC and US 
merger legislation, which would not allow a 
deferral or suspension of action as envisaged by 
the agreement. 
1.2. Canada 
315. Following negotiations, the draft compe-
tition cooperation agreement between the Euro-
pean Communities and the Canadian Govern-
ment was finalised in May of this year. On 4 June 
the Commission adopted a proposal for the joint 
adoption by the Council of Ministers and the 
Commission of a decision to conclude the agree-
ment. The European Parliament has now 
approved the Commission proposal. It is 
expected that the agreement will shortly be 
adopted by the Council and Commission, and 
that it will be signed and come into effect during 
1999. In the meantime, the Commission and the 
Canadian Competition Bureau will discuss bilat-
erally the practical logistics of future cooperation 
between the authorities within the framework of 
the agreement. 
316. The proposed agreement is designed to fa-
cilitate increased cooperation between the Euro-
pean Communities and Canada with respect to the 
enforcement of their respective competition rules. 
An increasing number of cases are being exam-
ined by both competition authorities, and there is 
consequently a growing recognition of the impor-
tance, on the one hand, of avoiding conflicting de-
cisions and, on the other, of coordinating enforce-
92  (') Not yet published. 
(
2) Agreement between the European Communities and the Govern-
ment of the United States of America on the application of posi-
tive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws 
(OJL 173, 18.6.1998). IV — INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITES 
ment activities to the extent that this is considered 
mutually beneficial by both parties. 
317. In substance, the proposed agreement is 
very similar to the one entered into between the 
EU and the US in 1991. Essentially, it provides 
for (i) the reciprocal notification of cases under 
investigation by either authority, where they may 
affect the important interests of the other party; 
(ii) the possibility of coordination by the two 
authorities of their enforcement activities, and of 
rendering assistance to each other; (iii) the possi-
bility for one party to request the other to take 
enforcement action (positive comity), and for one 
party to take into account the important interests 
of the other party in the course of its enforcement 
activities (traditional comity); and (iv) the 
exchange of information between the parties, 
while not affecting either party's confidentiality 
obligations with respect to such information. 
2. Other countries 
2.1. Japan 
318. The Commission finalised a new list of 
proposals for further deregulation in Japan. The 
list included a series of proposals for deregulation 
in the area of competition. The new package was 
given to Japan on 12 October during an EU-Japan 
ministerial meeting in Tokyo. The proposals were 
also discussed with Japan at a high-level mission 
to Tokyo between 3 and 6 November. 
319. During the annual bilateral meeting 
between the Commission and the Japanese Fair 
Trade Commission (JFTC) in Brussels on 24 
November, positive developments in the area of 
deregulation of competition policy were 
acknowledged (elimination of most exemptions 
and exceptions from Japanese competition rules, 
increased budgetary resources and staff for the 
JFTC). 
320. However, the Commission repeated its 
main proposals to the Japanese Government for: 
• competition advocacy by the JFTC in gov-
ernment measures, 
• JFTC review of existing and new administra-
tive guidance, 
• tougher investigative action by the JFTC, par-
ticularly in the distribution area, 
• deterrent sanctions for antitrust infringe-
ments, and 
• better chances for victims to seek injunctive 
judicial relief and damages in court. 
321. The OECD recommendation, issued in 
1986 and last revised in 1995 ('), establishes so 
far the basic framework for cooperation between 
the Commission and the JFTC. In the period from 
1993 to 1998 the Commission made 30 notifica-
tions to the JFTC and received from the JFTC 7 
notifications in return. This would indicate that 
the Commission deals with more cases involving 
Japanese companies or other Japanese interests, 
whereas the JFTC deals with fewer cases involv-
ing European companies or other European inter-
ests. In turn this could be explained by the fact 
that European firms have more difficulties pene-
trating the Japanese market, than Japanese firms 
the EU market. 
In the Nordion case, the Commission cooperat-
ed with the JFTC. Following Nordion's under-
taking to abandon the exclusivity clauses con-
tained in its sales contracts with European cus-
tomers, the Commission decided to suspend a 
proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
against Nordion for abuse of a dominant posi-
tion in the market for the production and sale of 
molybdenum 99 (Mo-99), a base product for ra-
diopharmaceuticals used in nuclear medicine. 
The enquiry carried out in Japan by the JFTC 
led to identical results for the Japanese market. 
The JFTC adopted a recommendation request-
ing Nordion to put an end to the exclusivity 
clauses tying Japanese customers. Nordion ac-
cepted the JFTC recommendation and, thus, the 
Japanese competition authority issued the for-
mal decision on this case in September 1998. 
The final decision has the same content as the 
recommendation. 
2.3. Mediterranean countries 
322. Agreements have already been concluded 
with Tunisia, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian 
Authority. Others are being negotiated with Alge-
ria, Lebanon, Egypt and Syria. The provisions on 
competition contain clear commitments aimed at 
bringing the competition policies of the countries 
(') Revised recommendation of the Council concerning Cooperation 
between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices affect-
ing International Trade, 27 and 28 July 1995, C(95)l30/final.  93 concerned into line with the Community arrange-
ments. A first conference bringing together repre-
sentatives of the Community and of the national 
competition authorities of the Member States and 
of the Mediterranean countries was held this year 
in Tunis. Only Tunisia and Algeria have asked for 
technical assistance. As regards Tunisia, a prelim-
inary report identifying a technical assistance pro-
gramme was drawn up in September. It is being 
studied by the Tunisian authorities. 
323. A Commission communication on 'the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the single 
market' (COM(1998) 538 final of 23 September 
1998) proposes, among other things, cross-sector 
action in the competition field to promote coop-
eration and technical assistance. 
2.4. Latin America 
324. Ever since there has been a comprehen-
sive framework of agreements with the coun-
tries of Latin America, the Commission's strate-
gy has been one of strengthening relations with 
groups of countries (Mercosur, the Andean 
Community and the Central American isthmus). 
In this connection, specific cooperation actions 
have been initiated, namely compilation of the 
competition laws of the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the drawing-up of a 
list of competition authorities and institutions to 
facilitate contact between those responsible for 
implementing competition policy and the busi-
ness community, and publication of a Boletín 
Latinoamericano de Competencia, which is dis-
tributed through the Internet ('). 
325. The Commission has started negotiations 
with Mexico with a view to introducing free trade 
arrangements. In the interim agreements of 1997 
it is stipulated that the European Community and 
Mexico will have cooperation machinery at their 
disposal which will extend to technical coopera-
tion. 
326. In recent years there has been a strength-
ening of relations between DG IV and the com-
petition authorities of the Mercosur countries — 
Argentina and Brazil in particular — and of 
Chile, which has an association agreement with 
Mercosur. A comparative study has been made of 
the laws of Mercosur, Chile and the European 
94 
(') These documents are available on the Internet at the following 
address: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/intcma/other.htm. 
Community, and it has proved very useful as a 
means of gaining an insight into the position of, 
and problems facing, these countries when it 
comes to developing a comprehensive legal 
framework in the competition sphere. 
327. The prospect of the possible opening of 
liberalisation negotiations with Mercosur and 
Chile is another major factor militating in favour 
of establishing a cooperation framework. In prin-
ciple, the development and effective application 
of competition rules in Mercosur ought to afford 
firms operating in this market greater legal cer-
tainty. In a recent communication to the Council, 
the Commission indicates that the negotiations 
will also cover competition rules, including 
machinery for cooperation and coordination 
between the authorities responsible for their 
implementation. 
2.5. Russia, Ukraine and the other NIS 
328. The partnership and cooperation agree-
ments (PCAs) which the EU has concluded with 
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and most of the other 
former Soviet Republics contain — to a greater 
or lesser extent — a commitment by these coun-
tries to move towards an approximation of their 
competition and State aid legislation with that of 
the Community. Although progress is slow, the 
joint Committees established under the PCAs 
with Russia and Ukraine are expected to set up 
subcommittees during the first half of 1999 to 
deal with competition and State aid. A number of 
Tacis projects, with the task of providing relevant 
expertise, are also being undertaken. 
329. In the wake of the economic turmoil expe-
rienced by Russia this year, the State Anti-
monopoly Committee was integrated into a new 
ministry incorporating a range of diverse compe-
tencies. It is not yet clear what implications this 
will have for competition law enforcement in the 
Russian Federation. 
C — Multilateral cooperation 
1. WTO: Trade and competition policy 
330. The European Community has taken the 
initiative of putting competition on the interna-
tional agenda. The Commission communication 
of June 1996 inspired the Singapore ministerial IV — INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITES 
meeting to set up a WTO working group on the 
interaction between trade and competition policy. 
557. Under the guidance of its chairman, Pro-
fessor Jenny, the group has attracted a remarkably 
high degree of interest and participation. This is 
reflected in the large number of submissions pre-
sented by WTO members and in the quality and 
openness of the discussions held on the different 
items on its agenda. Particularly noteworthy has 
been the active participation of developing coun-
tries, many of which have made presentations on 
their experiences relating to the introduction and 
enforcement of competition law. The group has 
been remarkably free of ideological controversies 
or North-South divisions. Differences of opinion 
about the scope of the group's mandate have not 
prevented a substantive discussion of the various 
issues raised by members. 
332. The discussions have been essentially 
analytical in nature. The points on which there 
appears to be a large degree of consensus include: 
• the need to proceed in parallel with a process 
of trade liberalisation, elimination of unnec-
essary regulations and a strengthening of 
competition law and policy; 
• the importance, from the development point 
of view, of adopting a competition policy as 
part of the process of market-oriented reform; 
• the increasing importance of international 
cooperation to address effectively the interac-
tion between trade and competition policies. 
333. The group has also made considerable 
progress in identifying those elements of competi-
tion law and policy which may be of particular rel-
evance for the multilateral trading system. These 
include (a) the type of anticompetitive practices 
subject to competition law disciplines; (b) the ex-
tent of sectoral or regulatory derogations from the 
application of competition law; and (c) mecha-
nisms for enforcement, including the role of ad-
ministrative authorities and the courts. 
334. There is a general recognition that certain 
types of anticompetitive practices by business 
can create barriers to entry or otherwise upset the 
equality of competitive opportunities. It is also 
generally acknowledged that competition and 
trade can be significantly affected by regulatory 
policies, the activities of enterprises with exclu-
sive or special rights, and by a wide array of trade 
policy measures. 
335. The work in the group was confined to an 
educational process and the group will continue 
this exploratory work into 1999. The WTO wi 11 al-
so have to answer the question whether there is a 
political will among its members to go ahead and 
open negotiations in 1999 on the establishment of 
a multilateral framework of competition rules. 
336. In April the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body adopted the final report of the GATT panel 
regarding access to the Japanese market for pho-
tographic film and paper. The panel ruling dis-
missed the US claims as they had failed to estab-
lish a causal link between measures adopted by 
the Japanese Government and an upsetting of the 
competitive relationship between domestic and 
imported products. The Kodak/Fuji panel was 
established at the request of the United States. 
The EU intervened as a third party in view of its 
economic interest in the case. 
337. The issue of whether anticompetitive 
practices have a negative impact on trade falls 
outside the scope of current WTO rules. Accord-
ingly the panel did not pass judgment on this and 
focused exclusively on whether nullification of 
trade benefits could be attributed to measures 
taken by the Japanese Government, but in this 
case there were many competition issues which 
would have been addressed in a more satisfactory 
way within a competition law framework. 
338. In this connection, Sir Leon Brittan, Euro-
pean Commission Vice-President, and Mr Karel 
Van Miert, Commissioner responsible for com-
petition, said that 'The adoption of the report 
clearly illustrates the need to supplement the cur-
rent framework of WTO rules with a WTO 
framework of competition rules'. 
2. OECD, Unctad 
339. The Commission played an active part in 
the work of the Committee of Competition Law 
and Policy of the OECD, especially in the round 
tables organised in 1998 (positive comity, insur-
ance, procurement markets, relationship between 
regulators and competition authorities, boycott, 
broadcasting and buying power). The recom-
mendation on hardcore cartels, adopted by the 
Committee in May, is also of particular interest. 
This document seeks to strengthen the effective-
ness and efficiency of members' law enforcement 
against hardcore cartels by eliminating or reduc- 95 ing statutory exceptions that create gaps in the 340. The Commission also played an active 
coverage of competition law, and by removing part in the work of Unctad in the area of compe-
tile legal restrictions that deny competition agen- tition policy and in particular in the Expert Meet-
cies the authorisation to provide investigative ing on Competition Law and Policy which met 
assistance to foreign competition agencies. from 29 to 31 July. 
. 
96 
• V — OUTLOOK FOR 1999 
1. Legislative and regulatory activities 
341. The coming year will see the Commission 
giving further thought to refocusing its depart-
ments' efforts on cases of manifest interest to the 
Community. Despite the hopes founded on the 
new provisions on vertical restraints, the ineffec-
tiveness of the first refocusing measures adopted 
in 1997 will induce the Commission to take fresh 
steps to ensure that its legal instruments and 
resources are geared more closely to present 
needs and the challenges ahead. 
342. The Commission will have to implement 
the new arrangements regarding vertical restraints 
of competition. Regulation No 19/65/EEC and 
Article 4(2) of Regulation No 17 should be 
amended in 1999. The Commission will then get 
down to drafting the new exemption regulation 
and guidelines on vertical restraints, which will 
probably not be ready for adoption before 2000. 
The Commission is also likely to adopt a new 
notice on commercial agents. 
343. The process of modernising Community 
competition law is set to continue and the Com-
mission is considering proposing a review of 
Regulation No 17, which lays down detailed 
rules for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty. The proposal should be the high point 
of the modernisation exercise. 
344. After a record year for fines, the Commis-
sion is considering reviewing in the light of the 
experience gained some of the provisions of the 
guidelines on setting fines so as to correct certain 
aspects deemed not to accord with the objectives 
pursued. 
345. In the merger control field, the Commis-
sion is contemplating adopting a new notice on 
ancillary restraints inasmuch as the existing one 
dates back to 1990 and is no longer entirely con-
sistent with current practice. A notice on reme-
dies making it possible to remove the Commis-
sion's doubts about the compatibility of a notified 
operation with the common market is also to be 
adopted next year. 
346. The Commission will continue its work 
on drawing up Community instruments in the 
State aid field, in particular notices designed to 
increase transparency and simplify the monitor-
ing of cases of minor importance. It thus intends 
to adopt two block exemption regulations, one on 
small and medium-sized enterprises and the other 
on training aid. The guidelines on employment 
aid are to be reviewed in 1999. 1999 should also 
see the formal adoption of the procedural regula-
tion following the reaching of agreement on it in 
principle at the Council meeting of industry min-
isters on 16 November. 
2. International field 
347. In the international field the Commission 
will continue its policy of bilateral and multilat-
eral cooperation with competition authorities. 
With a view to enlargement of the Union the Com-
mission will concentrate on fostering a competi-
tion culture in the countries of central and eastern 
Europe. It will be especially vigilant regarding the 
effective application of competition rules in these 
countries. It will renew its call for an efficient 
supervisory system for State aid to be set up as 
quickly as possible. In this connection it will con-
tinue its work on drawing up guidelines for State 
aid in these regions which will take account of the 
special circumstances of economies in transition. 
As part of its bilateral cooperation with the coun-
tries of North America, the Commission will 
apply itself to implementing the EU-US positive 
comity agreement, and it will support adoption of 
the draft cooperation agreement with Canada. 
In the multilateral cooperation sphere it will con-
tinue to participate actively in the work of the 
WTO on the interaction between trade and com-
petition. 
3. Supervisory activities 
348. The Commission intends to redouble its 
efforts in 1999 to promote competition in the 
European Community so as to ensure the suc-
cessful introduction of the euro. This will 
involve, among other things, waging a ruthless 
campaign against the emergence of cartelisation 
phenomena which might be seen in some 
old-established industries as a means of putting 
off the evil day when cost cutting and restructur-
ing have to be carried out following the inevitable 
boost to competition caused by the euro's intro-
duction. The Commission will therefore attach 
particular importance to the formation and oper-
ation of its anti-cartel unit, which already has a 
number of cases in its in-tray. It will nevertheless 
remain vigilant in its other areas of activity,  97 including that of the monitoring of abuses of 
dominant positions. It even intends adding to its 
corpus of decisions in such new sectors as the 
environment, sport and the professions, where 
major cases are in the pipeline. Important deci-
sions are awaited in the financial, data processing 
and air transport sectors. 
349. As far as merger control is concerned, the 
Commission does not expect the number of cases 
notified to stabilise in view of, firstly, the world-
wide restructuring drives that are taking place in 
a number of industries and, secondly, the impact 
of the introduction of the single currency in 
Europe on 1 January 1999. It expects to receive 
between 230 and 250 notifications in 1999. 
350. The success of the liberalisation policy 
will depend on a strict application of Community 
competition law. The Commission will have to 
ensure that the liberalisation directives are duly 
transposed into national law and that their provi-
sions are applied by Member States in accor-
dance with Article 86. It will pay particular atten-
tion to monitoring the implementation of full 
competition in telecommunications markets, act-
ing in conjunction with national regulatory 
authorities and, if necessary, national competi-
tion authorities. It will also closely monitor 
implementation of the postal services directive. 
Lastly, after the adoption of the liberalisation 
directives in the energy sector (first stage for 
electricity markets in February 1999), it will 
apply itself to rendering effective the application 
of the competition rules to this sector, which is to 
be gradually opened up to competition. 
351. Energy sector liberalisation will also have 
an impact on the number of State aid cases inves-
tigated by the Commission. 
352. An important step in the field of aid policy 
will be the implementation of the procedural regu-
lation. This instrument, which makes the proce-
dural rules more transparent, should improve 
compliance with them. It also provides the Com-
mission with new weapons in its fight against un-
lawful aid measures and the misuse of aid. 
The fall in the number of new aid cases in 1998 
was probably temporary and cyclical. The year 
1999 should see numerous notifications of aid 
measures linked to the new regional maps or to 
training aid. 
Lastly, the Commission intends to continue pur-
suing its policy of firmness towards unlawful aid, 
as attested to in 1998 by the record number of 
negative decisions. 
98 ANNEX — CASES DISCUSSED IN THE COMPETITION REPORT 
1. Articles 81, 82 and 86 
Case 
ACEA 
Stainless steel 
Brussels Airport 
Cologne/Bonn Airport 
Düsseldorf Airport 
Frankfurt/Main Airport 
Hamburg Airport 
Stuttgart Airport 
Alpha Flight Services/Aéroports de Paris (ADP) 
Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli 
dello Stato (AAMS) 
Atlas/Global One 
Automec 
British Interactive Broadcasting (BIB) 
British Airways and American Airlines 
British Sugar, Tate & Lyle, Napier Brown 
and James Budgett 
Cartonboard 
Cement 
Pre-insulated pipes 
EACEM 
EUCAR 
Inmarsat 
IRE/Nordion 
KLM and Northwest 
Kodak 
Lufthansa, SAS and United Airlines 
P&I Clubs 
Beams 
Reductions in piloting tariffs 
REIMS II 
Sabena/Austrian Airlines/Swissair and Delta 
Air Lines 
SNCF/Cégétel 
Télévision Par Satellite (TPS) 
Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement (TACA) 
Ferry services between Greece and Italy 
Uniworld 
Valpak 
Van den Bergh Foods 
Verbändevereinbarung 
Volkswagen 
Publication 
OJL 100, 1.4.1998 
OJL 216, 1995 
OJL 173, 14.1.1998 
OJL 72, 11.3.1998 
30.10.1998 
30.10.1998 
OJL230, 18.8.1998 
OJL 252, 12.9.1998 
OJC322, 21.10.1998 
OJL 239, 30.7.1998 
OJL 284, 19.10.1998 
OJL24, 30.1.1999 
OJC 185, 18.5.1997 
OJLC 239, 30.7.1998 
OJL 301. 1997 
OJC371, 1.12.1998 
OJC293, 22.9.1998 
OJL 246,4.9.1998 
OJL 124, 23.4.1998 
Point 
131 
3, 65, box 3 
110 
Box 4 
Box 4 
72 
Box 4 
Box 4 
72 
70 
Box 5 
28 
96, 98,99 
101-103 
Box 3 
Box 3 
165 
Box 3 
103 
132 
90 
74 
104 
336 
101 
116-119 
Box 3 
110 
93 
104 
88 
96 
73, 105 
65 
Box 5 
133 
74 
127 
69 
2. Merger control 
Case 
Agfa-Gevaert/Du Pont 
Allianz/AGF 
Anglo American Corporation/Lonrho 
Bertelsmann, Kirch and Premiere 
Publication 
IP/98/148 
IP/98/419 
IP/98/477 
Point 
153 
146 
Box 5 
96, 142, 155  99 100 
Boeing/MDD 
BP/Amoco 
BT/AT&T 
Canal+/CDPQ/BankAmerica 
Daimler-Benz/Chrysler 
Deutsche Telekom/BetaResearch 
Dresser/Haliburton 
Enso/Stora 
Exxon/Shell 
Gencor/Lonrho 
Hercules/Betz Dearborn 
Hoffmann-La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim 
ITS/Signode/Titan 
Kali und Salz 
KPMG/Ernst & Young 
Krauss-Maffei/Wegmann 
LHZ/Carl Zeiss 
Marsh McLennan/Sedgwick 
Owens-Illinois/BTR Packaging 
Pakhoed/Van Ommeren 
Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand 
Saint-Gobain/Wacker-Chemie/NOM 
Samsung/AST Research Inc. (AST) 
Seagram/Polygram 
Skanska/Scancem 
Telia/Telenor/Schibsted 
Unichem/Unifarma 
Veba/Degussa 
Vendex/KBB 
Wienerberger/Cremer und Breuer 
Wolters Kluwer/Reed Elsevier 
Worldcom/MCI 
IP/98/1106 
IP/98/1062 
IP/98/696 
IP/98/103 
PRES/98/381 
IP/98/1022 
IP/98/648 
IP/98/870 
IP/98/121 
IP/98/132 
IP/98/555 
IP/98/933 
IP/98/931 
IP/98/454 
IP/98/166 
IP/98/824 
IP/98/982 
IP/98/742 
IP/97/1076 
IP/98/494 
IP/98/51 
IP/98/230 
IP/98/213 
Box 5 
313 
138 
Box 7 
313 
96, 141, 155 
312 
148, 159, 163 
313 
Box 5, 149 
313 
152, 163 
158 
140, 147, 149, 175, 179 
138, 145, 150 
169 
138 
313 
161 
162 
145, 149,313 
Box 5 
180 
313 
165 
Box 7 
170 
163 
168 
138 
138, 154 
142, 164,311 
3. State aid 
Case 
Aid for the construction of a hydrogen 
peroxide factory 
Air Belgium 
Air France 
Alitalia 
Annulment of a final decision, Spain 
AutoEuropa 
Tauern motorway in Austria 
Banco di Napoli 
Publication 
OJL 171, 17.5.1998 
Not yet published 
OJC 208,4.7.1998 
OJC 198,24.6.1998 
Not yet published 
Point 
221 
258 
256 
254 
237 
243 
261 
271 
Biotec Biologische 
Naturverpackungen GmbH 
Brilén SA 
Brittany Ferries 
British Airways 
BP Chemicals 
Case di Cura Riunite 
OJC 219, 15.7.1998 
OJC 199,25.5.1998 
Not yet published 
OJC 149, 15.5.1998 
214 
248 
259 
256 
201 
197 ANNEX — CASES DISCUSSED IN THE COMPETITION REPORT 
Chambre syndicale des entreprises de transport 
de fonds et valeurs (Sytraval) and Brink's 
Channel Tunnel rail link 
Chantiers de l'Atlantique/Renaissance Financial 
Cityflyer Express 
Coal industry in Germany (1997)  OJL 324,2.12.1998 
Coal industry in Germany (1998)  Not yet published 
Coal industry in Spain  OJL 303, 3.6.1998 
Comité d'entreprise de la Société française 
de production and others 
Commend 
Coopérative d'Exportation, Livre Français (CELF) 
Cordex SA  OJC 207, 3.7.1998 
Crédit Lyonnais  OJL 221, 8.8.1998 
CTRL 
Dutch petrol stations on the border with Germany OJ C 307, 7.10.1998 
EDF  Not yet published 
English Partnerships scheme 
Fiat Mezzogiorno  OJL 117, 13.5.1993 
French and Dutch film industry  Not yet published 
ESF Feralpi  Not yet published 
Gas distribution in Denmark  Not yet published 
German development aid to Indonesia  Not yet published 
Germany and Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH 
Gestevision Telecinco SA  Not yet published 
Green electricity  Not yet published 
Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato  Not yet published 
Intermills 
Irish corporation tax  OJ C 395, 18.12.1998 
Italian regional aid scheme 
Kiener Deponie Bachmanning, Austria  OJC 201, 27.6.1998 
KNP Leykam  OJC 296,24.9.1998 
Kvaerner Warnow Werft  Not yet published 
Ladbroke Racing Ltd 
LDV Ltd  Not yet published 
Lenzing Lyocell  OJC 9, 13.1.1999 
Lift GmbH  Not yet published 
Magefesa  Not yet published 
Martinair 
280 
3,260 
234 
201 
240,241 
240,241 
236 
283 
216 
275 
247 
3,270 
260 
276 
204 
200 
245 
274 
235 
205 
233 
287 
272 
222 
196 
284 
192,210 
266 
199 
80,214 
231 
208 
244 
198 
229 
209 
257 
MTW-Schiffswerft and Volkswerft Stralsund  SEC( 1998) 71 final and SEC( 1998) 1313 final 231 -233 
Non-fossil fuel obligation for renewables (NFFO) Not yet published  212 
OcéNV 
Olympic Airways 
Ponsal 
Preussag Stahl AG 
Publicly owned shipyards in Spain 
Recovery of aid 
Spanish scheme to assist the purchase 
of industrial vehicles 
Flemish Region 
Residents of the Canary and Balearic islands 
RTVE 
Ryanair Ltd 
OJC 270,29.8.1998 
Not yet published 
Not yet published 
Not yet published 
Not yet published 
214 
255 
202 
203 
231 
189,287 
262 
211 
257 
272 
202  101 Acquisition of Saarbergwerke GmbH and 
Anthrazit GmbH by Ruhrkohle AG 
Santana Motor SA 
Saxonylon Textil GmbH 
Seat SA 
Sican 
SNIACE SA 
Sunair 
Road haulage and intermodality in Italy 
Transmediterránea 
Viscido and others v Ente Poste Italiane 
Preussag  Not yet published 
OJL 6, 10.1.1997 
Not yet published 
OJL 88,9.4.1996 
OJC 307,7.10.1998 
Not yet published 
OJC211, 7.7.1998 
240 
245 
249 
245 
215 
250 
258 
261 
259 
206 
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